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Abstract 
Abstract 
Active Security Vulnerability Notification and Resolution 
Abdulaziz Ibrahim Alayed 
The early version of the Internet was designed for connectivity only, without the 
consideration of security, and the Internet is consequently an open structure. Networked 
systems are vulnerable for a number of reasons; design error, implementation, and 
management. A vulnerability is a hole or weak point that can be exploited to compromise 
the security of the system. Operating systems and applications are often vulnerable because 
of design errors. Software vendors release patches for discovered vulnerabilities, and rely 
upon system administrators to accept and install patches on their systems. Many system 
administrators fail to install patches on time, and consequently leave their systems 
vulnerable to exploitation by hackers. This exploitation can result in various security 
breaches, including website defacement, denial of service, or malware attacks. The overall 
problem is significant with an average of 115 vulnerabilities per week being documented 
during 2005. 
This thesis considers the problem of vulnerabilities in IT networked systems, and maps the 
vulnerability types into a technical taxonomy. The thesis presents a thorough analysis of 
the existing methods of vulnerability management which determine that these methods 
have failed to mange the problem in a comprehensive way, and show the need for a 
comprehensive management system, capable of addressing the awareness and patch 
deployment problems. A critical examination of vulnerability databases statistics over the 
past few years is provided, together with a benchmarking of the problem in a reference 
environment with a discussion of why a new approach is needed. The research examined 
and compared different vulnerability advisories, and proposed a generic vulnerability 
format towards automating the notification process. 
The thesis identifies the standard process of addressing vulnerabilities and the over reliance 
upon the manual method. An automated management system must take into account new 
vulnerabilities and patch deployment to provide a comprehensive solution. The overall aim 
of the research has therefore been to design a new framework to address these flaws in the 
networked systems harmonised with the standard system administrator process. The 
approach, known as AVMS (Automated Vulnerability Management System), is capable of 
filtering and prioritising the relevant messages, and then downloading the associated 
patches and deploying them to the required machines. 
The framework is validated through a proof-of-concept prototype system. A series of tests 
involving different advisories are used to illustrate how AVMS would behave. This helped 
to prove that the automated vulnerability management system prototype is indeed viable, 
and that the research has provided a suitable contribution to knowledge in this important 
domain. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
1.1 Introduction 
Security vulnerabilities are a known problem in operating systems, Internet servers and 
application programs, and may take many forms (e. g. old or unpatched software, poorly 
configured servers, disabled security controls and badly chosen passwords (SANS, 
2001)). Their exploitation can enable various security breaches, from denial of service 
attacks to defacement of web sites (CSI, 2000). 
Many companies are not aware of the problem and used to think, "It will never happen to 
me" but have suddenly found themselves the victim of some sort of attack on their 
network. Companies with high revenue or popular websites become targets for hackers 
to get privileges or try to improve their skills or prove their capability. 
Although alerting systems and vulnerability scanners exist, they often rely upon an 
administrator to manually run them and rectify the problems identified. As such, even 
vulnerabilities that have been recognised in the industry for some time may remain 
unnoticed and unresolved on many systems (CNET, 2001). 
In recent years, published statistics have continually illustrated the significant scale of the 
vulnerability problem. The Symantec's Internet Security Threat report IX shows that 3,767 
new vulnerabilities were documented in 2005, while the number in 2004 was 2,691 a 40% 
increase (the increase from 2001 to 2002 was 81%) (Symantec, 2006). Meanwhile, 
statistics from CERT show that the total number of vulnerabilities reported to them in 2004 
and 2005 were 3,780 and 5,990 respectively. While the latest figure represents a 
2 
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significant increase, both figures are dramatically higher than the figure for 2001, which 
had been just under 2,500 (CERT, 2006). The percentage of vulnerabilities were identified 
in 2004 and 2005 and considered as easy to exploit were 73% and 79% respectively 
(Symantec, 2006). 
On January 25 `h, 2003 the "Slammer" worm, also known as "Sapphire" the fastest 
spreading computer worm in history began and spread through the Internet, by infecting 
vulnerable copies of Microsoft SQL server and MSDE 2000. The worm infected more than 
90 percent of vulnerable hosts within 10 minutes, causing significant disruption of 
financial, transportation, and government institutions. The worm began to infect hosts at 
5: 30 am, by exploiting a buffer-overflow vulnerability, the worm infected 75,000 hosts, 
and caused network outages and cancelled airlines flights. The software weakness was 
discovered in July 2002, and Microsoft consequently released a bulletin MS02-61 
including the patch of the vulnerability in October 2002 (Moore et al, 2003). London-based 
market intelligence firm Mi2g estimated that the worm caused between $950m and $1.2bn 
in lost productivity in its first five days worldwide (CNET, 2003). 
August 2003 witnessed the appearance of the Blaster worm. The worm exploited a publicly 
known vulnerability in Windows NT, 2000, XP and 2003. It appeared on 11 August 2003. 
The exploited vulnerability was known as Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) 
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) interface, and Microsoft had released an associated patch on 
16 July 2003. The Blaster worm spread via self propagation, and infected 188,000 
machines around the world in 48 hours. The worm costs $1 billion in lost productivity 
(CERT, 2004a; NetworkWorld, 2004; Microsoft, 2004f; Poynteronline, 2004). 
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Furthermore, alerting or management vulnerability system and advisories sources send 
new alerts and advisories, scanners can only detect issues that they are aware of and 
require a means of being updated. New alerts and advisories can occur on a daily basis and 
come from many sources such as Symantec, eTrust, CERT, BugTraq, and Microsoft, etc. 
These alerts and advisories need the system administrator to manually extract the relevant 
messages by filtering and prioritising all the incoming messages, and then downloading 
and installing the patch a cross the target network. Scanner updates are often provided, but 
using proprietary approaches and vendor-specific formats, placing a dependency upon 
individual vendors to release updates for each new vulnerability - for which there may be 
an unpredictable lead-time, leaving systems more vulnerable in the interim. Finally, 
although some scanning software includes functionality for fixing problems identified, the 
current approaches are limited. Minor system configuration weaknesses can be rectified, 
but many issues require more substantial action, the vulnerability scanners might lead to 
denial of service. Microsoft released automatic update for some of its operating system and 
application versions, but system administrators will not enable this feature in their network 
because it might lead to denial or disturbance of service, or security breaching, and they 
have to test the new patch before they can deploy it. Furthermore, Microsoft's automatic 
update system only helps with Microsoft products, and many networks utilise software 
from many different vendors. Research is required into novel mechanisms to automate the 
above processes - enabling autonomous identification and rectification of vulnerabilities in 
a timely, reliable manner. 
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1.2 Aims and objectives of the research 
This study is concerned with the problem of managing IT software security vulnerabilities 
and advisories. The aim of this research is to define, design and validate a comprehensive 
automated vulnerability management system in IT networked systems, which is 
harmonised with the typical system administrator process. More specifically, it identifies 
the scale of the vulnerability problem and focuses on the current approach, with the aim to 
solve the problem by automating the process in a stable and trusted manner. 
In order to do this, the research programme can be divided into three key phases. The first 
phase provides a comprehensive analysis of software security vulnerabilities in its current 
state, and focuses on a benchmarking study for a networked reference environment to 
estimate the scale of the problem in a real network. The second phase of the research 
programme aims to solve the problem through the development of a framework for 
notification of new advisories and rectifying them in stable manner. The third and final 
phases involved the complete specification and development of part of the framework. In 
order to validate the design, this stage also included the development and testing of a 
prototype. 
A principal objective of the first phase was to assess the vulnerability problem in computer 
networks. In order to do this, an extensive literature search was performed in order to 
determine the nature and extent of the problem identified, Once the problem has been 
assessed by a benchmark study, they remained as the focus of the remainder of the research 
program. 
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The objective of the second phase of the research was to design and evaluate a generic 
architecture for an automated vulnerability management system. This encompassed the 
following stages: the first stage of automation is determining a means of notification of 
relevant new vulnerabilities, the advisories are then filtered and prioritised according to the 
local system configuration using a generic format-reducing the problem of information 
overloaded for administrators. 
Finally, the objective of the third phase was to design and evaluate an automated 
vulnerability management system, capable of acting upon the notification data above by 
determining mechanisms to rectify weaknesses in a stable and trusted manner. The 
prototype system has been implemented and evaluated within a trial environment. 
These objectives can be more formally specified as follows: 
0 Understand the vulnerability problem. 
" Assess the current state of vulnerability problem. 
" Assess vulnerability notification formats and design a generic form. 
0 Design and specify a system that implements the new model. 
0 Assess practical implementation and validation of vulnerability resolving 
framework. 
These objectives correspond to the general sequence of the material presented in the 
subsequent chapters of the thesis, as will be discussed in the next section. 
6 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
1.3 Thesis structure 
This thesis describes the research leading to the formulation of a framework for managing 
the vulnerability problem. The foundations for the thesis are provided in chapter 2, which 
provides an overview of security vulnerabilities, followed by an analysis of vulnerability 
technical types, life-cycle, and examples of vulnerability exploitation. Much of the chapter 
draws upon information from relevant literature sources. However, it should be noted that 
due to the practical nature of the problem domain many of these sources are from an 
industrial/commercial origin rather than academic papers. This approach is also reflected in 
later chapters. Having said this, reference to relevant academic source is made where 
appropriate. 
Chapter 3 discusses the existing methods of vulnerability management (i. e. the mechanism 
for assessing vulnerabilities and deploying patches using assessment tools), discusses 
host/network-based scanners. The chapter then evaluates the assessment tools, and 
discusses their weaknesses, and how they assist hackers to exploit the target networks. 
These are followed by automatic updating systems, and then discuss their weaknesses. 
Then focuses upon the vulnerability databases. The chapter then proceeds to discuss the 
vulnerability alerting systems. 
Chapter 4 presents the results of a benchmarking study that scaled the vulnerability 
problem. An analysis is presented of the vulnerability statistics, and addresses the 
vulnerability in a reference environment. Finally, the implications of the findings enable 
conclusions to be drawn regarding the problem of vulnerability and the necessary 
directions for further research. 
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Chapter 5 presents a new generic vulnerability advisory format. Initially the need for a 
generic format is established, followed by the description of the elements of the format. 
The need for automated filtration and notification for the administrator is identified. 
Chapter 6 presents a detailed specification of the conceptual architecture of the automated 
vulnerability management system, which includes the design of a new, comprehensive 
framework based on the generic vulnerability format, which was identified in chapter 5. 
The comprehensive framework consists of a notification system, and rectification system 
including deployment of patches into network clients. 
Chapter 7 presents the implementation of the prototype automated vulnerability 
management system, developed following the specification defined in chapter 6, and then 
discuss the challenges faced in the implementation with the current advisories format and 
the dynamic changes of vendor websites. 
Chapter 8 presents the validation of prototype design. The performance of the prototype 
has been measured and extensive results of notifications and rectifications are provided in 
full, in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the design in a real-world scenario, and 
compare the automated vulnerability management system (AVMS) with the available 
alerting systems and patch management systems. 
Finally, chapter 9 presents the main conclusions arising from the entire research 
programme, highlighting the principal achievements and limitations of the work, along 
with suggestions for potential further development. 
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A number of appendices are also included, which provide a range of supporting materials, 
including published papers arising from the research. 
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An Overview of Security Vulnerabilities in 
Networked IT Systems 
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2.1 Introduction 
Security in general means freedom from risk or danger. In the context of information 
technology, security is the ability of a system to protect information and system resources, 
which include hardware, software, and data. Computer security is associated with three 
very important aspects: confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA): 
0 Confidentiality ensures that assets are accessed by authorized persons only. 
Confidentiality is sometimes called secrecy or privacy. 
0 Integrity means that assets can be modified only by authorized persons in 
authorized ways, and the prevention of unauthorized modification of 
information. Integrity refers to maintaining correctness of data or systems. 
Integrity may be compromised as a result of a system error. 
0 Availability means that assets are accessible to authorized persons and 
associated assets when required (Seth, 1999). 
The aim of security is to preserve these three goals; a secure system is finding the right 
balance between the goals which often conflict. For example, the system is not effectively 
secured it confidentiality is preserved by preventing the users from reading a particular 
object, without considering the requirement of availability for proper access to it. Figure 
2.1 illustrates the relation between the three aspects, while the overlap area represents a 
secure system (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2003; Purdue, 2004). 
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Source : (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2003) 
Figure 2.1: Relationship between Confidentiality', Integrity, and Availability 
2.2 Definition of a vulnerability 
A vulnerability is a weakness that can be exploited to compromise the security of the 
system and can be further defined as: 
"a flaw in a product that makes it infeasible - even when using the product 
properly - to prevent an attacker from usurping privileges on the system, 
regulating its operation, compromising data on it, or assuming ungranted trust" 
(Microsoft, 2006a). 
Vulnerabilities may be caused by errors in the design of a system, poor implementation, or 
incorrect configuration. Vulnerabilities can affect many aspects of a system, including 
operating systems, user data and application programs. The exploitation of a vulnerability 
can result in various security breaches, including hacker attacks (such as denial of service 
12 
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and defacement of web sites), and malware incidents (such as viruses and worms) (CSI, 
2001). 
Malicious attackers use various methods and tools to exploit vulnerabilities in systems to 
compromise security. Non-malicious attacks occur due to poor security controls that allow 
vulnerabilities to take place, for example when employees use a diskette or download files 
that are infected with a virus (Longstaff et al, 1997; Microsoft, 2006a). 
Because the Internet infrastructure was designed for connectivity without considering 
secure infrastructure and security processes, network defence becomes more difficult. 
Furthermore, the Internet is an extremely dynamic environment, in terms of both topology 
and emerging technology (Microsoft, 2006a; Marchany, 2001). The level of Internet usage 
is increasing dramatically. The number of Internet users was reported to have risen over 
the previous five years to 1,018,057,389 in 2005, representing an increase of 182% over 
the previous 5 years (Internet World Stat, 2006). Security breaches increased over this 
time, costing companies millions, with the number of vulnerabilities and incidents rising in 
parallel. 
Because of the inherent insecurity of the original design of the protocols, many Internet 
technologies are still unstable. Internet attacks in general are easy, inexpensive, and may be 
hard to detect or trace, For example, IP addresses for most are dynamically assigned. 
Making attackers difficult to trace most are carried out remotely, which means an attacker 
does not have to be physically present to carry out the attack. The 2005 VIII and 2005 IX 
Symantec Internet Security Threat Reports reported that more than 80% of vulnerabilities 
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published during the 2004 and 2005 were classified as remotely exploitable (Symantec, 
2005; Symantec, 2006). In fact, many attacks can be launched readily from anywhere in 
the world-and the location of the attacker can easily be hidden using freely available 
tools. Nor is it always necessary to "break in" to a site (gain privileges on it) to 
compromise the security of its information or service (Longstaff et al, 1997; Marchany, 
2001). 
Some recognised vulnerable operating systems may still be shipped with the operating 
system configured in an insecure manner, relying on the user to update them after 
installation, for example Windows XP. Because of awareness problems, these vulnerable 
operating systems may not be updated for some time (Longstaff et al, 1997). 
Finally, the lack of well trained people to maintain network security opens the doors for the 
hacker community to exploit weaknesses in vulnerable systems. 
2.3 Factors of the vulnerability problem 
Some of the factors that contribute to the vulnerability of IT systems are: 
2.3.1 Systems are designed without considering security 
When designing systems, security must be considered from the beginning of the design 
process. The security skills and processes involve expensive tools and engineers, and 
updates to network components and software on regular bases. Many systems may be 
designed without sufficient consideration of security issues. Although many systems have 
14 
Chapter 2 : An Overview of Security Vulnerabilities in Networked IT Systems 
security controls, they have vulnerabilities which allow an intruder to bypass the security 
controls. In many cases, the security controls themselves introduce weaknesses such as 
firewall (Denning, 1996; Ixis a, 2004). 
2.3.2 Developers and users have limited resources 
System developers and vendors have limited resources to spend on product development 
and support. Simultaneously, organizations do not consider security as an important issue 
either because they have limited resources or they are not aware of the risk until they 
become a victim of an attack (Denning, 1996). 
2.3.3 Flaws in protocol design 
Communication protocols sometimes have weak points. Attackers use these to gain 
information and may eventually use this to gain access to systems. Some known issues are: 
0 TCP/IP. The protocol stack has some weak points that allow IP address 
spoofing and TCP connection request (SYN) attacks. A SYN attack take places 
in which an attacker sends a succession of SYN requests to a target's system. A 
SYN flood is a form of denial of service attack (Microsoft, 2006a; Wikipedia, 
2005). 
" Telnet Protocol. The protocol allows someone to log onto a system over the 
network. When using the telnet client to connect from one system to another, 
user names and passwords are transmitted in clear text (Microsoft, 2006a). 
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0 File Transfer Protocol. FTP allows users to connect to remote systems and 
transfer files. The user authenticates to the remote computer using their user 
name and password. One problem is that the password is transmitted over the 
network in plain text and is therefore easy to intercept. Another problem is that 
FTP can be anonymous which allows users to transfer files without having an 
account on a computer. The first problem with anonymous FTP is that there is 
often no record of who has requested information. The second problem with 
anonymous FTP is the threat of denial of service (DoS) attacks, because any 
unauthorized person can transfer files, hence authorized users may be denied 
access to a system if too many files are transferred simultaneously (Microsoft, 
2006a; Ixis, 2004d). 
2.3.4 Security is complicated and cannot be measured 
Security processes are not only quite complicated, fuzzy, and sometimes conflicting, but 
they vary between systems. Not all weaknesses and attacks can be anticipated, so 100% 
security is impossible to achieve. Vulnerabilities can be found in any product; in fact a 
vulnerability is inherent in any product, and security measures are very expensive. For 
example, the cost of supporting a desktop is roughly $100 per visit (Pentura, 2004). 
However, the hacker community is constantly discovering new methods of attack. The 
only way to have a secure system from outsider attacks is to isolate the network from the 
Internet (Denning, 1996; Ixis, 2004c). 
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2.3.5 The rapid growth and use of the network 
In recent years there has been an explosive growth in the Internet; with an estimated 2.3 
million hosts connected each month (Marchany, 2001). The Internet world stats show that 
there are 1,018,057,389 Internet users around the world, updated December 2005, while 
the number in 2000 was 361,001,737. This increase represents a 182% increase in just five 
years (Internet World Stats, 2006). 
2.3.6 The lack of security experts to address the problems 
The dramatic expansion of the Internet has increased the need for security experts to 
configure and maintain the network in a secure manner. Because there are insufficient 
experts available in the job market, inexperienced people are being taken on to secure 
systems, causing a number of problems and opening windows of opportunity for the hacker 
community to exploit the network weaknesses (SANS, 2001). 
2.3.7 No priority list for dealing with vulnerabilities 
The number of vulnerabilities continues to grow, and there is no priority list for dealing 
with them (Noack, 2000). 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Vulnerabilities 1,090 2,437 4,129 3,784 3,780 5,990 
Table 2.1: CERT statistics 2000-2005 
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For example, statistics from the CERT coordination centre of Internet security expertise, 
located at the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development 
centre operated by Carnegie Mellon University are shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 shows that the total number of vulnerabilities reported in 2005 was 5,990 which 
is represent a significant increase compare to 2004, and dramatically higher than the 
figures for 2000 and 2001 (CERT, 2006). 
2.4 A taxonomy of vulnerabilities 
There are three types of system vulnerabilities: design, implementation, and configuration 
vulnerabilities (Howard & Longstaff, 1998). The following taxonomy is useful in 
understanding the technical causes behind successful intrusion techniques, and can be used 
to identify general solutions for addressing each type of problem. 
" Design vulnerability 
"A vulnerability inherent in the design or specification of hardware or 
software whereby even a perfect implementation will result in a 
vulnerability" (Howard & Longstaff, 1998). 
A protocol that has a fault in the fundamental design is susceptible to misuse 
even if it works well. For example, the Network File System protocol has no 
mechanism for authentication. The hackers target the NFS servers easily 
(Longstaff et al, 1997). 
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The security issue is often left out and then added as an add-on to the software, 
which did not have it during the design plan. The reason being that security is 
not considered an essential part of the software's original design. The software 
may not work, as planned and unexpected weaknesses may be present 
(Longstaff et al, 1997; Ixis, 2004b). 
" Implementation Vulnerability 
"A vulnerability resulting from an error made in the software or 
hardware implementation of satisfactory design" (Howard & 
Longstaff, 1998). 
A protocol can still be susceptible even if it is designed carefully because of the 
wrong way of implementing it. For example, a protocol for electronic mail is 
implemented such that hackers can easily connect to the mail port of the user's 
machine and force the machine to do a task which it was not intended to do by 
the service (Longstaff et al, 1997; Ixis, 2004c). This type of vulnerability 
enables the intruders to attack the victim's machine from remote sites without 
access to an account on the victim's system. Attacking a victim's computer 
system is a first step leading to the exploitation of the faults left in the system or 
the software (Longstaff et al, 1997). 
A software application can be at risk due to the flaws either left unidentified or 
that were identified and not solved before the application was released. This 
type of vulnerability has a wide range of subclasses, which allow the intruders 
to use their own attacking tools (Longstaff et al, 1997; Ixis, 2004c). 
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If the weaknesses are left for exploitation then the intruders at any remote site 
can gain access to the victim's system. The intruders gain access to the 
additional unprivileges through accessing the unprivileged user's account 
(Longstaff et al, 1997; Ixis, 2004c). 
" Configuration vulnerability 
Vulnerabilities in this category of system and network configurations are not 
caused by problems inherent in protocols or software programs. Rather, the 
vulnerabilities are a result of the way these components are set up and used. 
Sometimes the intruders exploit software applications that are delivered with 
default settings. This happens because the system administrators and users may 
neglect to change the default settings, or simply set up their system/software to 
operate for the time being which results in leaving the network vulnerable 
(Longstaff et al, 1997; Ixis, 2004d). 
The File Transfer Protocol (FTP) service is a good example of a faulty 
configuration on a computer system. FTP has defined security rules such as 
password file, archive tree, and the ancillary software keep separate from the 
rest of the operating system. Doing this, the malicious content cannot reach the 
operating system. Misconfiguration of websites using their anonymous FTP 
archives lets the unauthorized users authenticate and get the information and 
use it to use the system (Longstaff et al, 1997; Ixis, 2004d). 
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2.4.1 Mapping vulnerabilities to the taxonomy 
The Bugtraq database included 5925 reported vulnerabilities up to 30 November 2002. 
Figure 2.2 shows a breakdown of this total, based on Bugtraq's taxonomy which included 
12 defined classes (Chen et al, 2003). 
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Figure 2.2: Bugtraq total reported vulnerability breakdown into classifications 
By comparison CERT reported that 57% of total vulnerabilities in 2002 were related to 
buffer overflow. In 2003 up to August 50% of the reported vulnerabilities were classified 
as buffer overflow (Ruwase & Lam, 2004). However, 50% of the 60 most severe 
vulnerabilities published by CERT/CC were buffer overflow vulnerabilities. Further more. 
well known worms such as CodeRed, Slammer, Blaster and Welchia which spread 
worldwide by exploiting buffer overflow vulnerabilities caused billions of dollars in lost 
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productivity (Ruwase & Lam, 2004). This shows that buffer overflows are the most 
common vulnerability in networked systems. 
Analysis of different vulnerability advisories from different sources and taxonomies such 
as Aslam et al, 1996, ICAT a security vulnerability database which is based on and 
synchronized with the CVE vulnerability naming standard (ICAT, 2004) and Securityfocus 
classification (Securityfocus, 2004) characterise vulnerabilities into a number of types as 
described in the following sections. 
2.4.1.1 Input validation error 
This error results when: 
1. A functional module fails to properly validate the input it accepts from another 
module or another process. 
2. A program failed to recognize syntactically incorrect input. 
3. When a module failed to handle missing input fields. 
such that a vulnerability is present that can be exploited by a certain input sequence (ICAT, 
2004). 
2.4.1.2 Boundary condition error 
The input generated either by human or machine causes vulnerability to the system after 
exceeding an assumed boundary. For example, a system running out of resources in terms 
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of disk space, memory and network bandwidth, and a variable rolling over its minimum 
value after reaching the highest value (ICAT, 2004). 
An example of a boundary error vulnerability [MSO4-012] is an activation function in the 
RPCSS Service involved with DCOM activation for Windows 2000, XP, and 2003 allows 
remote attacker to cause a denial of service (Microsoft, 2004a). 
2.4.1.3 Buffer overflow 
A buffer overflow occurs when the input received is longer than the expected input and 
causes vulnerability to the system. The input buffer fills up and overflows the allocated 
input memory in case a system does not check about this condition. An attacker can make 
the system crash or get his instructions executed by creating extra input (ICAT, 2004). It is 
very common that buffer overflows occur in the operating systems, i. e. Windows and Unix 
and due to the nature of C programming language, these overflows are hard to locate in the 
code (SearchSecurity, 2002). For example, in Windows NT 4.0 SP6a, 2000 SP2-SP4, and 
XP SP1 face a buffer overflow vulnerability [MSO4-011] in the rendering of Windows 
Metafile (WMF) or Enhanced Metafile (EMF) images that enables the execution of code 
by a remote attacker using a malformed WMF or EMF image ( Microsoft, 2004b). 
2.4.1.4 Origin validation error 
This error results when a system fails to properly authenticate a subject before performing 
privileged operations in the two following cases: 
1. The error result when an object accepted input from an unauthorized subject. 
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2. The error result because the system failed to properly or completely authenticate a 
subject. 
For example the Windows Management vulnerability MSO4-011 affected Windows XP, 
allowing an authenticated user to launch applications with system privileges (ICAT, 2004; 
US-CERT, 2004; Microsoft, 2004c). 
2.4.1.5 Access validation error 
If the access control mechanism is not working properly, it may result in this error causing 
vulnerability to the system. The mechanism itself contains the problem rather than the user 
controllable configuration of the access control mechanisms. [RHSA-2004-096] wu-ftpd 
2.6.2 and earlier is an example of access validation error with enabled restricted grid 
option, that can change the permissions to prevent access to home directory allowing local 
users to bypass access restrictions and in its place lets the wu-ftpd use the root directory 
(RedHat, 2004). 
2.4.1.6 Exceptional condition handling error 
This vulnerability is facilitated because of the handling (or mishandling) of the exception. 
For example, RedHat Enterprise Linux is affected by an empty field email message as 
remote attackers are allowed by mailman before 2.0.13 causing denial of service (ICAT, 
2004). 
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2.4.1.7 Configuration error 
User controllable settings may result in a system vulnerability because of this error. The 
end user configuration is the basic reason for this vulnerability rather than the design of the 
system. After a system with weak configuration ships from the manufactures, this 
vulnerability is considered as a configuration error. For example, a remote unauthenticated 
user gains unauthorized access to a victim's email account using Outlook Web Access 
(OWA) on the Microsoft Exchange Server, resulting in a user randomly logged on with 
full permission to another user's email account. A user experiences such problem on a PC 
running Exchange Server 2003 and Microsoft Windows Server 2003 when installing 
Windows SharePoint Services 2.0 which results in disable of Kerberos authentication for 
US being disabled, and causes the OWA users to view other user's mailboxes (ICAT, 
2004, Microsoft, 2003a, Internet Security 2003). 
2.4.1.8 Environment error 
A system may become vulnerable because of the operational environment thereby resulting 
in occurrence of this error. For example, a system by some means becomes vulnerable 
when another application or operating system is intercepted while installing any 
application. Synaesthesia 2.2 and earlier is an example of an environment error that can 
allow execution of arbitrary code by allowing users via symlink attack on the configuration 
file of a program that represents sounds visually. The configuration file is created by 
Synaesthesia while holding root privileges (ICAT, 2004; Debian, 2004). 
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2.4.1.9 Synchronization error 
This error presents synchronization and it is sub classes to the following: 
" Race condition error 
Two tasks acting simultaneously on a resource result in a race condition error 
(e-consultancy, 2004). The existence of a vulnerability characterized as a race 
condition is caused due to the non-atomicity of a security check. For example, 
an operation allowed to operate is checked by the security model and the 
environment change within due course. An attacker can get privileges to exploit 
this window of opportunity (ICAT, 2004). Live update capability in Symantec 
AntiVirus Scan Enginer 4.0 and 4.3 for RedHat Linux is an example of a race 
condition error and symlink attack on /tmp/LiveUpdate. log file enables a local 
user to create or append to arbitrary files. A component that retrieves product 
and virus definition, as known as Symantec LiveUpdate, when updates directly 
from server of Symantec LiveUpdate and run, creates an easily predictable 
temporary log file in the /tmp directory. A symlink attack launched by a local 
attacker exploits this vulnerability error and gains chance to elevated privileges 
on the system (xForce, 2004; ICAT, 2004). 
" Serialization error 
This error results when an inadequate or improper serialization happens to the 
operations (Aslam et al, 1996). For example, when a map is tested in the 
BizTalk Mapper of the Microsoft BizTalk Server 2004 by using the 
Input/Output setting to Native, an error message occurs "Native serialization 
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error: The path is not of a legal form". This problem occurs under the following 
conditions (Microsoft, 2004e): 
" The Input/Output settings for the map test are set to Native 
9 The map refers to a schema in an external assembly 
0 Atomicity error 
The atomicity error occurs when the code is terminated along with the data, 
which is already modified as a part of a project but partially. It also occurs 
when the data structures are partially modified by another process (Aslam et al, 
1996). An example of this error is the Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.5 and 6 
Plug-in Navigations Handling Address Bar Spoofing Vulnerability. These two 
allow unauthorized modification. The remote attackers can change the 
displayed address bars and therefore send-up web pages (SecurityFocus, 
2004b). 
2.4.1.10 Other 
It is possible that a vulnerability will not fall in any of these category. Any such 
vulnerability is characterized as vulnerability type "other" (ICAT, 2004). 
A vulnerability type can be mapped into the technical taxonomy as shown in Table 2.2. 
From Table 2.2 it can be observed that the vulnerabilities under Implementation and 
Configuration can be eliminated by system administrators by correctly implementing and 
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configuring the vulnerable system. Although the vulnerabilities under configuration 
present low percentage in Figure 2.2 the system administrators should close even this small 
window as it is too risky. 
Vulnerability type 
Design 
vulnerability 
Implementation 
vulnerability 
Configuration 
vulnerability 
Input validation error  
Boundary condition  
Buffer overflow  
Access validation error   
Exceptional error   
Configuration error   
Origin error   
Environment error  
Race condition  
Serialization error  
Atomicity error  
Other    
Table 2.2: Mapping vulnerability to the taxonomy 
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2.5 Vulnerability life-cycle 
This section attempts to provide an overview of a vulnerability life-cycle, looking firstly at 
host life-cycle and then system vulnerability life-cycle by identifying the different distinct 
stages and the impact of publishing vulnerabilities for the system administrators. 
2.5.1 Host Life-cycle 
An information system transitions between several distinct states namely hardened, 
vulnerable, and compromised. A system typically oscillates between hardened and 
vulnerable states and may move on to a compromised state if a vulnerability has been 
exploited as shown in Figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.3: Host life cycle 
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The system remains hardened when all patches have been installed. The system becomes 
vulnerable when the system administrator fails to install at least one patch. When the 
vulnerability is exploited, then the system may be compromised. 
The administrator's goal is to keep the system in a hardened state and minimise the 
occurrence of vulnerable and compromised states (Arbaugh et al, 2000). 
2.5.2 System vulnerability life-cycle 
A vulnerability will generally pass through several distinct stages, as part of an overall 
lifecycle; namely birth, discovery, disclosure, release of a fix, publication, and automated 
exploitation. Intrusions based upon the vulnerability will increase once the problem is 
discovered, and the rate will continue to increase until an appropriate solution (e. g. a 
software patch) is released (Arbaugh et al, 2000). Figure 2.4 depicts this lifecycle. 
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Source: (Arbaugh et al, 2000) 
Figure 2.4: Lifecycle of system-security vulnerability 
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The vulnerability curve in Figure 2.4 has been determined by reports from organisations, 
with the data extracted from CERT Coordination Centre's incident and vulnerability 
record. Usually the organisations report incidents including intrusions and compromises to 
their systems. However, many organisations do not report if their systems have been 
compromised for two reasons. The first is that they fear if the intrusion becomes public 
knowledge it may affect their reputation. The second reason is the difficulty to know the 
reason behind system compromise. The usual order of appearance of states is as follows 
(Arbaugh et al, 2000): 
" Birth. This part of the life cycle signifies the creation of the error/problem. The 
birth usually occurs unintentionally especially when a large project is being 
developed. If it happens that the birth of a flaw is intentional and dangerous, 
then the discovery and birth coincide. 
0 Discovery. If a person discovers the problem in the product that makes its 
security or survivable implications then the flaw becomes a vulnerability. The 
discovery depends on the flaws' finding and not on the person's intentions. 
Although, in some cases it is clear that the person may not observe or clearly 
find out the flaw's appearance process. 
0 Disclosure. After the Discovery phase of the life cycle discloses the details of 
the flaws' findings, the vulnerability discloses. This disclosure then happens to 
a wider audience related to the problem. BugTraq is a full-disclosure moderated 
mailing list for reporting the vulnerability. 
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0 Correction. After reporting the details about the vulnerability. The vendor or 
developer releases a software modification or configuration change or a 
solution that corrects the discovered flaw. 
" Publicity. There are several ways in which the vulnerability becomes publicly 
known. It happens that a news story reports the detail of the problem, or 
sometimes an incident response centre could issue a report concerning the 
vulnerability. The vulnerability is known on a larger scale to the outer world 
when it becomes big enough. 
0 Scripting. Moderate skills for scripting successful exploitation is easy to do the 
new flaws found out. When a hacker scripts down the exploitation, those with 
little or no skill can easily exploit the vulnerability to compromise the systems. 
Then this scripting dramatically increases the size of the population that can 
exploit systems. At this point, the vulnerability becomes a functioning standard. 
" Death. When the number of systems shrinks to insignificance, it destroys the 
vulnerability itself. In theory, vulnerability dies if the administrators patch all 
the systems at risk to correct the flaw. If they retire such systems, or if attackers 
and the media lose interest in the vulnerability, then also the vulnerability dies. 
Administrators can never patch all the systems at risk in reality. It is ideal to 
disclose the vulnerability to the public so that the awareness increases and the 
vendors are encouraged to release the patch as soon as possible. 
The goal of a system administrator is to reduce the window of exposure (the area under the 
curve). To reduce the window of exposure there are two approaches (Arbaugh et al, 2000; 
Schneier, 2000). 
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The first approach is to limit the amount of vulnerability information available to the 
public, consequently minimising the opportunities for hackers to exploit vulnerabilities. 
The disclosure could be argued more harmful than helpful to the public. This approach is a 
theoretical approach, but impossible to have in practice (Schneier, 2000). In fact the hacker 
community already exchange vulnerability information and attack tools, but system 
administrators are not always as well informed. 
The second approach is to reduce the window of exposure in time. When a vulnerability 
receives wide publicity, the vendors will release the patch faster. The exploitation will rise 
up after releasing the patch as shown in figure 2.4. 
The reason behind this increase is that the hackers are reverse engineering the patch to 
identify the vulnerable function in the software (Schneier, 2000). The reverse engineering 
can be done by comparing the vulnerable version with the patched one (using available 
tools to find the difference), and then locate the files that have been changed. The 
comparison then moves on to compare patched and unpatched versions of located files, 
then focusing upon specific functions that have been changed. Finally, the vulnerable 
functions are uncovered, and then write the appropriate code to exploit the vulnerability, 
the exploits being widely known in short time before system administrator start installing 
the patch, Figure 2.5 shows the patch reverse engineering (Farrow, 2004). 
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ry 
Patched file 
Figure 2.5: Patch reverse engineering 
An example of reverse engineering, the ASN. I vulnerability could allow an attacker to 
execute code with system privileges on an affected system. The flaw affected unpatched 
copies of Windows NT, 2000, XP, and Windows Server 2003, and was discovered by eEye 
Digital Security in July 2003, Microsoft released security bulletin MSO4-007 including the 
patch for this critical vulnerability on the 10th February 2004. After three days the 
vulnerability had been exploited. The attacker could gain privileges, and could then take 
any action on the system such as installing programs, accessing data, and manipulating 
user accounts (eEye Digital, 2004; About, 2004; Micosoft, 2004d). 
In another recent example, on 13 April 2004 Microsoft released MSO4-011 bulletin 
including 14 patches to fix 14 vulnerabilities without beta testing. On I May 2004 a hacker 
released the Sasser worm as a result of reverse engineering (Computer Weekly, 2004a). 
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From the above the hackers can reverse-engineer the patch, and stopping beta test as in the 
last example will not stop the exploitation. Usually Microsoft works with ISPs and selected 
users to test the patch and performance of the patched software and the impact on their 
system. Stuart Okin, Microsoft's chief security officer, argued that testing of the patch with 
closed groups, could lead to the patches finding their way to the hacker community 
(Computer Weekly, 2004b). 
Ideally the system administrator should act upon the patch released immediately to close 
the window of exploitation. In some cases the vendor may ignore the vulnerability which 
opens a window of exploitation for attackers. Section 2.6 discusses some examples of 
exploitation where patches were released earlier than exploitation. 
2.6 Examples of vulnerability exploitation 
This section discusses the exploitation of vulnerabilities where the patches were released 
before exploitation. Table 2.2 shows virus/worm incident, patch released date, exploitation 
date, and the last column representing the number of days between the patch release and 
exploitation date. 
Additionally, there is a new type of exploitation called "Zero-day" attack. A zero-day 
attack exploits a discovered vulnerability rapidly in the wild before the vulnerability is 
reported to a vendor or public database (Computerworld, 2004; NewsFactor, 2004). 
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Virus/Worm Patch Date Exploitation Date Number of Days 
Code Red 18/6/2001 16/7/2001 28 
Nimda 29/3 & 16/5/2001 18/9/2001 125 
Slapper 30/7/2002 13/9/2002 45 
Slammer 24/7/2002 25/1/2003 170 
Blaster 16/7/2003 11/8/2003 26 
Sasser 13/4/2004 1/5/2004 18 
Table 2.2: Vulnerability exploitation by viruses/worms 
The hackers use their skills and tools to discover a new vulnerability in network 
components to achieve zero-day attacks. Then they announce the newly discovered 
vulnerabilities on their forums via the Internet (Computerworid, 2004; NewsFactor, 2004). 
Although, there have been no significant zero-day attacks yet, the threat is growing for 
several reasons (Computerworld, 2004): 
1. The number of days between released vulnerability patch and exploitation such 
vulnerability is increased in the recent exploitation as shown in the last worms in 
Table 2.2. 
2. Hackers design exploitations to propagate faster. For example, the Slammer worm 
propagated in ten minutes and infected about 75,000 hosts. 
3. The number of vulnerabilities and exploitations are growing. 
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The first level protection such as firewalls, antivirus, and intrusion detection systems 
cannot protect against zero-day attack. Unfortunately, zero-day attack information is 
available after exploitation only. In March 2003, a U. S. Army Web server was 
compromised by exploiting a buffer overflow vulnerability in WebDAV in Windows 2000 
server. Microsoft was not aware of the vulnerability. The exploited machine collected 
information on the network and sent it back to the hacker. The system engineers detected 
this exploitation when they noticed an increase in network scanning activity originating 
from the compromised web server. The engineers reformatted the exploited machine and 
the machine become exploited again (Computerworld, 2004; NewsFactor, 2004). 
2.6.1 Code Red 
A worn program, Code Red was found in the summer of 2001, which exploited the 
vulnerability in Microsoft's Internet Information Server (IIS). The Security Company, 
eEye Digital Security discovered the flaw in IIS on 18 June 2001. The Security Company 
warned that an exploit could be created to take advantages of the vulnerability. The eEye 
Security Company also provided a complete analysis of the worm program after it was 
released on the Internet on or around July 13 2001. The Code Red worm program exploited 
and infected more than 359,000 servers in less than 14 hours on 19 July 2001. It also 
attacked the White House website as reported by the eEye Security Company. This same 
Code Red caused a productivity loss of more than $2.6 billion as reported by CNET 
(2003). Before the problem occurred and infected the computer systems, a patch was 
released to eradicate the IIS vulnerability and was widely publicized. The individuals or 
companies who ignored the news stories or warnings on the internet about this flaw, were 
the most infected victims. This worm program was so dangerous that if it had infected a 
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computer system, the other hackers can easily take advantage of it and remotely control the 
infected systems (eEye, 2001). The vulnerability type was input as validation error/buffer 
overflow, the CVE number is (CVE-2001-0500; ICAT, 2001). Two new versions of the 
worm program were made available on the internet and spread more quickly than the 
original version of Code Red. This worm program after infecting a system scanned the 
Internet, then identify other vulnerable systems, and infect all the systems automatically by 
installing itself through port 80. Whenever the worm-infected system joins other system, it 
is also infected automatically. The first version was serious as if it would install on a 
system and then return back to attack the first time attacked system, through which it was 
originally infected. A time-sensitive coded worm program activates on the defined date as 
occurring on the victim's computer clock. Its occurrence depending on dates is like this 
(eEye, 2001), 
9 It goes into propagation mode from the 1St to the 19th of the month. 
" It goes into a flood mode from the 20th to the 27`h of the same month. During 
these dates, it launches a denial-of-service attack for the system. 
" The worm program hibernates after the 27th to the 1St of the next month. 
2.6.2 Nimda worm 
Another example of vulnerability exploitation is the Nimda worm. The vulnerability type 
here was a design error, and the worm had the potential to affect both user workstations 
(clients) running Windows: NT, 2000 or ME and servers running Windows NT and 2000. 
This worm propagated through email. It arrived in an email with a file named readme. exe 
attached. The Nimda worm was discovered on 18 September 2001. The impacts of Nimda 
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worm were that an intruder could execute arbitrary commands within the local System 
security context on a machine running the unpatched versions of Microsoft's Internet 
Information Server IIS. The high scanning rate of Nimda could also cause bandwidth 
denial-of-service to connected networks with infected machines. The solutions for this 
worm were to apply the appropriate patch from the vendor (CERT, 2001). 
2.6.3 Sasser worm 
On 1 May 2004, the "Sasser" worm was released by a German hacker. The worm spread 
through the Internet exploiting a vulnerability and infecting Windows 2000, XP, and 2003, 
and then disable computer system. The worm hit thousands of small companies and high 
profile organizations. On 13 April, Microsoft released the bulletin MSO4-O1 to fix 14 
vulnerabilities in windows. Microsoft published a revised knowledge base article (835732) 
on 21 April, after customer complains of patch problem. The Sasser worm did not spread 
via email. The infected computers may run more slowly than normal and shut down 
intermittently. Sasser causes the Windows Local Security Authority Subsystem Service 
(LSass) to fail, resulting in the infected PC rebooting automatically. LSass is a core 
function in Windows which is used to log users onto the Windows PC (Computer Weekly, 
2004c). 
2.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has studied the problem of security vulnerabilities in networked systems. The 
Internet vulnerability problem and the factors of this problem have been identified and 
discussed. The taxonomy of vulnerabilities and mapping vulnerabilities to the taxonomy 
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has been identified. Vulnerability life-cycle has been identified, and the reasons behind the 
increasing occurrences of the problem have been discussed. The last section in this chapter 
discussed the exploitation of vulnerabilities. The next chapter will look at vulnerability 
databases, vulnerability assessment tools, alerting systems, and the current approach of 
updating systems. 
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3.1 Introduction 
It is a difficult task to keep up with the vulnerabilities in the computer network. 
Vulnerabilities are appearing at an average of around fifty per week (Penetration-testing, 
2004). In fact, statistics revealed that in 2004, a total of 3,780 vulnerabilities were reported, 
with a further 4,990 in 2005 (CERT, 2006). At least 90% of the computer system's security 
breaches were avoidable by proactively locating the weaknesses and resolving them with a 
patch or an update (Ray, 2003). According to the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) software bugs cost the U. S. economy $60 billion dollars per year 
(Andriole, 2003). Therefore, organizations are searching for effective tools to reduce the 
attacks on their networks in order to reduce costs to the company related to employee 
downtime, loss of sensitive or important data, and repairs to the computer systems. Due to 
the increasing number of vulnerabilities in the IT networked systems, there are a myriad of 
vulnerability solutions available. 
Furthermore, system vulnerabilities exist when errors are made to the configuration or 
setup of the system. This normally occurs when new systems are installed and are 
improperly configured, which opens the doors for weaknesses or vulnerabilities until the 
configuration has been properly corrected (Sunbelt Software, 2004). Hackers look for these 
configuration vulnerabilities using automated scanning software, which is often shared 
among them across the Internet. Also, many organizations create system vulnerabilities 
when they fail to perform ongoing checks upon their systems for weaknesses (SANS, 
2005). 
Many organizations rely upon firewalls as the main security defense to block traffic from 
reaching its system's ports. However, firewalls are not effective for the emerging 
innovative techniques of intruders because the advancement in technology increases the 
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complexity of attacks (French, 2004). In order to develop a successful strategy for network 
security, system administrators should take a proactive approach, in which, the first step is 
to identify the system's vulnerabilities. These weaknesses can incorporate misconfigured 
web servers, bad code unpatched software, poorly secured firewalls, out of date operating 
systems with buffer overflow bugs that can be exploited for Denial-of Service (DoS) 
attacks or other vulnerabilities, and weak passwords (Ray, 2003). An excellent example of 
vulnerabilities exists with older versions of the DNS Bind application that can be exploited 
to give attackers root access to a system or allow hackers to run arbitrary code. A 
vulnerability assessment tool can scan these target systems to detect if these vulnerable 
versions of DNS Bind are running (Fussell, 2004). A survey concluded that 80% of 
respondents to the 2004 InformationWeek Global Information Security Survey specified 
that the main source of attacks against their networks were the operating system and 
application vulnerabilities (Hulmes, 2004). 
The focus of this chapter is to discuss in detail the current state-of-the-art in vulnerability 
management solutions. The sections that follow will discuss: 
" Vulnerability assessment tools. 
e Automatic updating systems. 
" Vulnerability databases. 
" Vulnerability alert services. 
The chapter concludes with final remarks on different discussed solutions. 
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3.2 Vulnerability assessment tools 
3.2.1 The need for vulnerability assessment tools 
Vulnerability scanners are increasingly becoming as essential to a network as virus scaning 
software; especially, the regular and ongoing network-security vulnerability assessments 
since each new system, server, or application that is added to a network increases the 
vulnerability to intrusion. Keeping up-to-date with the latest advisories and software 
updating is a continuous job for IT administrators (McCollum, 2003). 
Vulnerability assessment tools interrogate an operating system and software configurations 
for known vulnerabilities and provide reporting features to support analysis. The purpose 
of a vulnerability assessment tools is to make an in-depth scan of a network system and 
detect a variety of factors, which could create problems with administration, and operation 
of the network. As new viruses, hacking techniques and questionable Internet usage 
continue to rapidly evolve and change, the purpose of a vulnerability assessment tool 
becomes essential (McCollum, 2003). Vulnerability assessment tool can help to secure a 
network before hackers identify weaknesses in a system enabling them to mount an attack 
(Rotondo, 2003; Bradley 2003). 
A survey by Internal Auditor magazine determined that 24% of respondent organizations 
used assessment tools. As shown in Figure 3.1,83% of auditors use tools ranging from 
stand-alone security scanning software to vulnerability assessment features built into 
general-purpose security management products. 17% of auditors use internally developed 
software (McCollum, 2003). 
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Figure 3.1: Vulnerability assessment tools survey 
According to a similar survey conducted by Information Week Magazine, 23% of more 
than 2500 respondent organizations use vulnerability assessment tools (InformationWeek, 
2003) 
Sunbelt's survey (Sunbelt Software, 2004) showed that, 20% use Microsoft Baseline 
Security Analyzer (MBSA), 17% use Nessus, of 55% of respondents who us a security 
scanner. The survey results are illustrated in Table 3.1 and clearly show that 37% of 
respondents who use vulnerability assessment tools use free tools (i. e. MBSA and Nessus). 
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These different survey results emphases that there are about 70% of organizations are not 
taking advantage of available assessment tools. According to Sunbelt Software's security 
vulnerability survey 20% of those who use vulnerability assessment tools considered these 
tools as "invaluable" in their network security (Sunbelt Software, 2004). 
Vulnerability Assessment Scanner Percentage Using It 
Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA) 20% 
Nessus 17% 
LanGuard (GFI) 14% 
Retina (eEye) 11% 
Internet Security Scanner (ISS) 11% 
Nmap 6% 
Source: Sunbelt Software, 2004 
Table 3.1: The percentage using vulnerability assessment tools 
Vulnerability assessment tools have assisted companies to strengthen and protect their 
networks from attacks. One case in point is Continental Airlines, in 2003 the company 
learned about the importance of vulnerability assessment from the SQL Slammer worm 
that damaged their networks and disabled the airlines ticketing system. As a result, flights 
were delayed which caused consumer discontent and loss in revenue. Continental Airlines 
decided to proactively identify system weaknesses instead of waiting for future attacks. 
The company accomplished its goal by purchasing the Retina Security Suite software, 
which searched the network's firewalls, routers and servers. The software provided 
systems administrators with detailed reports on the types of vulnerabilities discovered and 
the steps to patch the weaknesses. Due to the company's proactive steps, Continental 
Airline's systems were not compromised during the W32. Sasser attack (Chen, 2004). 
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Even from their first conception (in the Security Profile Inspector (SPI), by James 
Rothfuss) vulnerability assessment tools have revolutionized the need for proactive 
security measures. The SPI software was the first assessment tool to evaluate the process 
of file creation (Ray, 2003). Later in 1995 the potential of vulnerability scanners improved 
with the Security Administrator Tool for Analyzing Networks (SATAN) developed by Dan 
Farmer and Wietse Venema. The software scanned computers for misconfigurations 
through the Internet without requiring access to the computers. Progressively, Farmer and 
Venema expanded the software to hide the complexity behind the Web interface so any 
individual could operate the scanning process. Additionally, the scripts allowed for the 
detection of vulnerabilities in the systems (Ray, 2003). 
Now, vulnerability assessment tools can scan multiple networks faster and for specific 
vulnerabilities, such as assisting companies to locate user accounts that do not have a 
password, accounts that have expired or do not have expiration dates, or users who are still 
using the passwords given to them during the initial set up by vendors (Hulmes, 2004). 
3.2.2 Tasks of a vulnerability assessment tool 
In general, vulnerability assessment tools perform the following functions: 
scanning/mapping, data management, reporting, and analysis and recommendations. 
3.2.2.1 Scanning/mapping 
The scanning and mapping function perform the following (Sunbelt, 2004; Snyder, 2003): 
" Detect the mapped drives of a network or to actually detect network devices and 
how ther are inter-connected. 
47 
Chapter 3: Existing Methods of Vulnerability Management 
41 The detection, or discovery, of Operating System versions is important to 
determine how diverse a network is and if some of this diversity is arising from 
systems which are very old and need to be replaced. 
" The detection of the TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) in 
mapping allows the machine identities currently on the network to be determined 
and communicated with to determine their connection status. 
" Computers not having a standard connectivity could be located or detected on the 
network. 
" The determination of what ports are running on a server is vital toward the 
prevention of unauthorized network penetration. Although a server can have its 
standard secured ports running and available, the status and what the port is 
specifically being used for are important not only for the prevention of hacking, but 
the unauthorized use of resources on a network for personal reasons. 
" The further detection of network appliances such as switches, hubs and routers 
allows the determination of how these devices are connected in the network and if 
their arrangement could be abused to bypass some portion of network security. 
3.2.2.2 Data management 
The management of data on the network has become increasingly important and a key 
point of vulnerability scanners. Data management can include: 
" The amount of data traffic, 
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9 The size of the traffic to the number of recurrences of the traffic. 
The amount of the traffic can be a factor on a network during peak periods of a day such as 
in the morning when all the users are logging on at around the same time. This sudden 
surge in data traffic can create bottlenecks in network communication and a loss of 
efficiency. Vulnerability scanners can determine the peak times and any alternate 
connectivity, which may help to alleviate the slow down (Sunbelt, 2004; Snyder, 2003; 
Ray, 2003). 
The monitoring of the size of the data can be very essential to network performance. A 
large file or job traversing across a network can create several un-specific problems with 
the network and its computers overall performance. A very large transmission could also 
indicate a serious program or other problem. Unusual or unidentifiable occurrences of 
traffic on a network are also an important part of vulnerability scanners. The cause may be 
a violation of policy and/or security. The origin could also be emanating from a location 
that is not aware it is creating the disturbance. A past lack of large-scale monitoring of 
networks has left several procedures in standard practice, which can be detected by 
vulnerability scanning for the problems, and errors they can create (Sunbelt, 2004; Snyder, 
2003). 
3.2.2.3 Reporting 
The automated reporting feature of vulnerability scanning is a very important feature, 
which underscores an ease of use with automation. The ability to create reports of network 
difficulties is essential to documenting problems to be able to determine how to address the 
errors, and data analysis allows the administrators to specifically determine the problem 
rather than speculating and performing tests to see if the problem had been addressed. With 
the increasing complexity of networks it has become more difficult for not only a standard 
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administrator but even an advanced administrator to effectively determine the actual cause 
of a problem amidst the variety of possibilities created by a complex network. A 
vulnerability scanning program's ability to better track and report an error allows a better 
timeliness for finding the problem and a definite quality to the actual cause. Reporting 
even allows the comparison of a questionable occurrence with other network traffic to even 
better determine the best solution (Sunbelt, 2004; Snyder, 2003). 
3.2.2.4 Analysis and recommendations 
A good vulnerability scanner analyzes the scan results and provides recommendations for 
remedial action. Some scanners do this within the report; others provide links to the 
vendor's website or other online resources. 
Vulnerability remediation tools also exist, which work in conjunction with popular 
scanners to aggregate the results of the scans and automate the remediation process 
(Sunbelt, 2004). 
3.2.3 Vulnerability assessment types 
There are two basic methods of dealing with security breaches (Sunbelt, 2004): 
9 Reactive method; the reactive method is passive when a breach occurs, the 
system administrator responds to it, investigate how the intruder got in, and 
then resolve the vulnerability problem. 
" Proactive method; the proactive method is active, in this case the system 
administrator finds the vulnerabilities in his system, before the attackers 
discover and exploit them. 
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The ideal security system employs both reactive and proactive methods. Vulnerability 
assessment tools are proactive tools which enable system administrators to resolve the 
known vulnerabilities to prevent exploitation of them by the attackers, instead of 
responding after attack, thus decreasing the load on reactive mechanisms (Sunbelt 
Software, 2004). 
There are two major ways of classifying vulnerability assessment systems (Bace and Mell, 
2001): 
9 The location of the assessment tool as shown in Figure 3.?. 
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Figure 3.2: Vulnerability Assessment Types 
a) 1-lost-based: This is conducted by an application running on a specific 
computer and that specific computer is evaluated. 
b) Network-based: This is conducted by an application running on a server 
across the local area network. 
" The assumptions regarding the level of trust invested in the assessment tool. 
a) Credential. 
b) Non-credentialed. 
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The terms refer to whether the analysis is done with or without system 
credentials (such as passwords or other identification and authentication that 
grant access to the system internals) (Bace and Mell, 2001). 
The following sub-sections discuss the first classification for vulnerability assessment 
tools. 
3.2.3.1 Network-based assessment tool 
The network based vulnerability assessment tools evaluate or scan against one or more 
target servers across a network, as well as scanning remotely in ways similar to a hacker 
probe (Messmer, 2004). A compilation of vulnerability data is used to create network 
packets in a way that can be transmitted across a network to a server or group of servers to 
determine if a particular vulnerability exists (Rotondo, 2003). Additionally, an effective 
network based scanner should incorporate mapping and port scanning abilities, to assess 
networked computer systems for security vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the network based 
assessment tools can only evaluate the vulnerabilities that are known in their databases. 
This is why it is important to update the vulnerability databases regularly to ensure the 
potential vulnerabilities are listed for scanning (Fussell, 2004). 
Overall, the network-based vulnerability assessment tools do not require the system 
administrator's interaction. Also, the target system owners do not have to install anything 
on the target system for the vulnerability assessment tool to function. This ability protects 
the target server from corruption based on new code being introduced on the system or any 
degradation of performance to the system (McCollum, 2003). 
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In contrast, the network-based vulnerability assessment tool does not have direct access to 
the tile system on a target. Therefore it cannot detect whether, known vulnerabilities exist 
if file permissions are set incorrectly. Also, the network based scanners has an inability to 
scan fire«alls as shown in Figure 3.3. This figure reveals how the network based 
assessment tool will scan networks to evaluate all of the systems on the corporate network 
except those systems routed from the corporate network behind a firewall. The rationale 
for this problem is that the firewall is configured not to allow any File Transfer Protocol 
traffic; however, the file server that will be scanned may possess a vulnerable version of 
FTP software (Fussell, 2004). 
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Figure 3.3: Network-based vulnerability assessment tool 
This is a problem because the system serves various computers on its LAN segment. In 
order to prevent this scenario, a network scanning server is placed on the LAN segment, 
but inserting scanning servers on all segmented LAN's will likely introduce higher costs 
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and inefficient use of resources. Therefore, this may not serve as a viable option (Fussell, 
2004). 
3.2.3.2 Most-based vulnerability assessment tools 
I lost-based vulnerability assessment tools perform vulnerability scans. However, the major 
difference between the network-based and host-based tool is the host-based tool resides on 
the server being scanned. 
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Figure 3.4: Host-based vulnerability assessment tool 
This position allows the host scanner to scan practically anything. Also, since the agent has 
high-level privileges, it can be instructed to look for various items such as file permissions, 
running processes/services, password integrity, account integrity, system configurations 
and network settings. Figure 3.4 illustrates the Host-based assessment tool (Fussell, 2004). 
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Furthermore, the host-based vulnerability assessment tool locates and identifies the 
operating systems running on a particular host computer and tests it for weaknesses 
(Grimes, 2003). Additionally, the indicated server is used as the scanning server like 
network based vulnerability tools. The indicated server downloads new agent updates to all 
agents registered with it and verifies that all agent code is up to date (Fussell, 2004). Host- 
based vulnerability scanners are more expensive than network-based scanners. However 
the host based assessment tools generates detailed data compared to the network-based 
scanners. One of the major disadvantage of the host based scanners is that the computers 
have to remain idle for the software to perform the security scan (Messmer, 2004). Table 
3.2 illustrates the pros and cons comparison for Network-based and Host-based. 
Network Host 
Network-based scanning does not Host-based scanning is encrypted 
require the scanned systems to be from end to end. 
running any particular operating 
system. 
Pro Network scanning can be minimal Host-based scanning performs a 
cost. variety of more checks than 
network scanning. 
Network-based scanning requires Host-based scanning deploys 
nothing to be installed on target easily in existing network 
scanning systems. infrastructure. 
Network -based scanning is only Host-based scanning requires that 
encrypted between the scanning the operating systems being 
server and the console. scanned to be supported by the 
scanning software. 
Con Network scanning is limited to Host-based scanning can be 
what checks it can perform. expensive 
Network-based scanning requires Host-based scanning involves 
much involvement in existing installing software on systems to 
complex network infrastructures. be scanned. 
Source: Fussell, 2004 
Table 3.2: Pros and cons comparison 
The architecture of vulnerability assessment tools is discussed in the next section. 
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3.2.4 Architecture of vulnerability assessment tools 
Network vulnerability scanners generally comprise five components to its architecture: 
0 vulnerability database, 
0 user configuration console, 
" scanning engine, 
0 current active scan knowledge base, and 
" results repository and report generation tool. 
Each structure is illustrated in Figure 3.5 and is described in detail in the text that follows 
(Fussell, 2004). 
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Figure 3.5: Network-based vulnerability assessment tool structure 
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" Vulnerability database 
This database encompasses the operating system's vulnerabilities and instructions 
on how to identify them. The network scanner requires regular and ongoing updates 
since new vulnerabilities are discovered at a rapid pace. 
" User Configuration Console 
The system administrator operates the user configuration console. The console 
guides the scanning engine to the types of vulnerabilities to scan on a specific 
system. 
" Scanning engine 
When a selection is made on the console, the scanning engine, which is the main 
component of the assessment tool, produces packets. After the scanning engine 
creates the packets, they are transported to the computer system to test the chosen 
vulnerabilities (Security Innovations, 2004). 
" Current Active Scan Knowledge Base 
Overall, the active scan knowledge base is the intermediary process for the 
distribution of information from to scanning engine to the report generation tool. 
" Results Repository and Report Generation Tool 
The results repository collects information retrieved from the active scan 
knowledge base and stores the findings created by the scanning engine. Next, the 
report generation function develops reports in the results repository. The reports 
convey to the user the types of vulnerabilities located and on which system the 
vulnerabilities were found as well as the options selected from the console. 
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3.2.5 Functional requirements 
The vulnerability scanners run under the control of the operating system, such as Microsoft 
Windows or UNIX. Since vulnerability scanners are applications, a number of functional 
requirements are necessary to ensure the most effective functioning product. It is unlikely 
that one product will satisfy the entire set of requirements. Therefore, a company should 
select the vulnerability assessment scanner that incorporates the following functional 
requirements (eEye, 2003; Sunbelt, 2004; eEye, 2004; Compaq, 1998): 
9 Technology: The type of scanner to consider such as host versus network based 
scanner. 
9 Graphical User Interface (GUI): This is needed for system configuration and 
reporting. 
* Number of vulnerabilities listed in the database: The vulnerability scanner 
should have the capability of identifying the most common weaknesses. 
,* Ease of use: The ability for the system administrator to install and operate. 
* Reporting: The ability to generate accurate and detailed reports along with the 
ability to customize the reports. 
o Analysis and recommendations: The vulnerability scanner should identify the 
networks weaknesses and generate options for correcting them. 
Accuracy of analysis: The scanner should develop reports that include a low 
number of false positives or errors. 
Secure installation: The product should be supported with installation and 
configuration instructions to ensure that the application is securely installed. 
* Integrity: The product should provide an automatic integrity feature to ensure that 
the application cannot be modified or infected with malicious code. 
58 
Chapter 3: Existing Methods of Vulnerability Management 
e Ease of update: The vulnerability assessment capability should be easily updated. 
Ideally, software updates should be automatically downloaded and should not 
require reconfiguration of the system. 
* Alert option: When a significant vulnerability is detected, the system should be 
capable of issuing an alert in several ways, including automatic reporting through 
the GUI, electronic mail, and paging. 
* Scheduling: A scheduling feature should be provided to support the out of office 
hours assessment of specific network nodes. 
e Ability to repair vulnerabilities: This feature known as auto fixing is provided to 
automatically repair some of the system vulnerabilities, which allows the system 
administrator to centralize the deployment of the patches. 
o Open architecture: Allows the administrator to develop vulnerabilities tests and 
auditing modules tailored to an organization's precise requirements with any 
programming language. 
* CHAM (Common Hacking Attack Methods): These methods simulate the 
thought process of a hacker or security analyst in order to find holes in networks 
and software packages. CHAM is able to identify unknown vulnerabilities in 
networks (eEye, 2004). 
3.2.6 Analysis and comparison of vulnerability assessment tools 
Trials conducted by Network Computing (2001) evaluated five popular platforms to see 
the ability for each scanner in detecting published vulnerabilities and misconfigurations. 
Each scanner was run individually against all targets hosts then; all target hosts were 
rebooted before the next scanner was run. Scanners were updated with the latest 
vulnerability before they were in used. All tests were enabled, except those leading for 
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denial of service attacks. All five vulnerable machines were scanned in unison. CyberCop 
Scanner, Hackershield and Retina ran from a Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server system. 
Internet Scanner ran from an NT workstation. Nessus Security Scanner, SAINT and SARA 
ran from a Red Hat Linux 6.2 workstation. Table 3.3 illustrates the detection result, Nessus 
was the best in detection 15 out of 17, and the ISS and NetRecon both detected 13, Retina 
I 
was the lowest in detection with only 6.5 (Network Computing, 2001): 
Axent Bind eEye 
Scanner NetRecon View Digital ISS Nessus Cyber SARA SAINT 3.0+SU7 Hacker Security Cop 
Shield Retina 
Detection 
Result 13 12 6.5 13.5 15 12 10 9 
out of 17 1 
Table 3.3: Vulnerability Scanners detection result 
Table 3.3 shows clearly the contrast between the vulnerability scanners in detection result. 
Studies such as this reveal that all scanners are not the same, and show evidence that the 
vulnerability scanners are not enough for administrators to rely upon to tackle the 
vulnerability problem. The result could be worse for larger networks and applications. 
3.2.7 Disadvantages and limitations of vulnerability scanning 
Depending on the type of vulnerability scanning software used, the software does not go 
without its problems or considerations. Many vulnerability scanning software affect the 
devices that run on the computer. In order for the vulnerability scanning software to 
effectively search the system for weaknesses, the scanner may damage computer devices 
or cause the computer to crash (Bradley, 2005). Assessment tools do not provide a 
complete security solution. The following bullets recognized the disadvantages and 
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limitations of vulnerability assessment tools (Bace and Mell, 2001; Sunbelt Software, 
2004; ITSC, 2001; Rotondo, 2004; Bradley, 2005): 
* Hackers can use the tools to exploit the target vulnerable network. For example, 
The Security Innovation Software Security team (Security Innovation, 2004) has 
reviewed and test a group of available vulnerability scanning tools in UNIX, Linux 
and Windows operating systems. From the perspective of a potential attacker only 
not how useful these tools for system administrators. The test looked at: 
0 How deeply the tool has penetrated into the hacker community. 
0 How easy it is to be used by a hacker. 
0 How much damage the tool can do by hacker. 
The security threat rating of this test shows that Nessus, NeWT and Whisker are the 
highest ranking respectively. 
* The tools can only identify known vulnerabilities. 
9 No guarantee for the network to be immune against attacker. 
e Most recommendations can be done by system administrator, although some of 
them can be done by the tools without interactions from administrator. 
* Tools cannot replace human judgment. 
* May cause denial of service. For example, the scanners with auto fixing feature 
may cause denial of service when deploy the new patches. 
e Auto fixing feature has limited scope. 
9 Updating of scanners database by vendors, the vendors may delay the release of 
updating of known vulnerabilities. 
e Some scanners can run only on one kind of operating system (e. g. Nessus can only 
run on Linux). 
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om Risk of false positives. Sometimes, they report a vulnerability while there is not 
vulnerability. This is called "False positives" most vulnerability scanners report 
some false positives, particularly if the target machine is running software that 
intentionally lies to the computer sending data packets. Some firewalls, can be 
configured to report that all ports are open, implying all services are being offered. 
This confuses an attacker, but also leads to false positives for vulnerability testing 
systems (Ward, 2000). 
e False negatives. In many cases assessment tools do not find exist vulnerabilities. 
These false may be caused by configurations of the target machine (Ward, 2000). 
Furthermore, the major problems with host based vulnerability scanning software are 
(Fussell, 2004): 
* The cost is based on the number of target systems and a manager's license. 
* It requires code installation on the target system, and 
9 Its operation of the software's agents is an extensive process due to the numerous 
involvements of target system owners. 
In contrast, the problems associated with the network based vulnerability assessment tool 
are as follows: 
o The communications between the console and the scanning server is encrypted, but 
the communications between the scanning server and the target systems are not 
(Figure 3.3). Therefore, the communication process allows a hacker to visualize 
existing vulnerabilities on a particular server. Instead of scanning an unauthorized 
network port, hackers prefer authorized scanning server platform assessments to 
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detennine the networks traffic; rather than scanning the network and risking 
identification from security activity logs of the machine (Fussell, 2004). 
9 Network-based scanning is an intensive and time-consuming operation. The factors 
that affected on the assessing time for a single host including number and type of 
tests and network performance. The scanning process can place a heavy load on the 
target network, and can take several hours. So, it is desirable to perform the 
scanning after working hours (Fussell, 2004). 
3.2.8 Conclusion and future trend of vulnerability assessment tools 
As technology advances, the need for vulnerability scanners is one of the most important 
security tools available to companies, which allow system administrators to identify known 
vulnerabilities. However, the vulnerability assessment tool vendors have extensive work 
ahead of them to create a scanner that incorporates all of the essential functions for 
identifying and resolving weaknesses. Presently, technology has failed to create such a 
program, although several vulnerability scanners are close to ideal specifications of an 
effective vulnerability product. Vulnerability scanners are different to vulnerability 
databases, so, a system administrator cant rely on one scanner. 
I 
Additionally, because of the ever and rapidly changing technological world, vulnerability 
scanners have already become an important tool in the future development and design of 
networks. New discoveries and achievements in the fields of technology will always 
create new challenges for implementing them into a practical usage. These 
implementations will certainly always create a new activity on any existing network and 
would need to be evaluated for their best optimal use. Tools such as vulnerability scanning 
would need to be used for creating this avenue while monitoring for any violations, which 
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may be searching for weaknesses in the new technology. Future needs must be met and 
fully deployed. Finally, the scanners alone do not solve the vulnerability problem. 
3.3 Automatic updating systems 
The publication of risks of networks with aggressive worms has demanded better security 
configurations to reduce the vulnerabilities. The automatic downloading of patches and 
updates is included with more and more packages (Dunn, 2004). 
Companies with IT departments arc familiar with the routine of software requiring patches 
to extend the usability of the package and to rectify errors that were not discovered during 
their own system testing. Furthermore companies have become used to applying patches 
for vulnerabilities in the package that have been maliciously discovered and sometimes 
exploited (MacLeod, 2004). 
The increasing number of patches has put an increasing demand on the support centre staff 
of an IT operation to keep the systems working correctly no matter what threats are thrown 
at it. The problem often comes in with the volume of patches, their severity and the lack of 
time taken to correctly assess the validity of the patch, the soundness of the patch, applying 
the patch correctly, and determining that the system still works correctly. All this places a 
larger burden on support centre staff (MacLeod, 2004). 
3.3.1 Automatic updating systems products 
This section will outline MicrosofVs automatic updating system as an example of 
automatic updating products. Similar products also exist for other operating system 
platforms, such as Sun Microsystems, SuSE, etc. 
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Microsoft's Strategic Technology Protection Program (STPP) was launched in October 
2001 as a consequence of the Code Red and Nimda worms. The program was designed to 
help Microsoft customers to be secure, and includes the following security tools 
(Microsoft, 2001b): 
e Microsoft Software Update Services (SUS). 
* Microsoft Baseline Security Analyser (MBSA). 
3.3.1.1 Microsoft software update services (SUS) 
Microsoft Software Update Services (SUS) is designed to keep Windows-based systems up 
to date with the latest critical updates inside the corporate firewall. The administrator also 
receives an email when new updates are available. SUS consists both client-side and 
server-side and consists of two downloadable components (Microsoft, 2003b; Microsoft, 
2003c): 
* Microsoft Software Update Services. This is the server component. 
9 Automatic Updates. This is the Windows feature. When combined with SUS there 
are additional features it allows the downloading of the updates to be scheduled, 
and the use of a Group Policy Object Editor to manage the configuration of 
automatic updates. It also does a CRC check that the package has not been 
tampered with. 
There are some disadvantages to SUS. The first is that the updates are not pushed out to the 
corporations. They have to be retrieved manually or by scheduled update. The second is 
that it does not check if all updates have been successfully installed. The third is it does not 
handle application updates; these still need to be retrieved outside SUS. And finally it does 
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not deploy patches for third party software (Petri, 2004, Shinder, 2004). Infoworld argues 
that automatically pushing and installing patches may be an answer when viewing the 
number of clients that suffer from virus infections long after a patch is available (Evers, 
2003). 
The reporting available from SUS is limited and is located within the IIS logs. There are 
some scripts available to improve the reports (Hughes, 2003). Table 3.4 shows Microsoft's 
suggested recommendation for updating systems. 
Software Home User Small Medium Large 
Patching (One or Business Network (Up Network 
Needs several PC's) (Up to 50 to 500 PCs) (>500 PCs) 
PCs) 
Secure Windows Windows Windows Microsoft 
With Latest critical Update Update 
SUS SMS 
security updates 
Windows up-to 
date Windows Windows SUS 
Microsoft 
With Latest critical Update Update SMS 
updates 
Table 3.4: Microsoft's suggested recommendation for updating the systems 
3.3.1.2 Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA) 
The Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA) is a scanning tool that allows a home 
user or an administrator to scan one or more Windows-based computers for unpatched 
security holes. It has been designed to scan machines that are running Windows NT 4, 
2000, XP Professional, XP Home Edition and 2003, and can be executed from anY 
machine that is running any of these versions. MBSA uses the HFNetChk tool (Microsoft 
Network Security Hotfix Checker) to check the latest system updates. HFNetChk is a 
command-line tool that enables an administrator to check the patch status of Windows NT 
4.0,2000 and XP machines. HFNetChk does this by referring to updating Microsoft 
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security hotfixes XML database. MBSA reports in a Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
(Microsoft, 2004g). 
3.3.1.3 MBSA mechanism 
When the MBSA tool is run for the first time it will download the XML file so that the tool 
will be up-to date with the latest patches. The XML file is available on the Microsoft 
Download Centre web site. MBSA downloads the file, verifies the signature, and then 
decompresses the file to the local computer on which MBSA is running. After the file is 
decompressed, MBSA scans the selected computers to determine the operating system, 
service packs, and with programs are running. MBSA then parses the XML file and 
identifies security patches that are available for installation. To determine if a specific 
patch is installed on a given computer, three items are evaluated: the registry key that is 
installed by the patch, the file version, and the checksurn for each patched file (Microsoft, 
2004g). 
MBSA also effectively supports alternate namings of files, which allows the ignoring of 
the same fix packages for differrent locales and processors. It also supports both SUS and 
SMS for managing the download and installation of updates (Microsoft, 2003b). 
3.3.2 Automatic update risks 
Automatic update is seen as the way of providing fixes to vulnerabilities and adding 
functionality to or supplementing the application. The benefits for companies that lack 
resources to manual check for software updates for each piece of software used in a 
corporation are self-evident (Dunn, 2004). 
67 
Chapter 3: Existing Methods of Vulnerability Management 
But what are the costs? The danger in downloading of patches and installing them without 
interaction with users / administrators is not immediately apparent. 
Automatic updates systems may rely on automatic identity checking are open to spoofing 
identities and changing conditions of acceptance. Many automatic update applications rely 
on a similar methodology of searching the Internet for updates and downloading them. 
This is compounded by network security being relaxed to allow these applications to work 
cfficiently. Applications that can tunnel through perimeter protection should be closely 
monitored. They may provide safe checks but the extents of these are not exhaustive, 
especially for smaller updates (MacLeod 2004, Dunn 2004). An attack through these 
means may provide devastating results, but it is seldom that the source is readily identified 
(Dunn, 2004). 
There are three major pathways to exploitation: 
a) When a software product automatically checks for the latest update. The common 
method for this is to hard-code the DNS name of the update server into the software 
product. Thus all update is requested from the same server. 
The identification of the update server is vulnerable on several points: 
* DNS responses can be spoofed to map to a different site (different IP 
address). An attacker on sarne network who requests an update can use a 
combination of ARP spoofing, packet redirection and DNS spoofing to 
force a system to request updates from malicious site. The free tools are 
available for the attackers in the Internet. 
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* An external attacker could gain an access the same as local if the local 
network DNS server is vulnerable, such as BIND, 30% of the Internefs 
DNS servers are vulnerable to such attacks. 
b) Data integrity. It is easy to impersonate a trusted update source and forge 
authentication in a badly configured system. Thus, the fooled system will download 
and execute the file without checking the integrity of the file. 
c) Integrity of update payload - has every application used in the network been 
evaluated that it does not suffer from these failures. This opens corporation to 
installation of backdoor software, malware to destroy components or affect data 
integrity, self replicating worms, DDOS attack launches. 
3.3.3 Addressing the problems of automatic updating 
The use of vulnerable DNS must be in concert with other security measures to be valid. 
a) Do not use automatic authentication credentials. Allow administrators to specify 
the authentication credentials. 
b) Use encryption, and test thoroughly especially in the encryption initialization 
process. 
c) Validate the update payload to ensure it is what was intended to be sent / received. 
Implement PKI and a multi-tiered approach in case one component fails. 
d) Do not allow the automatic installation of patches. Perform the installation 
manually first (Dunn, 2004). 
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In addition to these risks, as Ufleder (2002) points out, if patch management is not backed 
with a whole risk management policy the correct application of patches, tested to the 
degree required by the organization, the defense of the system is not complete and cannot 
be effectively maintained. 
The parameters of Ufleder's paradigm are: 
a) There must be an accurate inventory of hardware and software including versions. 
b) Assess the patch before deploying it, even if the company only has a time frame of 
hours. 
3.4 Vulnerability databases 
The vulnerability database provides technical information about a vulnerability with 
technical advice/solution to solve the problem. There are many such lists and databases, 
most of which are made available for online public access, and anyone can subscribe to the 
mailing lists. At the top level, these sources can be categorized according to whether they 
are provided by a specific product vendor, such as Microsoft or Sun, or independent 
sccurity advisory groups. 
In many cases anyone can report a vulnerability to the operator of the vulnerability 
database, who in turn will do some preliminary analysis and forward a resulting report to 
the affected vendors as soon as is practical. In some cases, the database staff work with 
vendors on understanding the cause of the vulnerability and facilitate the development of 
solution. They also send vulnerability information to others who can contribute to the 
solution (Microsoft, 2004g). For example, in the case of vulnerabilities reports issued by 
the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Centre (CERT/CC), details are 
usually disclosed to the public after 45 days of the initial report. The schedule might be 
shortened if a threat is especially serious or they have evidence of exploitation already 
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having taken place. Conversely, the schedule might be lengthened if a threat requires 
"hard" changes, such as modifications, to core operating system components (CERT, 
2004b). 
3.4.1 CERT/CC 
The CERT/CC is a major reporting centrc for Inteme security problems. It provides 
technical advice and coordinates responses to security compromises, cooperates with other 
security experts to identify solutions to security problems, and analyzes product 
vulnerabilities and maintains a searchable database of problems. CERT/CC is part of the 
Networked System Survivability (NSS) program at the Software Engineering Institute 
(SEI), a federally funded US research and development centre operated by Carnegie 
Mellon University (CMU). CERT/CC was established in November 1988 after the Morris 
worm incident, which brought 10 percent of the Internet down (CERT, 2004b). The CERT 
website maintains advisories dating back to this point (CERT, 2004b). The CERT/CC 
monitors public sources of vulnerability information and receives vulnerability reports. 
They received about 18000 vulnerability reports since November 1988. CERT/CC experts 
analyze the potential vulnerabilities and work with product vendors and track their 
response. CERT/CC interacts with more than 600 software and hardware developers 
(CERT, 2004b). 
The information released by CERT/CC can be divided into three categories: advisories, 
incident notes and vulnerability notes. CERT advisories are limited to vulnerabilities that 
meet a certain severity threshold. Incident notes contain information that does not meet 
their criteria for alerts, but that might be useful to the Internet community. Finally, 
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vulnerability notes are very similar to advisories, but may have incomplete information. In 
particular, solutions may not be available for all vulnerabilities in the database. 
The Department of Homeland Security announced in September 2003 the creation of US- 
CERT, a partnership with CERT/CC. From this point, no new subscriptions were accepted 
to the CERT/CC advisories mailing list, and subscribers have the opportunity to subscribe 
to one or more mailing lists from US-CERT instead. The goal of US-CERT is to reduce the 
frequency and impact of cyber attacks to computer security incident response teams 
(CSIRTs), information sharing and analysis centres (ISACs), managed security service 
providers (MSSPs), information technology vendors, security product and service 
providers, and other organizations that participate in cyber watch, warning, and response 
functions. US-CERT utilizes CERT/CC to help prevent cyber attacks, protect systems, and 
respond to the effects of cyber attacks across the Internet (US-CERT, 2004b). 
The US-CERT released alerts about critical security issues for technical users bi-weekly. 
The biggest change from CERT/CC advisories is the increase in information for the 
general public. US-CERT alerts include the content of CERT/CC, also include additional 
information provided by public and private organisation (US-CERT, 2004b; CERT, 
2004c). The CERT/CC Advisories and Notes are fully CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures) compliant (CERT, 2004b). 
3.4.2 BugTraq 
BugTraq describes itself as: 
"A full disclosure moderated mailing list for the detailed discussion and 
announcement of computer security vulnerabilities: What they are, how to 
exploit them, and how to fix them" (BugTraq, 2004). 
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Since its original inception in November 1993, the list has grown to encompass over 
27,000 subscribers, and includes information relating to vulnerabilities, exploits and 
associated fixes for a wide variety of operating systems and application programs. 
As with the CERT offering, the database is completely searchable by vendor, title (product 
name, technology, etc), keyword, and CVE ID number, allowing users to easily find the 
information they need. The database is hosted by SecurityFocus. com, but is also licensed 
to security product and service vendors to allow them to create information resources for 
their employees and customers. 
A significant point to note in the case of BugTraq, in comparison to the other two sources 
discussed, is that vulnerability or patch information is not verified or validated before 
inclusion in the list. As a result, potential users are warned not to assume that the 
inforniation is correct, and are advised to wait until it is verified by other subscribers if 
they are not in a position to do so themselves (BugTmq, 2004). 
3.4.3 Microsoft Bulletins 
Microsoft Security Response Centre (MSRC): Microsoft has had a security response 
capability since 1996. It aims to keep customers safe by eliminating security vulnerabilities 
whenever they are found in a Microsoft product. They have set up a special email address 
to make it easy for customers to send reports. When they receive a mail from a customer, 
the first thing they do is determine whether it's really a report of a security vulnerability. 
Many of the emails they receive are security-related, but are not reporting potential 
security vulnerabilities. After determining the email is a report of a potential vulnerability, 
they move on to perform an initial assessment by produce the scenario the customer 
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reported, and may discuss the problem with the customer. If the report passes this test then 
they move on to a formal investigation of the potential report. For example, the centre 
received more than 5000 mails in the first eight months of 2000, only about 400 mails 
passed initial assessment. Representing ten percent of received reports pass initial 
assessment. And about ten percent of the formal reports perform genuine security 
vulnerability. Finally, only one percent of all received emails identify security vulnerability 
(Microsoft, 2006b). 
Customer reports are not the only source of potential security vulnerabilities. They 
constantly monitor security-related mailing lists like NTBugTmq, BugTraq, and 
Win2kSecAdvice, as well as a variety of security-related web sites. Consequently when 
they see reported security vulnerability on one of these sites, they do initial assessment, 
and then move on to formal report if it passes this test. They also receive reports from 
teams within Microsoft. For example, customer support teams might discover a 
vulnerability while helping customers, the customer support team report the vulnerability 
to MSRC (Microsoft, 2004h). 
In the vast majority of cases, they deliver a software fix via either a service pack or a patch. 
A service pack corrects a large nwnber of bugs, including security vulnerabilities. Even in 
the case where they provide a fix via a patch, they also include it in the next service pack 
for the product. A patch corrects only one specific vulnerability, and should only be 
installed by customers who are directly affected by the vulnerability manually or use 
automatic update. Even so, building a patch is no easy task. The patch needs to not only 
eliminate the vulnerability, but also do so without introducing any changes in system 
behaviour that will cause new problems. Once the patch has completed testing, they release 
it to public. The vulnerability patch cost Microsoft about $ 100,000 (Microsoft, 2004c). 
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From October 2003, Security bulletins will be released on the second calendar Tuesday of 
every month. An additional security bulletin summary document per product family will be 
issuccl monthly. 
The benefit of switching to a monthly basis of release patches is to minimise system 
administrator burden when install multiple patch rather than install single patch. The 
second benefit is to give system administrator enough time to test the new patches before 
deploy them. The third bcncf it is the release schedule allows system administrators to plan 
and arrange for deploying patches. 
The subscription with Microsoft bulletins is open for public and can be done automatically 
(Microsoft, 2004b). I'lie total number of Bulletins for June 1998 until March 2006 is 473 
(Microsoft, 2006c). 
3.4.4 Linux advisories 
Linux security goal is to provide a centralized security advisory resource to members of the 
Linux/BSD/Open Source communities. They are currently monitoring and maintaining up 
to date listings of advisories for many of the major Linux and BSD distributions. The 
Linux Security Advisories web site displays the most recent fifteen advisories. For more 
advisories it is available in the vendor link. Also the advisory listing is available in RDF 
fonnat (Linux, 2004). 
3.4.5 Redhat advisories 
Red Hat general advisories release three categories: security alerts, bug fix alerts, and 
enhancement alerts. Each alert is comprised of a summary of the problem and the solution, 
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including the RPM packages required to fix the problem. Currently supported products 
(new versions) are indicated in the Advisories web page, the advisories are issued. The old 
versions are unsupported (the advisory is no longer being issued) which is indicated by 
unsupported, and the user can upgrade his old version to the updated one (supported 
product). 
The Redhat-uratch list is for announcements from Red Hat, Inc. regarding critical bug fixes 
and security issues in Red Hat Linux and related products (Redhat, 2004b). 
3.4.6 SuSE 
SuSE runs two free security mailing list services to which any interested parties may 
subscribe. The first mailing list is the general/Linux/SuSE security discussion. The second 
mailing list is SuSE's announce-only mailing list. All SuSE's security announcements are 
sent to both mailing lists (SuSE, 2004b). 
3.4.7 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) 
CVE is a list of information security vulnerabilities that aims to provide common names 
for publicly known problems (CVE, 2004). The MITRE Corporation maintains CVE and 
moderates Editorial Board discussion; it is a not-for-profit corporation working in the 
public interest in partnership with government clients. It addresses issues of critical 
national importance, and is funded by federal government. The goal of CVE is not to 
provide a database in its own right, but rather to make it easier to share data across separate 
vulnerability databases and security tools by providing a common enumeration. After a 
vulnerability is discovered and reported, it is assigned a CVE candidate number (CAN) and 
proposed to the CVE Editorial Board for consideration. The board then discusses the new 
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vulnerability and votes on whether it should become a full CVE entry. If the candidate is 
rejected, the reason for rejection is noted in the Editorial Board Archives posted on the 
CVE Web site. If the candidate is accepted, it is entered into CVE and is published via the 
site, along with a description, and the candidate number is converted into a CVE name. 
The CVE Editorial Board includes representatives from numerous security-related 
organisations such as security tool vendors, academic institutions, and government, as well 
as other prominent security experts. CVE relies on certain mechanisms to handle newly 
emerging information. The information could be posted to mailing lists such as Bugtraq, 
CERT, or other organizations that are designed to handle new information. Many of these 
organisations have a presence on the CVE Editorial Board. Thus, new entries will make it 
into CVE once they have been verified through these other mechanics. CVE-compatible 
means that a tool, Web site, database, or other security products uses CVE names in other 
products that allows it to be cross-referenced with other products that employ CVE names 
(CVE, 2004). In the last CVE version 20040901, the total CVE entries: 3052 and the total 
candidate CAN: 12144 (CVE, 2006). 
3.5 Vulnerability alert services 
A vulnerability alert service provides IT networks of the new vulnerabilities that are 
relative to their systems, the alert service is very valuable service to the system 
administrators (Sintelli, 2004). Vulnerability databases providing alert services provide an 
early warning of vulnerabilities. Often they are published before being confirmed by the 
software vendor. Thus the credibility of the vulnerability report needs to be verified. 
(Sintelli, 2004; Elkarra, 2003) The reason an enterprise is interested in a vulnerability 
reporting service is to be aware of the current security of their IT infrastructure investment. 
Prompt reporting saves the employees from searching for new vulnerabilities therefore 
saving time and costs (Sintelli, 2004). A Security Focus survey showed that security 
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personnel can spend an average of 2.1 hours a day just trying to determine whether 
advisories are applicable to their enterprise (Elkarra, 2003). 
3.5.1 Alert system criteria 
The following criteria and functionality should be considered: 
* Database of vulnerabilities 
The seller of security services needs to have an up-to-date database of known 
vulnerabilities. In 2004 this number had exceed 13,000 vulnerabilities with 1,500 
being prior to 1999 (Sintelli, 2004; Shimanek, 2004). 
There is a large difference in the classification of vulnerabilities between different 
vendors. This has been partially remedied with many vendors using CVE 
compatibility as a classification tool. However, in comparing products, the different 
vendors do not use the same terminology in their specification sheets. Some prefer 
to quote the software they cover, rather than the vulnerabilities they cover. 
o CVE compliant 
A standardized list of names has been published for information security and 
vulnerability exposures by the Mitre Corporation with industry consensus (Elkarra, 
2003). This assists in the analysis of the authenticity of vulnerabilities, and unique 
naming, making it easier to determine which have to be patched and have been 
patched. It also assists in determining if all points of a particular vulnerability have 
been addressed (Sintelli, 2004). 
* Vulncrability ratings 
Each software vendor has a different rating system for the vulnerabilities that they 
have acknowledged. Unacknowledged vulnerabilities don't have a rating. Alert 
services can help the enterprise by providing an independent rating for 
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vulnerabilities across software vendors, allowing the enterprise to better assess their 
total exposure and the time frame of the likely appearance of a patch (Sintelli 
2004). 
Related to enterprise IT infrastructure 
Each year many vulnerability are reported. However, each one may affect only a 
small number of software applications, or only particular versions of that software. 
It is much more relevant to the enterprise if only applicable alerts are forwarded to 
them (Sintelli, 2004). 
Further the alert levels cater for the level required by the enterprise. Thus they may 
want to receive critical alerts by SMS, but minor ones by email. Most enterprises 
would also like to limit their exposure, thus requiring 240 advisories (Sintelli, 
2005; ThreatFocus, 2004). 
3.6 Conclusions 
This chapter discussed different vulnerability approaches. It discussed the vulnerability 
assessment tools focusing on the number of vulnerabilities that each tool can detect and the 
weaknesses of assessment tools. This chapter also introduced the software automatic 
updating systems, describing the mechanism of it. The chapter has showed how the 
automatic updating system can be misused. Further more the chapter introduced the 
vulnerability databases which represent the source for vulnerability information for IT 
organizations and different vulnerability approaches. Finally the chapter discussed the 
alerting systems showing the need for notification of the problem. The current approaches 
show clearly the need for a comprehensive vulnerability management system, which can 
address both the notification and rectification of problems. The first step towards 
furthering research is to study the vulnerability problem in reference environment. The 
next chapter presents a benchmarking study. The study will commence by discussing the 
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vulnerability statistics of very well-known databases and then benchmarking the impacts 
and finally the implications of findings. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Having introduced a number of the key information repositories in previous chapters, it is 
now relevant to examine the number of incident reports or advisories that the repositories 
make available for security-conscious system administrators to consider. According to the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), software bugs cost the U. S. 
economy $60 billion dollars per year (Andriole, 2003). The following subsections discuss 
the vulnerability statistics of very well-known databases, a benchmarking study to 
determine the overhead these may represent for administrators, and finally the implications 
of the findings. 
4.2 Vulnerability statistics 
Table 4.1 shows the number of reported vulnerabilities recorded in recent years. 
According to CVE Version Number: 20040901, CVEs were not archived until 1999. The 
two CVE rows in the table represent CVE entry and candidates that were not accepted as 
full CVE entries (CVE, 2006). 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
CVE 821 808 625 643 81 75 - 
CAN 731 395 771 947 1047 1697 3052 
Total 1552 1203 1396 1590 1128 177 12 3052 
Table 4.1: CVE Statistics 
Figure 4.1 clearly shows that the problem is worsening, where the number of 
vulnerabilities for 2005 exceeds the total number for 2004 and 2003, and that this period 
represents the highest number of vulnerabilities for any reported year. 
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Figure 4.1: CVE Statistics (1999-2005) 
The scale of the problem is also reflected in tindings from other sources. For example. 
statistics from the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Centre 
as shown in Figure 4.2. indicate that the total number of vulnerabilities reported to them in 
2002 and 200-3 were 4,129 and 3,784 respectively, and 3,780 for 2004. While the later 
figures show a slight decrease. all three figures are markedly risen compared to the 
previous years. The number of reported vulnerabilities in 2005 was 5,990, which 
represents the highest number (CERT, 2006). 
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Figure 4.2: CERT vulnerability reports (1995-2005) 
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In a further example, Symantec's widely-cited Internet Security Threat Report IX, (2006) 
states that during the second half of 2005,1.896 new vulnerabilities were identified. which 
represents a 34% increase from the 1,416 new vulnerabilities identified during the second 
halt' of 2004. and a 60.3% increase from the 1.180 vulnerabilities identified during the 
second halt' of 2003. Figure 4.3 shows the docurnented vulnerabilities in the Symantec 
database from 2001 onwards. As shown in Figure 4.3. the first half of 2003 marked the 
first consecutive increase in total volume. Between the first half of 2001 and the first half 
ot'200'1. the total number increased steadily. After a drop-off in disclosure activity in the 
second halfot'2003, it again rose tor four halt'-year periods of 2004 and 2005 and is now 
exceeding the peak level seen in the first half of 2003 by 25% (Symantec, 2006). 
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Figure 4.3: Symantec documented vulnerability statistics 
Figure 4.4 clearly shows the increase in reported vulnerabilities when assessed on a ý, veekly 
basis. Over the second half of 2005, a weekly average of 79 was disclosed, which is slight 
increase from 78 per week in the first half of 2005, constituting one additional vulnerability 
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per week. Over the second half of 2004 an average of 58 new vulnerabilities were identified 
per week. 
90 
80 
40 70 
60 
50 
40 
30 to 
20 
10 
0 
Figure 4.4: Vulnerabilities reported pervveek 
I'lils means that system administrators currently have 21 additional vulnerabilities to 
address per week, on average, than they did one year ago (Symantec, 2006). 
For tile second half of 2005,853) docurnented vulnerabilities in the Symantec database were 
rated as high severity, a figure that represents 45% of the total documented vulnerabilities. 
W'hile the percentage of the high severity over the first halfot'2005 and the second half of 
2004 were 49% and 50% respectively (Syniantec, 2006). 
The Symantec Threat Report IX states that states that 986 (52%) documented 
vulnerabilities over the second half of 2005 were classified as moderate severity, while in 
the first half of the same year, 898 (48%) of documented vulnerabilities rated as moderate 
severity. and in the second half of 2004,666 (47%) were classified as moderate severity. 
For the past two periods the Symantec Threat Report VII states that documented 
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vulnerabilities were classified as moderate severity, over the first half of 2004, and the 
second half of 2003 were, 50% (638) and 54% (639) respectively (Symantec, 2005). 
The threat reports VII and IX states that the Symantec database rated 3% vulnerabilities as 
lower severity over the periods second half and first half of 2005, and second half of 2004 
of the total documented vulnerabilities. This figure is lower than for the first half of 2004, 
during which period 4% were rated as low severity, and slightly higher than the second half 
of 2003, during which 2% of vulnerabilities were classified as low severity. 
Overall, high severity and moderate severity vulnerabilities represented 97% of the total 
from the second half of 2004 onwards. This figure shows an increase from 95% during the 
first half of 2004. Symantec's Internet Security Threat Reports IX and VII explain the 
increase number in moderate and higher severity vulnerabilities into three reasons: 
0 The interest of the researcher is to find and report moderate high severity 
vulnembilities; 
0 Over 80% of documented vulnerabilities over the periods that covered in IX and 
VII threat reports are remotely exploitable. 
0 The commercialization of vulnerability information. Which means the 
researcher will not give enough attention to the low severity vulnerabilities. 
Over the second half of 2005,1498 vulnerabilities (79%) were classified as easily 
exploitable. During the first half of 2005,1366 (73%) of documented vulnerabilities were 
classified as easily exploitable. In the second half of 2004, this figure was 1005 (71%). It 
is evident that the figure increasing over three periods. Symantec attributed this to the 
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possibility that the same researchers are consistently finding the same types of 
vulnerabilities and the increase in web application vulnerabilities (Symantec, 2006). 
According to the IX report, 73% of easily exploitable vulnerabilities in the second half of 
2005 did not require any exploitability code at all. This is 18% increase from the first half 
of 2005, and 35% increase from the second halt' of 2004 (Symantec, 2006). The rise in 
easily and remotely exploitable vulnerabilities increases the chances of exploitation. and 
hence the challenge for security administrator. 
This problem is reflected by yet another source, which is Remote Assessment*s 
Int'Orniation Security Vulnerability Statistics, released in July 2003. Figure 4.5 shows the 
total number ot'reported vulnerabilities in their vulnerability database for the period from 
January 1997 to July 20033, also sho\vs the rating of the vulnerability i. e. high risk, medium 
risk and low risk vulnerability. The chart clearly shows that the number of vulnerabilities is 
increasing steadily and the number of vulnerabilities recorded for July 2003 is the highest 
t'Or a single month in the seven-year period (Rernote Assessment. 2005). 
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Figure 4.5: Remote Assessment Vulnerability Trend Analysis 
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Another example is the Secuma vulnerability database statistics where they monitor 
NUInerabilities in more than 8.500 products for different operating systems. Figure 4.6 
illustrated the advisory statistics on monthly basis from January 2003 up to the second 
week of March 2006. The chart shows clearly the increase in the number of advisories, 
although the fluctuation of monthly amount of released advisories by Secunia. While. 
Figure 4.7 illustrates the exploitation side statistics. Both figures reinforce the previous 
statistics about the significant increasing ofthe vulnerability problem. 
Figure 4.6: Secunia securit-v advisories (2003-2006) 
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Figure 4.7: Secunia exploitation side statistics 
An analýsis by Yankee Group shows that during the 12-month period from March 2004. 
there ý%as a significant increase in the number of vulnerabilities in security products 
(Yankee Group, 2005). 
4.2.1 Statistics comparison 
Figure 4.6 shows statistics relating to the total number of vulnerabilities reported each 
year. in the period from 1999 to 2005. The statistics are based upon the three public 
databases described in the previous subsections. The CVE figures show reported 
vulnerabilities and hence include candidates that were not accepted as full CVE entries. 
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Figure 4.6: CVE, (TRT and Symantec total vulnerabilities reported (1999 - 2005) 
It is also interesting to consider the way in which the totals from Figure 4.6 break domi into 
nionthly averages, as this more directly reflects the likely \, vorkload of any system 
administrator interested in addressing the problem. Table 4.2 represents a summarý, of the 
previous figures in this context. and illustrates clearly that throughout 2005 the problem 
increased significantly. Indeed. the CERT figures reveal that the average number of 
%ulnerabilities reported in 2005 increased more than five-fold compared to the average 
figure for the whole of 2000. and increased more than 57% from the previous year. The 
average figure for 2002 represents a four-fold increase compared to the average figure for 
2000. and an increase of more than 76% compared to the average from 2001. 
Ycar 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
CVE 29 23 27 31 22 34 59 
CERT 8 23 47 79 73 73 115 
0* Symantec 10 25 28 50 51 51 72 
Table 4.2: CVE, CERT and Symantec average vulnerability reported per week (1999 
-2005) 
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Comparing the vulnerability statistics of CVE, CERT and Symantec, it is evident that they 
differ in terms of the total number and the consequent averages. One reason for this is that 
the editorial boards of the databases do not use the same standard reference in assessing the 
vulnerabilities reported to them, and varying procedures are used to study any new 
vulnerability. This has knock-on effects in tenns of the vulnerabilities that are then passed 
on in reports. A second reason for the differences is that each database has different 
sources of reported vulnerabilities, which make it difficult for administrators to rely upon 
only one database in order to maintain vulnerability awareness. The impacts of this are 
examined later in the discussion. 
The Global Information Security Survey 2004 identifies the respondents' use of common 
information security which is illustrated in Table 4.3 to improve the security based on 
industry stratifications. The survey surnmarises the results in a typical organisation. 
Vulnerability management services Yes 
Maybe in 
2004 
Global 50% 24% 
Health Services 51% 31% 
Financial Services 62% 20% 
Manufacturers 39% 25% 
Public sectors 50% 22% 
Technology 54% 23% 
Retail 52% 30% 
Transportation 44% 40% 
Source: Global Infonnation 2004 
Table 4.3: Respondent's use of common information security 
4.3 Benchmarking the impacts 
In order to obtain a clearer impression of what the figures mean in practice, it is useful to 
consider the impacts of addressing vulnerabilities in practical context. To this end, this 
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section presents the results of a benchmarking exercise, in which the total number of 
patches required within a reference environment were traced over a 12-month period (I 
July 2000 to 30 June 2001). The environment in question was an independently managed 
sub network, comprising ten end-user systems and servers (i. e. web and mail) running a 
range of operating systems and applications that it would not be unusual to find together in 
a modem IT installation, and enable to analyse in detail of the application and other 
software that these machines were running. Relevant products were identified by referring 
back to the bulletins that were released over 12 month period, and identifying those that 
would be relevant to the target machines. This process focused upon a variety of different 
vulnerability sources (i. e. software vendor's bulletins, and public vulnerability databases). 
Table 4.4 shows the full list of 'operating systems and applications considered, alongside 
the total number of vulnerabilities and patches required within the reference environment. 
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Vulnerabilities 
Soffivare reported Clients affected 
Total patches 
(I Jul 00 - 30 required 
Jun 01) 
Windows NT 13 (a) 10 130 Workstation 4 
_ Windows 2000 27 (a) 1 27 
_ Office 2000 SR-I 6 (a) 10 60 
Office 97 6 (a) 2 12 
_ Windows 98 11 (a) 2 22 
_ Netmeeting 1 3 3 
_ Media player 6.4 2 (a) 10 20 
Adobe Acrobat I (b), (c), (d) 9 9 4.0 
Macromedia Flash I (b), (c), (d) 1 1 5 
Red Hat 7.1 19(d) 
(19/4/2001- 1 19 
26/6/2001) 
Sendmail 8.11.2 1 (e), (f), (c) 
(1/3/2001- 3 3 
30/6/2001) 
SuSE 6.4 44 (g) 3 132 
SuSE 6.1 37 (g) 1 37 
Netscape 4.76 1 (e), (f) 3 3 
Linux Kernel 2 (e), (f), (c) 2 4 2.2.14 
Linux Kernel 2 (e), (f), (c) 1 2 2.4.2 
Linux Kernel I (e), (c) 1 1 2.2.18 
Apache 2.0 1 (e), (c) I I 
Total 175 486 
(a) Microsoft Security Bulletin, http: //www. microsoft. com/technet/itsolutions/security/cuffent. asp 
(b) BugTraq, http: //www. securityfocus. com 
(c) httpJ/icat. nistgov/icat. cfm 
(d) http: //www. linuxsecurity. com/advisorics/indcx. html 
(C) BugTraq database, http: //www. securityfocus. com 
(0 httpd/www. cert. org/ 
(g) httpJ/www. susc. conVus/support/sccurity/index. htmi 
Table 4.4: Total vulnerabilities for software used and requiring patches 
It was determined that there were a total of 175 distinct patches during the benchmarking 
period that were applicable to the systems used within the reference environment. This 
resulted in a monthly average of 40 patches to be applied across the ten end systems. An 
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immediate observation is that such a figure could have significant workload implications 
for such a small environment, where the administration duties (including security) would 
typically be handled by a single person, and quite often as only a part-time activity. 
Furthennore, if the network were enlarged, then the burden of patches would increase 
correspondingly. 
The time taken to apply patches can be extremely variable, and while some may be applied 
fairly quickly on the fly, others demand more involved activity and may, for example, 
necessitate the restart of a system. These factors have a further influence on the 
administrator's workload, as well as potential implications for the availability of the 
system to other users. 
As the footnotes to Table 4.4 suggest, the information above was collated from a number 
of different sources, including the three lists discussed in the previous section, as well as 
product/vendor-specific sources. Ideally, it would be desirable for an administrator to 
simply be able to rely upon a single source of advisory information, such as one of the 
generic lists already discussed. However, looking at the number of vulnerabilities reported 
in each source in relation to the same product reveals another complicating factor, in that 
each database records a different number of reports. This is illustrated in Table 4.5, in 
relation to the Windows NT 4 and SuSE Linux 6.1 operating systems. In the case of 
Windows NT the product-specific source was Microsoft's Security Bulletins, whereas for 
SuSE the reference was Linux security advisories, and these are contrasted with the 
number of reports issued by CVE, CERT and BugTraq in the same period (July 2000 to 
June 2001). 
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Vendor 
Application bulletins CVE CERT BugTraq 
advisories 
Windows NT 13 11 (6 CVE 1 2 
Workstation 4 +5 CAN) 
SuSE 6.1 37 6 (CAN) 2 16 
Table 4.5: Comparison of vulnerabilities advisories from product-specific and generic 
sources 
As one might well expect, the vendor/product-specific sources provide the most 
comprehensive number of reports, but this is only of practical benefit if an organization 
happens to source all of its operating system and application software from a single 
vendor. In any other situation, an administrator is still forced to monitor multiple sources 
to guarantee being fully informed. 
4.4 Implications of findings 
The findings from the various phases of this investigation enable some clear conclusions to 
be drawn regarding the problem of vulnerabilities as currently experienced. Firstly, the 
statistics collected from the vulnerability databases show that the problem is increasing, 
largely independently of any specific operating system or application environment. In 
addition, unlike some other security issues such as viruses, it is not generally the case that 
old vulnerabilities can be relied upon to disappear in order to make way for new ones. 
With viruses, the problems posed by older strains are largely eradicated if the user or 
organization concerned is using recent enough anti-virus software that includes the 
appropriate signatures to enable detection. The result of this is that older viruses 
effectively die off in the wild. The same cannot, however, be said of vulnerabilities. Even 
when operating system vulnerability may have been recognized for some time, the original 
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vulnerable version of that software may still be being shipped - and it continues to rely 
upon administrators to apply the appropriate patches or service packs after installing it. 
Maintaining awareness of the vulnerabilities of relevance is far easier said than done. In 
order to do this effectively, administrators are currently obliged to monitor multiple 
sources of information rather than being able to rely solely upon one reliable source. For 
example, whilst Microsoft Security Bulletins may represent a suitably timely and 
comprehensive means of monitoring issues relating to products such as Windows and 
Off ice, they do not help at all if the organization runs other operating systems or 
applications from other vendors - so it becomes necessary to monitor and assess these as 
well, which equates to additional administrative burden. Of course, the majority of 
vulnerability advisory sources enable interested parties to subscribe to an email list, and 
thereby receive the advisory messages automatically, as opposed to the administrator 
having to actively go and search for them. Whilst this certainly helps to reduce part of the 
burden, it does not alleviate it altogether. For example, the administrator must still read 
each bulletin or advisory message that arrives in order to determine whether or not it 
requires action. In many cases it may be determined that this may not be the case - 
bulletins will very often be received that relate to a software product or version that an 
organization does not use. However, in order to establish this, irrelevant material must 
firstly be read, and potentially investigated, which ultimately serves only to waste time. 
The benchmarking study has shown that the implications of the problem go beyond simply 
monitoring and maintaining awareness of the problem, and that actually addressing them in 
a practical environment has major workload implications for a system administrator - even 
within the context of a relatively small environment such as that studied. In some cases, the 
number of systems may run into the thousands, whereas the administration team may 
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number less than ten. Relating this to the number of patches released per month, this could 
lead to the administrator having to patch more than 100 machines per day. 
Of course, the problem of vulnerabilities cannot simply be ignored - this is too risky and 
the evidence already shows that the problem is not just a theoretical one. The existence of 
vulnerabilities is well understood in the hacker community, and such weaknesses are 
frequently exploited in practical assaults upon systems. For example, according to 
Attrition. org, 99% of the 5823 web site defacements that occurred during 2000 were 
facilitated as a result of failures to address known vulnerabilities, for which the patches 
were already available (CNET, 2001). 
All of these observations lead to the natural question of what can be done to overcome, or 
at least reduce, the problems in order to make the situation more manageable. In this 
respect, two issues can be considered, both relating to the automation of what are currently 
manual processes. The first issue concerns reducing the problem of information overload 
for administrators, and requires a means by which administrators can be notified of new 
vulnerabilities in a manner that flags only the advisories that are likely to be of relevance to 
them. Such filtration and prioritisation of available advisories would enable administrators 
to direct their efforts more effectively, reducing the amount of time lost following up 
irrelevant material and enabling genuine problems to be addressed more quickly. 'Mis, 
however, does not overcome the problem that, having obtained the relevant information, 
they then have to act upon it. Finding the time to do this can be an equally, if not more, 
demanding task, and a further valuable element of desirable automation would therefore be 
an active vulnerability resolver, capable of acting upon the notification data above in place 
of the administrator. This is by no means a trivial undertaking and it is recognized that 
allowing autonomous control over the update of a system could itself represent a security 
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vulnerability and, as such, the mechanisms must be designed so as to rectify weaknesses in 
a stable and trusted manner, as well as to guard against compromise of the approach (e. g. 
by parties with a malicious intent). 
The proposed solutions are not trivial to achieve. Even with the information gathering 
aspect, there are challenges to address, including ensuring that any automated agent does 
not inadvertently filter out and discard relevant information. The automated rectification is 
more problematic, in that it would need to guard against causing inconvenience or indirect 
denial of service to legitimate users (e. g. any rectification agent must not, for example, take 
the system down to install a patch whilst users are working). Furthermore, the framework 
would need to ensure the validity of the patches and corrections that it tries to apply - 
using, for example, digital certificates to verify the legitimacy of the source. Without this, 
hackers could misuse the rectification agent as a means of getting the target system to 
accept malicious code. 
These proposals contrast significantly with current marketplace solutions for vulnerability 
resolution as described in chapter 3. The available alert systems only offer a notification 
process. Although some current scanners do include auto-update features that enable them 
to be aware of and detect the latest vulnerabilities (eEye, 2004b), these require specific 
actions on the part of the product vendors, who must release the associated update for their 
product. Where products also include 'fix-it' technology, allowing administrators to 
rectify some issues automatically, these often relate merely to configuration details and do 
not take care of significant software upgrades or patches (Forristal and Shipley, 2001). 
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The next chapter presents a framework for automating the vulnerability notification 
process. This includes a proposed mechanism for harmonising the various reporting 
formats, and represents the first stage of an overall vulnerability management system. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The scale of the vulnerability problem can be seen from the previous chapter. A means is 
required to enable administrators to be more selective in terms of the information that they 
receive. Ideally, notification should occur in a manner that flags only the advisories that are 
likely to be of relevance to the software and network configuration in the target 
organisation, and gives an indication of their relative importance. Such filtration and 
prioritisation of available advisories would enable administrators to direct their efforts 
more effectively, reducing the amount of time lost following up irrelevant material and 
enabling genuine problems to be addressed more quickly. 
It is suggested that the above could be achieved via an automated software agent, which 
allows administrators to define the information that they are interested in receiving and 
then filters and prioritises incoming advisory reports accordingly. The ability to perform 
such automatic filtering is currently complicated for reasons addressed in previous 
chapters. 
This chapter examines the vulnerability advisories by analyzing the different vendor's 
formats and their contents. This chapter also presents a suggested generic vulnerability 
format as an important issue of automation of the notification of the vulnerability problem. 
5.2 Obtaining relevant vulnerability information 
If system administrators wish to maintain awareness of vulnerabilities affecting their 
systems, then it is necessary for them to have appropriate sources of information. A 
number of publicly accessible sources are available that maintain repositories of the 
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associated warnings and advisory reports, which can be categorised according to whether 
they are provided by a specific vendor (e. g. Microsoft or Sun), or a vendor independent 
group. In the next section some examples of vulnerability advisory sources are 
summarised. Each vulnerability-reporting source releases its infonnation in a different 
format, and they do not provide a consistent set of details (so, the same vulnerability would 
be described in different ways by different reporters). 
As one might well expect, the vendor/product-specific sources provide the most 
comprehensive number of reports, but this is only of practical benefit if an organisation 
happens to source all of its operating system and application software from a single 
vendor. In any other situation, an administrator may end up needing to monitor, or 
subscribe to, multiple sources, each of which may provide a different level of information. 
Even if the organisation does only use software from one vendor, monitoring alternative 
sources might still be relevant, because generic security sites may issue an alert before the 
vendors formally acknowledge a vulnerability issue or release a patch. 
Most sources enable the administrators to subscribe to mailing lists rather than having to 
manually monitor the information from a website. However, although this is clearly helpful 
to some extent, it can also lead to administrators receiving large amounts of information 
unrelated to their systems. For example, subscribing to Microsoft Security Bulletins would 
not only yield messages relating to Windows XP, but also any other products from 
Microsoft's portfolio (some of which the recipient organisation might also run, but also 
many that it would not likely use). The consequence of this is that the volume of incoming 
information that they need to consider may quickly overwhelm administrators. For 
example, the administrator must still read each bulletin or advisory message that arrives in 
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order to determine whether or not it requires action. However, in order to establish this, 
potentially irrelevant material must firstly be read, and potentially investigated, which 
ultimately serves only to waste time. This overhead may in turn lead to administrators 
postponing consideration of the advisories until they have time in their schedule to 
examine many of them at one time (which may result in published vulnerabilities 
remaining unaddressed for a much longer period, leaving a greater window of opportunity 
for exploitation). Worse still, they become complacent about the situation particularly if 
the majority of advisories that they have to work through turn out not to be relevant to their 
systems. 
5.3 Vulnerability advisories 
This section discusses advisories and their formats. An advisory is a notification from a 
software vendor or a third party of advised or verified vulnerabilities in software products. 
The information provided in advisories includes the criteria on which to rate the 
importance, urgency and necessary of fixing vulnerability in relation to the software 
configurations of all the supported clients. 
So with this in mind this section tries to achieve a junction between several entities: 
a) The information in the advisory. 
b) A reliable way of extracting information from the advisory - the rules. 
c) How to hold the information. 
d) The criteria to assess the urgency of the advisory. 
e) A way to access and download the patch. 
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53.1 What users want from a notirication system? 
Cox and Microsoft both conducted client surveys to determine what vulnerability 
notifications should say. Several important points arose from this (Cox, 2005; Microsoft, 
2005), as summarized below. 
* Clients are concerned with the priority of the patch. Clients are running their own 
businesses with their own procedures and practices. They know when and for how 
long processes can be stopped to test and apply patches. They also know the cost of 
having critical systems unavailable for any length of time. So the priority of the 
patch will influence their decision as to when to schedule a maintenance period for 
a process. 
* Clients may not be able to close down affected software, i. e. stop the processing 
they are doing, at short notice. In this case the notification should advise what else 
they can do to prevent the problem until such time they can schedule a maintenance 
period for the affected software. 
e The customer's perception of the vulnerability may not be the same as the vendor's. 
A client may only use that software for limited purposes or circumstances. So in 
order to assess the risk themselves they need a detailed description of the 
vulnerability. It is also helpful if all this infonnation is located in one place, so that 
numerous resources do not have to be checked and integrated to form a solid base 
for assessing the advisory. 
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9 Further, it is disruptive to the client's processes to schedule maintenance periods 
that would make critical processes unavailable on a regular basis. They prefer to 
have their maintenance at scheduled intervals. This gives their employees adequate 
time to finish crucial work before the process (software or hardware) is unavailable. 
The next subsections analyzed different vulnerability advisories and then compared the 
formats and contents. 
5.3.2 Red Hat 
Red Hat provides a separate advisory for each security issue, although they may relate to 
several vulnerabilities. Each issue is released as soon as a patch is available (Redhat, 2006; 
Microsoft, 2005a). There are textual descriptions of the potential risks from the flaw. (Cox, 
2005) 
These advisories are accessible from their website, via an RSS feed or e-mail distribution 
list. However, enterprise product patches can only be retrieved by a custom tool (Redhat, 
2006; Microsoft, 2005a). 
Each advisory has a unique identifier, the specific products affected are named and the 
version given, the components of the software affected is identified, the CVE (Common 
Vulnerability and Exposures) identifier is given (Redhat, 2006) and (Microsoft 2005b). In 
addition there is a trackable link to the patch required to patch the vulnerability (Cox, 
2005). 
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The severity guidance has been recently introduced. They do not provide mitigation 
guidance (Microsoft 2005b). This has been introduced to help users to assess which 
vulnerabilities of all the advisories received need the most urgent attention. They use a 
four-point scale: low, moderate, important and critical, where critical are the urgent 
advisories. A critical rating is given when vulnerability can be exploited to compromise the 
system by a remote attacker. An important rating because remote exploitation 
compromises the confidentiality, integrity or resources of the machine infected. A 
moderate rating is given when the vulnerability may compromise the system but is less 
likely to continue. Low ratings are given when the exploitation is very difficult or the result 
of exploitation is inconsequential. (Cox, 2005) 
On examining the advisories the following was found: 
* The synopsis gives a one line description of the problem. 
9 Each advisory has a unique identifier 'Advisory Id: ' of the format RHSA-yyyy: 
xxx-yy eg RHSA-2004: 173-01 were xxx is the problem number and yy the 
version number. TVE Names' is followed by the CVE allocated number, and 
there may be several numbers included. 
* 'Product' specifies the products affected Red Hat Linux. 
* The topic gives a longer description than the synopsis. It may mention several 
different exploits solved by the patch, for example buffer overflow, malicious 
DAV server, out of bounds memory access. 
0 'Relevant releases / architecture' identifies the architecture, product including 
the version for exwnple, Red Hat Linux 9- i386. 
e 'Problem description: ' outlines the problem which may include vulnerability 
types and exploit results. Careful though need to be given for extracting 
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information so that for example 'not be used to execute arbitrary code' does not 
get put into a category of 'execute arbitrary code'. Types of exploit results 
mentioned include: 'application linked to libpng to crash' 'arbitrary code 
execution on the client' and 'update utmp and wtmp without requiring root 
privileges'. 
* 'Redhat package manager (RPM)s required: ' are given by aforementioned 
product and version in two sections - the SRPM and the architecture(s) 
downloads. 
5.3.3 SuSE 
SuSE issues two types of notifications. They are the Security announcement and a Security 
Summary report. Each notification is accessible from the website or via an email 
distribution list. Each notification needs to be examined to determine if it applies to the 
software the subscriber has (SuSE, 2005a; SuSE, 2005b) and (Microsoft, 2005b). 
S. 3.3.1 Security announcement 
9 Affected software is identified under 'Package: '. This identifies the application 
affected. 
e Each Announcement-ID: has an unique SUSE identifier of the forinat 'SUSE- 
SA: 2005: 013' where the year and problem number are variable, and SA 
identifies it as a security announcement. 
* Specific products affected are identified by name and/or version, which may 
run over multiple lines, e. g. '8.2,9.0,9.1,9.2 <p> SUSE Linux Enterprise 
Server 8,9'. 
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0 The 'Vulnerability type: ' is given to identify the kind of attack the 
vulnerability can lead to, such as 'local privilege escalation' or 'remote code 
execution'. 
0 'Severity (I - 10): ' is given on a scale of I to 10 with 10 being the most urgent 
category. This scale is calculated by adding and removing points depending on 
the risks and threats of the vulnerability (Cox, 2005). 
* Usually the CVE identifier is given under 'Cross References'. 
e The 'problem description' may indicate the exploit type such as 'buffer 
overflow', and 'authentication mechanism'. It may also mention the 
exploitation result, such as 6remote server to execute code', 'remote attacker 
can gain access' and 'remote attacker executing code'. 
* The 'package location and checksums' section gives the links for the patch by 
platform type (no delimiter) and operating system version. Each URL is 
followed by the key for the download. There may also be an entry for the 
4source rpm(s): ' 
Not all the issues in an advisory are described in equal detail (Cox, 2005). 
S-3.3.2 Security Summary 
These weekly reports give a brief description of the security issues. They recommend 
checking the website or using the YAST tool to check for applicable updates. CVE 
identifiers may be provided. The ratings given to a vulnerability are not necessarily 
compatible with CVE ratings (SuSE, 2005b) and (Microsoft, 2005b). 
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* The Announcement-ID gives the SUSE identifier for the problem, of the format 
SUSE-SR: yyyy: xxx, eg 'SUSE-SR: 2005: 007' where xxx is the problem 
number. 
e There may be 'Cross References' which may include CVE identifiers and other 
vendor number formats. 
0 Under 'solved security vulnerabilities' each vulnerability issue is briefly 
discussed and may mention which products are affected, the vulnerability type 
and the exploit result. Each vulnerability issue listed is preceded by a dash and 
several may be discussed. 
* 'Pending vulnerabilities' has a short discussion for each advised vulnerability 
issue that does not yet have a fix. It is similarly prefixed with a dash. However, 
dashes may also be used at lower levels of the discussion. Reference URLs may 
be given and the vulnerability may be mentioned in some format. 
53.4 SANS 
By contrast to the previously discussed advisories, SANS provides an amalgamation 
patches from many software vendors. Their main sources are vulnerabilities reported by 
Tippingpoint and Qualsys. There is a table of contents that prefixes the descriptions 
(SANS, 2005a). 
S. 3.4.1 Tippingpoint 
The first section contains the vulnerabilities from Tippingpoint. These are divided amongst 
critical, high and moderate ratings for widely deployed software, high patches for other 
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software and other criteria. There is no analysis of the relative severity of these 
vulnerabilities. 
A detailed description of the vulnerability is given. Ways of working around the problem 
may be given. This is followed by a sequence of links to the details of the discovery, 
responses by the vendor and if available, the patch availability. 
o Each vulnerability issue is numbered sequentially. 
e Each starts with a severity rating in the title together with the vulnerability. 
* 'Affected: ' describes the software product(s) affected by the vulnerability. 
'Prior' may be used to indicate earlier versions are also affected. 
e The 'problem description' can be scanned for word varieties of the exploit site. 
0 'References' points to URLs that describe the problem. Patches are not 
normally available. 
5.3.4.2 Qualsys 
The Qualsys section is also roughly divided by vendors or types of vulnerability. This 
gives the CVE identifier, if available, for each report, followed by a title, short description 
and a link to the reporter's description of the problem. These may repeat vulnerabilities 
that are reported in the previous section. The description may mention the vulnerability 
such as 'injection attack' and the exploit site such as 'disclose sensitive information'. 
5.3.5 US-CERT 
US-CERT published four documents, two of them for home and new users (US-CERT, 
2005a): 
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9 Cybcr Security Alerts; for current security issues that affect the general public. 
* Cyber Security Tips; provides a variety of common security topics. 
And the other two for system administrators: 
* Cyber Security Bulletins; summaries of published information about new security 
issues and vulnembilities. 
o Technical Cyber Security Alerts, for technical users as well; current security issues, 
vulnembilities, and exploits. 
5.3.5.1 Cyber Security Bulletins 
US-CERT published Cybcr Security Bulletins, which are provide weekly summaries of 
security issues and new vulnerabilities. They also provide patches, workarounds, and other 
actions to help mitigate risk. They released a table summarizes vulnerabilities that have 
been identified, even if they are not being exploited. The table consists of three sections: 
first is Windows Operating Systems only, second is Unix/Linux Operating Systems, and 
the third is Multiple Operating Systems. Complete details about patches or workarounds 
are available from the source of the information or from the URL provided in the section. 
CVE numbers are listed where applicable. The risk of the vulnerabilities is listed. 
Vulnerabilities that affect both Windows and Unix Operating Systems are included in the 
Multiple Operating Systems section. 
The Security Bulletins provide a table contains a sample of exploit scripts and "how to" 
guides identified during this period. The "Workaround or Patch Available" column 
indicates if vendors, security vulnerability listservs, or Computer Emergency Response 
Teams (CERTs) have published workarounds or patches (US-CERT, 2005a). 
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5.3.5.2 Technical Cyber Security Alerts 
CERT published security alerts, also called Vulnerability Notes, and tends to describe 
vulnerabilities independently of the software vendors. Each vulnerability has a 
vulnerability number (VU#) and, if available a CVE number (US-CERT, 2005b). 
They only publish vulnerabilities that have a high probable impact. This metric has a value 
range between 0 and 180. In evaluating the spread of viruses exploiting the vulnerability, 
the potential impact of infections, the reliability of the Internet in face of such an attack, 
and the possibility of the preconditions for infections existing are all weighted to achieve 
this metric. 
Multiple vulnerabilities may be included in a single report. There is a single sentence 
description each vulnerability issue. The next section discusses the possible impact of all 
the vulnerabilities in one section. The solution and vendor software affected is also 
discussed. 
Finally the advisory reports a link to the vendor's security bulletin as well as it's own local 
reports on the vulnerabilities, which may have links to the individual vendors problem 
report. The date the vendor modified information is given so person's can be aware if there 
has been progress from the vendor. 
In addition, US-CERT may also make comments if their evaluation of the problem is not 
compatible with the evaluation of the vendors. This may provide additional protection for 
the software users (US-CERT, 2005c). 
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* 'Systems affected' describes which platform is affected such as 'Microsoft 
Windows Systems', or 'Cisco routers and switches running IOS in various 
configumtions'. 
9 'Overview' may mention the exploit site such as 'remote execution', 'denial-of- 
service vulnerabilities' and 'cross-domain vulnerability', as well as the 
exploitation result, 'execute script in a different domain, including the Local 
Machine Zone", 'cause an affected device to reload' and 'remote execution of 
arbitrary codc. 
* 'DescriPtion' mentions the vendor identifier, and the vendor title of the 
vulnembility, which may mention the exploit site. This is followed by the 
CERT reference and their title, which may mention the vulnerability type. 
53.6 Microsoft 
Microsoft release bulletins on a monthly basis, except where there is immediate risk from a 
virus. There monthly bulletins will also incorporate any related knowledge based 
information. This will minimize the time taken to install the patches for mission-critical 
systems. To take into account cases where patches cannot be applied immediately, 
Microsoft also undertake to provide work around solutions where possible together with 
the impact of these work-around (Microsoft, 2005a) 
Microsoft has separated the technical user information from the end-user information. 
(Security Advisor, 2002; Microsoft, 2005a). The technical details include the CVE 
(common vulnerability and exposures) identifier, a description of the severity rating, 
mitigating factors, and a description of the virus. 
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Further Microsoft lists the service pack pre-requisites for the update and where localized 
versions can be located. It also lists which patches it replaces, and which software is 
affcctcd (Microsoft, 2005a). 
The impact of the vulnerability describes what would happen on an infected machine 
whether it is remote code execution, evaluation of privileges, denial of service or 
disclosure of data (Microsoft, 2005a). 
The maximum severity rating has been updated to: 
a) Critical - worms can be propagated without user intervention. 
b) Important - confidentiality, security, integrity and availability of data or resources 
may be compromised. 
c) Moderate - the danger depends on local configuration and auditing. 
d) Low - exploiting the vulnerability is difficult or the potential damage is minimal. 
Although these changes are discussed in various papers, they were not all evident in 
examined recent emails. 
Each severity rating is discussed under a separate heading, i. e. 'Critical Security Bulletins' 
and 'Important Security Bulletins' 
Each advised vulnerability issue listed: 
* Has a Microsoft identifier 'MSyy-9999' followed by a short title and 
knowledge base number if applicable. 
* Has one to several entries under 'Affected Software' 
'Impact' discusses the vulnerability type. 
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A re-release of a bulletin includes the URL of the update and the 'bulletin severity rating'. 
5.3.7 Symantec 
Symantec advisories are published when they need to deal with a new vulnerability. Each 
advisory contains the following elements (Symantec, 2005b): 
Risk: This ranges from 'very severe', 'severe', 'moderate', 'low' and 'very low', in 
descending order of importance. It is an amalgamation of various metrics, which are 
evaluated to the same scale. If the vulnerability is infecting a large number of Internet 
nodes globally it has a higher rating, such as 1,000 machines or 5 countries, than one 
infecting 2 sites / countries. If the vulnerability can inflict major damage it achieves a 
higher rating. If the vulnerability can be distributed easily, it achieves a higher rating. 
However, on viewing a recent advisory, the risk is rated 'high'. 
Then a 'Description' follows which discusses several issues. The first is the type of 
vulnerability, such as a buffer overflow, then the type of condition it exposes, and the 
result of a successful exploitation of the vulnerability. 
Each 'Platforms Affected' and 'Components Affected' entry describes an operating system 
including release version or software application including release version, such as 
'Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server SP2'. 
Finally, under 'Recommendations' the advisory lists the platforms affected again followed 
by the patch available to correct that version. The patch title, reference and URL are given. 
The URL page may have multiple patches for download. Knowing which one would apply 
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to which client would rely on a consistent naming strategy. Further URL browsing would 
be required if non-English versions of the patch were required. 
53.8 Bugtraq 
Security Focus publishes these advisories once they have been verified as vulnerabilities 
(Security Focus, 2500). Information published includes: 
* Bugtraqs own identifier as well as the CVE number under the title 'cve', 
* The 'class' of the error which may be 'boundary condition error; 
* 'Remote yes' - If the vulnerability can be exploited remotely; 
* 'Local yes' - if the vulnerability can be exploited locally; 
* 'Vulnerable' lists which software is affected. This may include software release 
information under the software that is vulnerable. 
* 'Not vulnerable' lists which software is not affected by the vulnerability. 
e 'Discussion' may mention what type of error it is, such as a buffer overflow, and 
the result of the exploitation such as arbitrary code execution, 
e 'Solution' may provide the URL to the patch to fix the problem listed by software 
version. 
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5.4 A generic vulnerability format 
Analysis of different vulnerability reports from different sources has identified the core 
elements that a meaningful advisory needs to include. The result is a generic data set for 
-vAnerability advisory reports, which has been abstracted and enhanced from existing 
advisory formats, as listed and described in Table 5.2. Although most of this information is 
commonly found in existing reports, it is often buried within free-text descriptions rather 
than being represented in distinct fields. Abstracting the information out into separate 
fields increases the potential for automated search and manipulation of the resulting 
infomiation. 
Main field Sub-field Defined values (if Description /Comments 
applicable) 
Title Title of the vulnerability or 
I. 
AdvisorN 11) A reference number for the 
vulnerability, assigned by 
vendor. 
Vendor 11) Denotes the vendor of the 
affected products. 
Affected Package The affected product packages 
Product in relation to this vulnerability. 
Version If all versions ofthe product are 
\ ulnerable, then this field could 
he left blank. 
Date Released I )ate of original iss 
Revised Revision history ofthe advisory 
ii fthe a licable). 
Severity/risk 0 -Itical or I ligh Indicates the level of risk to 
Aledium/Low systems on which the 
I -- II vulnerability could 
be exploitedi 
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Fxploitation 
side 
I `xploltat loll 
rat i tigs 
Internet 
Intranet 
Client 
Vulnerabilm 
t\ pc 
Farget tý pe 
Impact Availability 
consequence Confidentialit 
Integrity 
Automate, I 
exploit 
Local/Reinote 
I -oN),,, 'M ed i urn/14 i gh 
Low/Medium/High 
Lo, ýN, /Medium/lligh 
I nput error 
(Boundary/Buffer 
overflow). 
Access validation error. 
Exceptional condition 
error. 
Origin validation error. 
Configuration error. 
Design error. 
Other. 
Operating system. 
Network protocol stack. 
I Iser application. 
Server application. 
I lardware. 
Communication protocol. 
Otlicr component. 
Low/Medium/1-ligh 
Low/Medium/l I igh 
Low/Mediurn/l figh 
YesýNo//Unknown 
Indicates whether tile 
vulnerability can be exploited 
locally, remotely or from both 
_locations. 
Potential for exploitation via 
_the 
Internet. 
Potential for exploitation it' the 
attacker has access to the local 
Intranet. 
Potential for exploitation it' the 
attacker has access to the local 
client system on which the 
vulnerable software is installed. 
Indicates the type of fla\\, / 
weakness that is being 
exploited when targeting the 
vulnerabilit\. 
Indicates the type and level of 
software or hardware that 
contains the vulnerability and 
hence becomes the target of the 
exploit. 
The impact of' exploitation of 
tilts vulnerability on the system 
and its potential to cause issues 
such as Denial of service. 
Information Disclosure, and 
exposure of the system to 
hostile code. 
Indicates whether the 
exploitation can be automated 
in software, or requires manual 
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intervention by the attacker. 
I: xl)crti,, e to Low/Medium/High Indicatcs the level of technical 
exploit expertise that an attacker would 
require in order to successfully 
exploit the vulnerability. 
Solution Work-round Yes/No Information relating to any 
available solutions to avoid this 
vulnerability (Ifavailable). Patch Yes, /No 
available Details of any workaround or 
patch would then be 
documented in the 'problem 
description' field. 
Problem A free-text description of the 
dc"CrIptiOll vulnerability, which could 
present specific technical 
details and other 
supplementary information. 
CV11, Links to CVF and CAN eiitrý 
reference 
References I. Inks to information about the 
saine vulnerability, which may 
be provided in other sources. 
Cross Links to related reports about 
ret'ercilces other vulnerabilities. 
Obsoletes Details of any advisories that 
the current one supersedes or 
renders obsolete. 
Table 5.2: Draft generic vulnerability advisory format 
It is suggested that this could be used as the basis for a common vulnerability-reporting 
format, which could be adopted by multiple reporting sources so as to make their 
infon-nation compatible. From this, the aforementioned automated agent would have a 
consistent basis from which to work, and would thus be able to allow system 
administrators to filter the information to suit their needs, they could reduce the volume of 
information to which they are exposed (i. e. they should receive only reports that pertain to 
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their systems, rather than receiving everything the source has to offer), as well as having a 
more structured approach regarding what issues to address first. 
The next subsections will discuss the description details of the generic vulnerability 
format. 
5.4.1 Affected product (package and versions) 
This field will enable administrators to classify and filter vulnerabilities based on their 
software versions. The suggested fonn will contain software name, and vulnerable version 
number. 
5.4.2 Sevcrity 
This field is designed to enable one to quickly judge the impact of a vulnerability issue. 
Vulnerabilities can have one of four severity levels: "Critical", "High", "Medium", or 
"Low". It is difficult to accurately assign such ratings, as different vulnerabilities will have 
differing levels of impact depending upon the installed software base of an organization. 
Despite this problem, severity labels are still useful indicators of vulnerability impact 
(ICAT, 2004; Microsoft, 2004i). 
A vulnerability is of "Critical or High severity" ifi. 
1. It allows a remote attacker to violate the security protection of a system (i. e. 
gain some sort of user or root account). 
2. It allows a local attack that gains complete control of a system. 
A vulnerability is of "medium severity" ifi. 
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1. It does not meet the definition of either "high" or "IoNV' severity. 
A vulnerability is of "low severity" if- 
1. The vulnerability does not typically yield valuable information or control over a 
system but instead gives the attacker knowledge that may help the attacker find and 
exploit other vulnerabilities. 
2. The vulnerability is inconsequential for most organizations. 
5.4.3 Exploitation side 
The exploitation of vulnerability can be a local and/or remote. 
Local: The attacker has direct internal access to the local area network. 
Remote: The attackers can exploit the vulnerability remotely without having access to the 
network. 
5.4.4 Vulnerability types 
* Input validation error 
If the input being received by a system is not properly checked such that a vulnerability 
issue is present that can be exploited by a certain input sequence. The "Input erroe' can 
be categories into: Boundary overflow and Buffer overflow. These two are discussed 
below (ICAT, 2004). 
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9 Boundary overflow 
When the input being received by a system, be it human or machine generated, 
causes the system to exceed an assumed boundary thereby causing vulnerability. 
For example, the system may run out of memory, disk space, or network 
bandwidth. Another example is that a variable might reach its maximum value and 
roll over to its minimum value. 
e Buffer overflow 
If the vulnerability is caused by input being received by a system that is longer than 
the expected input length. If the system does not check for this condition then the 
input buffer fills up and overflows the memory allocated for the input. By cleverly 
constructing this extra input, an attacker can cause the system to crash or even to 
execute instructions on behalf of the attacker. 
o Access validation error 
A vulnerability is characterized as an "Access validation erroe' if a system is 
vulnerable because the access control mechanism is faulty. The problem lies not with 
the user controllable configuration of the access control mechanism but with the 
mechanism itself (ICAT, 2004). 
s Exceptional condition handling error 
A vulnerability that is characterised as an "Exceptional condition handling error" 
occurs if a system somehow becomes vulnerable due to an exceptional condition that 
has arisen and is related to the handling (or mishandling) of the exception by the 
system, which enables this vulnerability (ICAT, 2004). 
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* Origin validation error 
This occurs when the source of a request is not validated by the system before 
executing the request (SecurityFocus, 2005). 
e Configuration error 
Occurs if user controllable settings in a system are set such that the system is 
vulnerable. This vulnerability is not due to how the system was designed but on how 
the end user configures the system. We consider it a configuration error when a 
systems ships from a developer with a weak configuration. 
e Design error 
If there exists no errors in the implementation or configuration of a system, but the 
initial design causes a vulnerability to exist. 
* Other 
It is possible that a vulnerability issue encountered will not fall in any of the above 
categories. Any such vulnerability is characterised as vulnerability type "Othee'(ICAT 
2004). 
5.4.5 Target type 
The type and level of software or hardware that contains the vulnerability and hence 
becomes the target of the exploit, the target could be one of the following: 
o Operating system. 
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* Network protocol stack. 
* User app ication. 
9 Server application. 
9 Hardware. 
* Communication protocol. 
* Other component. 
5.4.6 Impact/consequence 
The impact of exploitation of the vulnerability on the system, it takes four types (ICAT 
2004): 
1. Availability: enables an attack that directly inhibits a user from accessing a particular 
system resource. Denial of service is availability violation. 
2. Confidentiality: enables an attack that can directly steal information from a system. 
3. Integrity: enables an attack that can directly change the infonnation residing or passing 
through a system. 
4. Security protection: enables an attack that gives the attacker privileges in a system that 
the attacker is not allowed to have by the access control policy of the system. 
5.4.7 Automated exploit 
The exploitation of a vulnerability can be automated in software, or may require manual 
intervention by the attacker. 
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5.4.8 Solution 
Come in two fields work-around and patch. 
Work-around: information relating to any solution countermeasure to avoid this 
vulnerability. 
Patch: the patch provided by the vendor to resolve this vulnerability. 
If the patch not available this means this vulnerability is too risky, and the vulnerability 
was released before they solve it. 
5.4.9 CVE Reference 
Indicates the CVE and CAN entry number for this vulnerability. This field enables one to 
search in databases. 
5.4.10 Expertise to exploit 
Indicates the level of technical expertise an attacker would require in successfully 
exploiting a particular vulnerability. These categorised into three levels 
* High: indicates high or specialised level of technical expertise is required for 
exploitation. 
e Medium: indicate medium level or more general level of technical expertise is 
required for exploitation. 
* Low: indicate low level or minimal level of technical expertise is required for 
exploitation. This level of expertise is the most risky and the administrator 
should act upon this vulnerability as soon as possible. 
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5.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined and analysed some different vendor's advisories and a 
comparison between the different advisories format has been made. The generic 
vulnerability advisory format that has been proposed will represent a valuable step forward 
in facilitating automated filtering and prioritization of incoming messages - thus reducing 
the potential for information overload and wasted time for administrators. The next chapter 
presents the standard process for addressing vulnerabilities followed by the need for 
automation in order to reduce the administrative burden. The chapter then presents an 
architectural specification and design of the automated vulnerability management system. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Having examined and analysed different vulnerability advisory approaches, and proposed a 
generic format, this chapter has identified the need to automate the management process. 
This chapter describes in detail the conceptual design of an automated vulnerability 
management system. This has been designed in two stages: 
* Automated Notification System; 
9 Automated Rectification System. 
The first stage of automating the process is to identity a means by which administrators can 
be notified of relevant new vulnerabilities, without having to explicitly visit associated 
vendor sites or subscribing and searching through product vulnerability mailing lists. Using 
this approach available advisories can be filtered and prioritized according to the local 
system configuration, and the advisories classified, hence reducing the problem of 
information overload for administrators. 
The second stage of automation will consider a generic architectural specification for an 
active vulnerability resolver, capable of acting upon the notification data above. It is 
recognize that allowing autonomous control over the update of a system could itself 
represent a security vulnerability it is therefore necessary to improve mechanisms to rectify 
weaknesses in a stable and trusted manner, as well as techniques to guard against 
compromise of the approach itself. 
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6.2 Addressing the vulnerability process 
The standard operation of addressing vulnerability involves the key phases illustrated in 
Figure 6.1 and described in the following sub-sections. 
System inventory 
assessment 
Inventory 
database 
---------------v............. ................ 
Subscription with SuSE 
mailing list RedHat 
CERT 
BugTraq 
Notification 
T 
phase 
Filtration the Microsoft 
messages SANS 
T 
Classification/ 
Prioritization 
-- ----------------------------------------------- ---- 
................. ...... ............. .............. .................... .... 
Mitigate Download Tolerate 
vatch 
Test the p 
Distribution/ 
Installation 
---------------- ------ --------------------------- ------------------------ 
Rectification phase 
Figure 6.1: Standard process for addressing vulnerabilities 
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e Audit ofcurrent environment (inventory) 
As networks grow and change, often without adequate documentation, it is 
important to obtain accurate information for each monitored system regularly. 
Once the inventory of the hardware and software, is complete, the system 
administrator should categorize the operating systems, software, firmware and 
any patches or upgrades that have been installed. 
e Notification 
Once the inventory is complete, the system administrator should monitor the 
relevant vulnerability information sources by visiting the websites regularly, 
which cannot be done continually. Alternatively subscription to relevant 
mailing lists can be used to obtain alerts or advisories. The notification phase 
consists of several distinct stages. 
Subscription with mailing list 
Subscribe with vendor's mailing list to receive new vulnerability 
advisories. The system administrator will receive all the advisories 
mailing list, which means he or she will be overwhelmed with the 
received information, so the incoming messages should be filtered. 
- Filtration 
Filter the relevant messages based on system inventory and 
configuration. 
- Classification 
Classify the relevant messages according to vulnerable software, 
version, vulnerability type, target, etc. 
- Prioritization 
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Priorities the relevant messages according to system administrator 
criteria, such as software, severity, exploitation potential, etc. 
The system administrator should read the relevant messages to understand the 
vulnerability and its impact on the system, and then decide to rectify, mitigate, 
or tolerate the vulnerability. Some advisories do not include patches, so the 
system administrator must either mitigate (work around) or tolerate the 
vulnembility. 
9 Rectification 
Acting upon the relevant messages from the notification, this phase consists of 
the stages listed below. 
- Download 
Download the relevant patches as instructed by the email notification. 
- Test the patch 
The system administrator should test the patch in test environment 
before deploying it to validate the patch and make sure it will not harm 
the system. The system administrator may roll back if the patch causes 
any problem, but the roll back may represent a difficult task in large 
system. 
- Distribute 
Distribute patch file into network clients. 
Install 
Installation of patch file in the clients (and possible reboot) will be the 
last process. 
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Most system administrators perform the above processes manually, which can represent a 
significant administrative overhead, while there is a lack in system administrator numbers 
(Marchany, 2001). The research has considered an architectural design to automate these 
processes based on receiving advisories by email. 
6.3 The need for automation 
The need for automated vulnerability management system is a necessity in order to 
overcome the vulnerability problem and to minimise the window of exploitation by 
minimizing the time taken to address the problem. 
In recent years, published statistics have continually illustrated the significant scale of the 
problem posed by vulnerabilities in system and application software, as seen in last 
chapter. So the sheer number of vulnerabilities to receive notification about causes a load 
on the security administration team. 
The team then has to assess the risk to the organization for the specific vulnerability as 
these are identified. They need to determine this from the information in the advisory. 
Often this is very brief which causes the team to have to perform additional research to see 
whether the vulnerability affects their systems' profiles. Automation which deciphers the 
flags and records systems' profiles can automatically perform this check. 
The dramatic expansion of the Internet has increased the need for security experts. In fact 
there is a shortage of security experts available in the job market so inexperienced people 
are being taken on to secure systems, which give the attacker a chance to exploit 
vulnerable systems. This shortage has been addressed in some areas such as intrusion 
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detection, but many areas still cannot find enough skilled people with the breadth of 
knowledge to fill organizations requirements. This lack of knowledge makes it difficult for 
the team to assess the actual risk of particular vulnerabilities as the administration team 
identifies them (Marchany, 2001). 
A limitation of manual response is that the vulnerabilities are well known in the hacker 
community. Some hackers have improved their skills and techniques, while some hackers 
with basic skills but using available automated scripts can successftilly attack the network 
to compromise the system security by attaining privileges or causing a denial of service 
(Thompson, 2004). 
The exploitation of vulnerability has already been identified in Chapter 2, and shows that 
attacks can readily exploit known vulnerability for which patches are available (as in the 
Slammer virus where a patch had been available for 18 days prior to its release (F-Secure 
2004)). Enterprises failed to apply the available patches which resulted in an average of $2 
billion loss in productivity (Moore, 2003). Another example, according to Attrition. org, is 
that 99% of the 5823 web site defacement that occurred during 2000 were facilitated as a 
result of failures to address known vulnerabilities, for which the patches were available 
(CNET, 2001). According to Symantec's Internet Security Threat Report IX, 79% of the 
new vulnerabilities documented in the second half of 2005 were classified as easily 
exploited, due to the fact that hackers needed only basic knowledge and basic tools 
(Symantec, 2006). 
Another limitation of manual vulnerability resolution is that there has been an explosive 
growth in the Internet, the size of networks are increasing and spreading geographically 
with more and more companies having global operations and mobile employees. From 
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Gandalf, it can be seen the hosts connected to the Internet has exceeded 350 million at the 
end of first half of 2005 as shown in Figure 6.2, representing a 23.9% growth for that year 
(Gandalf, 2006). This means that for any new patch, the number of machines that it needs 
to be deployed to is increasing, as is the variety of systems configurations that each 
company has within its organization. The management of these two factors increases the 
time taken to deploy patches throughout an organization. 
400 
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Source: Gandalf, 2005 
Figure 6.2: Internet hosts (1991-July 2005) 
The increase in network size and number of vulnerabilities open to exploitation represents 
a significant overhead for system administrators; they may involve dealing with deploying 
patches to address into thousands of machines. But the cost of each IT visit to a desktop is 
$100 (Pentura, 2004). Meanwhile, Symantec estimate the cost is f. 30 per visit to send an 
internal staff and the major outsourcing companies charge between E95 and E150 per each 
IT visit to desktop (Symantec, 2004). 
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Another limitation of manual rectification is deploying patches often available during work 
hours, leaving large window of opportunity for attackers. The time of attacks during the 
day is considered in organization's security strategy. According to Symantec's Internet 
Security Tbreat Report V, the attack is more active between 07: 00 and 20: 00 local time of 
the target system. Meanwhile, this report shows a significant change in the daily 
distribution of worm attacks in the second half of 2003 compared to the first half of the 
same year and the second half of 2002. Worm activity was more common on weekdays 
(Monday-Friday) than on weekends. However, in the second half of 2003, the same 
percentage of worm attacks occurred each day. The vulnerability problem is too risky, so 
the system administrator should keep an eye on their systems and maintain the awareness 
of the problem. For example, the Sasser worm was released on I" May 2004 by a German 
hacker. This self-executing network worm infected Windows 2000, XP, 2003, and spread 
through the Internet by exploiting a known vulnerability published on 13 April by 
Microsoft. The worm and problems with Microsoft's patch combined to cause problems in 
IT departments across the world. For example, P May was a bank holiday in the UK, and 
IT departments were unable to apply the patch. The release of the Sasser worm over the 
bank holiday weekend highlighted the dilemma of how quickly IT departments should 
deploy the patch to systems (Computer weekly, 2004). 
According to Symantec's Internet Security Threat Report IX, 80% of reported 
vulnerabilities during 2005 are remotely exploitable (Symantec, 2006), so any attacker in 
any part of the world can exploit these vulnerabilities and he can hide his IP address using 
free tools available on the Internet. However, the sizes of networks are increased, also 
spread geographically, so the worms can spread very fast in the global network. For 
example, the slarnmer worm infected 75,000 vulnerable machines in 10 minutes and 
doubled its numbers every 8.5 seconds during the first minute of its attack (Moore et al., 
2003). 
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Add to this the effects of globalisation where organizations increasingly have systems that 
are in different time zones to that of the IT department. Thus, deployment of patches can 
be tricky. The patches need to be deployed when the office does not need the systems to 
complete their work, but the patch needs to be deployed as soon as practicable. In a manual 
process this can mean that the security office needs to operational for 24 hours a day 
(Brandman, 2005; Microsoft, 2004). 
These examples demonstrate that the current speed of manual notification and rectification 
is inadequate and, reinforces the need for automation the manual process. 
6.4 Problems with automated notification 
Unfortunately, applying automated notification is not such a straightforward solution. 
There are challenges ensuring the validity and relevance of the information that automated 
notification systems receive. The first is that it receives pertinent up-to-date information 
from enough sources. Not all security advisories distribute information about new 
vulnerabilities with the same facility. If the organization uses a product from a particular 
supplier, it is possible that they are not receiving full coverage of all their systems. Most 
organizations today have multi-platform, multi-vendor operations and require information 
about a wide variety of applications and hardware. 
The second challenge regarding information received is that it does not get inadvertently 
filtered out and, thus result in the discarding of relevant advisories. This happens when the 
administration personnel is not sufficiently versed in both the technicalities of the package 
they are working with, or do not have enough experience in vulnerability effects to 
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calibrate the package to achieve correct notification with reference to all the organization's 
systems profiles. 
The notification system needs to verify the digital signature of incoming messages and 
discard malicious messages and have been misused by a potential attacker. It needs to 
guard against causing inconvenience or indirect denial of service to legitimate users (for 
example, the rectification system must not disrupt the user by taking the system down to 
install a patch whilst users are working). 
Furthermore, the framework would need to ensure the validity of the patches to ensure that 
it is exactly as the vendor intended. It is common to use a digital signature to sign the files 
available for download. This verification would prove that the files have indeed come from 
the legitimate source and have not been modified during download. Without this, hackers 
could misuse the rectification agent. 
Download and installation of patches without testing them is not secure. To avoid any 
problem with a patch, it is better to download and test the patch before deploying it to the 
network machines. In this way the system administrator can verify the patch and ensure it 
will not cause any problem to the system. Thus the automation system needs to have a 
patch status indicator so the security team can assess when the patch is ready for 
deployment. A patch goes through a process once it has arrived on the administration 
server. This process is: arrived, verified, unit tested, system tested, ready for deployment, 
and deployed. An indicator would allow the administration team know which patches had 
completed the process, or evaluate that although the patch had not been through the whole 
process the threat was so dire that it still needed to be deployed now. 
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6.5 Architectural specification for vulnerability management system 
From all of the above it can be seen that the current approaches help the administrators to 
solve the vulnerability problem only partially. For example, MicrosofVs Strategic 
Technology protection system (Microsoft, 2001) solves the problem for the recent versions 
of Microsoft Windows only (i. e. no help for other OS), and the SANS @RISK mailing list 
(SANS, 2004) still gives attackers an opportunity to exploit the vulnerabilities because it 
uses weekly alerts. In addition it does not cover all the vendors, and includes the critical 
vulnembilities only. 
The proposed approach uses a comprehensive solution including notification and 
rectification, and will be customised for the administrator's requirements in flexible, 
friendly, and powerful use. The research considered the time of notification and 
rectification to be immediately regardless of the severity of the vulnerability, rather than 
weekly reports as such SANS @RISK. This will close the window of exploitation for 
attackers to invest minutes and hours not days. Being based upon the foundation of the 
generic advisory fortnat already specified, it will also cover all the vendors based on 
system applications and administrators needs. 
The development of the architectural specification builds on the standard process for 
addressing vulnerabilities discussed in chapter 5. The aim was to create a full specification 
for the Active Vulnerability Resolver with specific consideration to its implementation in a 
reference environment network, with considerations of mechanisms for automated updates, 
and integration with the notification frarnework. Different factors have effect on the Active 
Resolver mechanism. As seen in chapter 5, several factors have already been identified, 
such as the software application (package version), the vulnerability target, the 
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vulnerability type, the impact of the vulnerability, the incident of the vulnerability report 
and the exploitation side. 
6.6 Automated vulnerability management system architecture 
The automated vulnerability management system is designed to provide a harmonised 
front-end framework for the system administrator. The overall process associated with the 
proposed architecture is illustrated in Figure 6.3. 
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Advisories Mailing Lists 
Email Client 
MS Outlook/Inbox 
All incoming Advisories 
on itor 
Work around 
Controller 
Database for 
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Automated rectifications 
(Downloader, Distribution) 
F-I II F-I 
Clientl Client2 Server 
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Figure 6.3: Automated vulnerabiliq, notification & rectification system 
6.6.1 Email client 
The Email clieni receives the incoming advisories from the mail server and saves them in 
the inbox. In this research, Microsoft Outlook is used to provide this facility. 
Automated Notifications 
(Filtrations, Prioritization, 
&Classification) 
Relevant Advisories 
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6.6.2 Subscription window 
The Subscription window enables the system administrator to subscribe with vendors 
mailing list without search or visiting vendors website's. Some vendors mailing list enable 
the user to subscribe by sending an email, while some other vendors have a subscription 
page in this case the user needs to type their email and tick the desired mailing list they 
wish to receive if the vendor has multiple mailing lists. After completing subscription the 
system administrator will receive the vulnerability advisory messages regularly. 
6.63 Automated notirications 
All incoming mails to the Email client are read and retrieved in the default mailbox of the 
system administrator machine (server). The retrieved emails are only those for vendors 
(Advisories source) registered within the database. The vulnerability advisory mails are 
then stored in the Advisories database after confirming it is a bona fide email by verifying 
the sender name, sender email and vendor's digital signature. 
Thereafter the Notification System maps the different vendor advisories format to the 
generic vulnerability format which is described in chapter S. As each vendor has a different 
method of formatting their emails. A dynamic rule based method would be most suitable 
for this process, the rules can be updated according to vendor advisory format. 
Filtration, Prioritisation, and Classification of the advisories is performed according to 
administrator-specified criteria after mapping the different advisories format to the generic 
vulnerability format that yield Relevant Advisories. 
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The relevant emails are displayed in a format similar to any email client showing vendor 
name, subject, size, time and date. The displayed emails are filtered and prioritised as 
system administrator required based on his criteria and he can sort the displayed emails in 
various orders. 
6.6.4 System database 
The System Database consists of a number of databases as following: 
6.6.4.1 Advisories database 
The Advisories Database stores all the incoming advisories according to the registered 
vendors, along with classification data extracted from the original message. The Advisories 
Database is designed to be searchable to help system administrator to build his own local 
database. 
the other tables, namely: 
e Vendor Details 
* Filtration Criteria 
* Client Information 
e Folders 
6.6.5 Controller 
This module is designed for use by the System Administrator to configure, the elements of 
Automated Vulnerability Notification and Rectification System modules according to the 
local system requirements. All modules are designed in dynamic and flexible way 
considering the dynamic changes in vendor's advisories format and WebPages and patch 
availability. 
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6.6.6 Relevant advisories 
The advisories which are relevant to the local system are displayed for the system 
administrator which is designed to be displayed according to system administrator 
specified criteria and priority and importance of the advisory and he sorting the displayed 
message in various order. The relevant messages passed on for the rectification system to 
act upon. 
6.6.7 Rectifications system 
The Rectifications System acts upon the Relevant Advisories by connecting the system to 
the vendor web site to download any specified patches, and consults the system 
administrator's policy for accepting them. Accepted security patches are saved in a profile 
and then deployed to the network clients by sending the patches via a communicator using 
the same port, IP address and authentication technique to avoid any misuse by hackers. The 
deployment of the patches is designed to avoid causing any interruption for the active user 
which may lead to a denial of service. On the server side the system administrator can 
deploy the patch manually or automatically at a scheduled time. On the client side the end 
user can select one of the four options to avoid any interruption for him. The options are: 
download and install patches, or ask the user before downloading the patch, or 
automatically download and alert the user for installation, or the fourth scenario 
automatically download and install the available patch at a scheduled time. 
The Automated Vulnerability Management System designed and implemented into two 
phase. 
* Automated Notification System. 
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* Automated Rectification System. 
6.7 Automated notification architecture 
Ile Automated Notification Architecture is comprised of a series of functional modules, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.4 and described below. 
The Auto Management System designed to filter messages presented in the generic form as 
described earlier in chapter 5. However, recognising that vendors currently use different 
fonnat, the notification system is also mapped to the different vendor standards. 
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9 Interface: The Interface reads and imports the emails from the Outlook inbox 
to the Automated Notification program. In addition it enables the automated 
vulnerability resolver to access Outlook facilities without the need to open the 
Outlook application. 
e Vendor name: The function of the Vendor name module is to check the vendor 
name and sender address of all emails in Outlook and save them in a database 
after the verification of the digital signature or the sender. Figure 6.5 shows 
vendor name and email for Microsoft and CERTadvisories. 
I 
From: Microsoft [20-6848-]SBsis7TKC56NStNVgYYrg@newsletters. microsoft. com] 
Figure 6.5: Vendor name and email from original advisories 
0 Veriýy digital signature: The purpose of Veri& digital signature is to verify 
the digital signature ofthe email source to prevent any malicious mails and to 
make this program secure, and not to be misused by hackers. In this research 
PGP freeware from PGP Corporation is used (PGP, 2004). 
Software: The function of Soffivare module is to check the software package 
and version in each advisory which is affected by vulnerability. This module 
represents an important stage of filtration, prioritisation, and classification of 
the incoming advisories. Figure 6.6 represents a sample ofthe affected software 
in vulnerability advisories from the vendor. 
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- Affected Software: 
Windows NT Server 4.0 Service Pack 6a 
Windows NT Server 4.0 Terminal Server Edition 
Service Pack 6 
Windows 2000 Service Pack 3 
Windows 2000 Service Pack 4 
Windows XP and Windows XP Service Pack 1 
Windows XP 64-Bit Edition Service Pack 1 
Affected products: 8.1,8.2,9.0,9.1,9.2 
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 8,9 
SUSE LINUX Desktop 1.0 
Novell Linux Desktop 9 
Figure 6.6: Affected software in vendor advisories 
9 Severity: The Severity module is to check the level of risk to a vulnerable 
system on which the vulnerability could be exploited. The severity could come 
from the original sources in different forms, as follows: 
e Critical 
9 High 
o Medium 
e Low 
9 Orin numbers 1-10, or 0-9 
The vulnerability severity displayed on the main form as it is from the original 
source to draw the system administrator attention to the importance of the 
vulnerability importance to act upon it. The Severity is important in 
prioritisation and classification of the advisory messages. Figure 6.7 shows how 
vendors rated the severity in their advisories. 
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Iseverity (1-10): 71 ICritical Security Bulletins 
Figure 6.7: Severity in different form of vulnerability advisories 
* Target type: The purpose of Target type is to identify the type and level of 
software or hardware that contains the vulnerability target type for the 
vulnembility. Some Target type is shown below. 
0 Operating system 
0 User application 
0 Server application 
0 Network protocol stack 
0 Communication protocol 
Hardware 
0 Other Component 
The system administrator can prioritise the incoming advisory based on the Target 
type. For example, some system administrators consider server applications and 
operating systems as a high priority. 
* Exploitation side: The purpose of Exploitation side is to identify if the 
vulnerability can be exploited locally, remotely or from both locations. If the 
vulnerability can be exploited remotely then the system administrator should 
priontise te vulnerability as a high priority to act upon it. 
9 Exploitation ratings: The purpose of Exploitation ratings is to identify the 
potential for exploitation via the Internet, from the Intranet or from the local client. 
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Few vendors currently provide this information in their standard advisories. Table 
6.1 represents Exploitation ratings in some vendor standard advisories. 
Internet Low/Medium/High 
Intranet Low/Medium/High 
Client Low/Medium/High 
Table 6.1: Exploitation rating 
These ratings help the system administrator to judge the vulnerability and the action 
they should take. For example, if the Exploitation rating via Intemet is high the 
vulnerability should be high priority; consequently the system administrator should 
take immediate action. 
* Vulnerability type: The purpose of Vulnerability type is to identify the type of 
flaw / weakness that is being exploited when targeting the vulnerability, in some 
advisories it is not directly defined it is buried within text and it is very helpful for 
system administrator to understand the nature of the vulnerability as well in 
prioritisation, for example buffer overflow could lead to denial of service, so the 
system administrator should act immediately. The Vulnerability type is important in 
classification; the system administrator can use it in a searchable database to find 
the vulnerability. Some vulnerability types are listed below. 
0 Input error (Boundary/Buffer overflow) 
0 Access validation effor 
0 Exceptional condition error 
0 Configuration error 
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0 Design error 
0 Other 
* Impact/Consequence: The purpose of the ImpactlConsequence is to identify the 
impact of the vulnerability on an affected system which helps the system 
administrator to understand the impact of the vulnerability on his system to make 
the right decision in a timely manner. Table 6.2 shows the impact of vulnerability 
on system security. 
Availability Low/Medium/High 
Confidentiality Low/Medium/High 
Integrity Low/Medium/High 
Table 6.2: Impact of vulnerability 
e Reference: The purpose of Reference is to identify any references for the 
vulnerability such as CVE references. The reference enables system administrators 
to link to a different databases and simplify the search for vulnerability in different 
sources to read more details about the vulnerability. 
* Relevant emails: The purpose of Relevant emails module is to display the relevant 
messages after filtration and prioritisation which can draw the system 
administrators attention to the important ones. The display form includes the 
following categories: 
0 Time 
0 Sender name (vendor) 
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0 Subject 
0 Time 
Size 
" Severity 
" Target type 
" Exploitation side 
" Exploitation rating 
" Vulnerability type 
Impact 
Reference 
The Relevant email passes the relevant advisories to the rectification system if the advisory 
includes a patch. 
6.8 Automated rectification 
The second element of the Automated Resolver addresses vulnerability rectification, and 
the associated sub-architecture is illustrated in Figure 6.8. 
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Figure 6.8: Automated rectification system 
The main functionality is split into server and client side elements, as follows: 
6.8.1 Server side modules 
Controller. This module enables the administrator to conligure the 
rectification system. On the server side (i. e. the administrator workstation). 
such configuration would apply to the Downloader (e. g. behavior 
characteristics to cons i der/pri oriti se when downloading the patches), the Patch 
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profile (e. g. save all the downloaded patches into a profile directory), the 
Network profile (e. g. client name, location, and IP address) and the 
Communicator (e. g. schedule the time of installation). Meanwhile, on the 
client side, the Controller configures the Patch profile (e. g. save all the 
downloaded patches into a profile directory) and can initiate the installation of 
a patch on the client. 
- Downloader. The Downloader is designed in a highly dynamic way to 
overcome the problem of indirect URL patch links. Some vendors released 
advisories with direct single/multi patch links, other vendors do not. In this 
case the downloader navigates all the URL links in the relevant email till it 
finds the patch link. Then it downloads all the patches in each advisory. The 
system administrator can set the depth of the search which makes the 
downloader more dynamic with any changes in vendor websites. It is 
configurable via the Controller, to download a required patch either manually 
or automatically. The downloaded patches are saved into the patches profile, 
irrespective of the operating system of the patch. 
Patches prorile (server). This module saves the patches on the server 
(Administrator workstation), irrespective of the operating system of the patch. 
So the system administrator can distribute the patch without connecting the 
clients to the vendor website 
Distributor. This module distributes the patches to network clients using 
Client information either automatically at a scheduled time, or manually by 
selecting the patch and then sending it to required clients. 
Client information. This module is a database for network information, 
including each machine in the network, its name, location, and IP address. 
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Communicator. The communicator is installed on the server (system 
administrator workstation) to provide a communication between the server and 
clients. Using the same port, IP address to prevent an attacker gaining access to 
the network. The Communicator is designed to use the Winsock protocol. The 
Winsock protocol is defined as (Winsock, 2005): 
"A network programming interface for Microsoft Windows which is 
based on the "socket" paradigm popularized in BSD Unix. It 
encompasses both familiar Berkeley socket style routines and a set of 
Windows-specific extensions" 
The Winsock protocol is implemented as a control in Visual Basic 6.0. It is the 
lowest level network programming protocol and is used to create applications 
that access the low-level functions of TCP/IP. Winsock is a set of routines that 
dcscribc communications to and from the TCPAP stack (Intcrnct, 200 1). 
6.8.2 Client side modules 
Client. This module represents the target machine to which the patch will be 
sent and installed upon. 
Patches Profile (client). This module saves the patches on the client when 
received from the server side. 
System tray. The Client side is designed to reside in the system tray to make it 
accessible in an easy way and to be active all the time to make the client up to 
date. The function of the system tray is to give options for the user to select one 
of the following: 
a. Accept download available patch and install it automatically. 
Or one of the following three scenarios: 
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b. Ask for pennission before download the patch. 
c. Automatically download the patch and then alert the user to accept 
installation. 
d. Automatic download and install the available patch at a specified 
scheduled. 
In all scenarios the client will not be connected to the vendors web site to 
download the patch. These scenarios are designed similarly to automatic 
updating software and viruses which are help system administrator and end 
users to deploy the available patch in time manner and avoid any interruption 
of the service for the active user. 
6.9 Conclusions 
This chapter has identified a standard process to address the vulnerability problem. It has 
also established the need for an automated vulnerability management system and outlined 
the problems preventing the adoption of the automated system. 
This chapter has focused upon the conceptual architecture for Automated Vulnerability 
Management System. Its description has included an introduction of the main concepts of 
the architecture, and the modules within it. Detailed focus was given to each module, and 
especially the notification system to filter incoming advisories and discard the irrelevant 
messages, and then prioritises relevant messages according to local system configuration. 
The architecture was designed to enable the system administrator to search in the local 
database for the incoming advisories. The notification system specifically addresses the 
problem of the high volume of incoming advisories, which means the system administrator 
will not be overwhelmed with the information. The second element of the automated 
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management system is the rectification system, which is designed to act upon the relevant 
advisories from the notification system by downloading the relevant patches, and then 
deploy them into the network clients. 
The next chapter presents the implementation of the Automated Vulnerability management 
system prototype. 
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7.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the implementation of an automated vulnerability management 
system prototype, which embodies a subset of the key elements of the proposed 
architecture. The prototype has been implemented to cover the largest possible mapping of 
the different vendor advisory formats. 
The aim of the prototype system is to demonstrate the many steps in vulnerability 
management and its correction that can be automated and left to run without intervention, 
with the necessary security being applied at all stages to communications from vendors and 
communications to client. Manual intervention is still required at some stages, for example 
to ensure urgent or critical patches are deployed first. Vulnerability management is the task 
of filtering the incoming advisories to discard the irrelevant messages, and then prioritising 
the relevant messages. These steps are the responsibility of the notification system. The 
subsequent task of the rectification system starts with downloading patches as advised by 
the vendor, and then distributing and installing such patches to the clients that require 
them. In addition this is to be handled in such a way as to ensure the patches are 
downloaded from the legitimate site, and the patch is installed on the client system 
requiring it. Thus, the automated vulnerability management system (AVMS) prototype can 
be regarded as having met its criteria if it can keep several different types of systems up to 
date with patches as they are released by the software vendors, in the order of their 
urgency. 
The next sections describe the development, operation and setting up parameters with 
detailed discussion on using the automated vulnerability management system prototype. 
Finally, the chapter conclude with remarks and findings regarding the AVMS prototype. 
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7.2 Implementation Overview 
A prototype of the automated vulnerability management system sub-system has been 
implemented in a reference network environment based on a Windows platfon-n, and 
provides a proof-of-concept for the ideas presented in the main architectural work. It 
demonstrates the ability of an automated agent to initiate appropriate rectification actions 
to a number of actual vulnerabilities, based on the reference environment's network 
configuration. The main program including the Notification System, Downloader, 
Distributor, and Communicator are installed on the server (system administrator 
workstation). The client information (such as name, location, and IP address) is saved in a 
database on the server, and the administrator can send the patches manually or 
automatically by nominating the target client(s). 
The elements of the AVMS architecture that have been implemented in the prototype are 
depicted in Figure 7.1. In order to achieve this aim the main functionality has been split 
into five sub systems over two areas: 
" Server side 
" Notification system 
" Downloader 
" Distribution 
" Clint side 
" Receiver 
" Installer 
The implementation of each module is discussed in the next sections. 
161 
Chapter / .-A 
Prototype A utomated Vulnerability Management System 7 
Advisories Mailing list 
Email Client 
MS Outlook/Inbox 
Admin Workstation 
-------------------------------- 
Filt 
Notification System 
------------------------------------- I 
ion, 
incoming Prioritization & Controller 
Advisories 
t4 
Classification 
Display Relevant 
-------------------------------- 
Advisories 
------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------- 
No natch 
Workaround 
endo 
------------------------------------- 
Patch available L 
Downloader 
v 
Tl; c! t r; hi Itnr 
------------------------------------------------- 
Rectification System ---------------- 
------------------------------------------------- --- ---------------- 
Installer Fsystem Patch 
Tray 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Client 
Figure 7.1: AVMS prototype Implementation 
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7.3 Development of a prototype 
The research analyzed the received email advisories and downloaded and distributed 
patches. The results of this analysis confirmed that having email management system, 
patch downloader and distributor functions was the most able structure to support the 
requirements of the model. 
The database requirements of this prototype were developed using Microsoft Access, as it 
is the most available database, without excessive database administrator knowledge 
requirements in order to have a functioning prototype. 
The user interface requirements were implemented using Microsoft Visual Basic. The 
object libraries for Microsoft Outlook (Email manager) and Microsoft Internet Explorer 
(Downloader) are used in order to interface with these applications on the server. The 
Communicator module uses the Winsock library. 
73.1 The Database 
Figure 7.2 shows the tables and their relationships necessary to support the prototype's 
functionality. Each table defined in the Access database is represented in the relationships 
window. All fields, for the table are shown, with the key fields in bold. Explicit relations 
between the tables can then be defined. The tables along the bottom are used to record the 
various criteria for recording the severity of each email. 
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Figure 7.2: AVMS prototype database relation schema 
The ernail table holds all the details of matching emails received from vendors subscribed 
to. These emails are mapped according to the rules set up for each vendor. There is a 
theoretical relationship between the criteria fields and the related fields on the email table. 
Further details for this relationship are presented in the next section. The patch and 
software fields hold multiple values. This is the multivalued dependency, discussed in 
detail in the next section. 
The Patch table is the link for all the downloadable patches mentioned in the email or 
discovered traversing links from the email. The table holds the URL location ofthe patch, 
the local path of the patch, which email it came from, whether it has been downloaded, and 
if not why. PatchSoft is a link table between patches and software, so that each type of 
software that the patch is applicable to can be listed. 
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The Vendors table holds the vendor name, subscription email address, or subscription 
webpage and PGP key infonnation. It is also the key to the Software table detailing which 
software that vendor sends patches for and the Vendor Email table which lists all the 
addresses that valid emails for that vendor emails may come from. 
The Client table lists the client's name and connection details. The ClientSoft table holds 
the software profile for each client. This software must exist on the Software table with a 
valid vendor Id. If it does not valid patches will not be located. Client Patch table holds the 
date that each qualifying patch was sent to the client. In order for a patch to qualify it must 
have a software record that matches a client software record. 
7.4 Server Side Modules 
Figure 7.3 illustrates the relations of server side functioning modules, namely Notification 
System, Downloader, and Distributor; the following sections discuss each module 
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Figure 73: Server Side Modules 
73.1 Automated Notification System 
In the ideal implementation, the notification system is designed to receive and filter 
incoming advisory messages, using the generic vulnerability-reporting format, previously 
defined in chapter 5. The notification sub modules use the parameters set up by the 
controller for vendor emails and rules to retrieve matching emails from the Outlook system 
and to code the information into the AVMS prototype database. These modules retrieve 
emails received in the default mailbox of the machine it is running on (system 
administrator workstation). The emails retrieved are only those for vendors registered 
within the database. In addition, emails are only retrieved when they are dated later than 
those emails already on the database for that vendor. If a new vendor is added to the 
system, the default is to retrieve all emails for that vendor. When the database is populated 
with at least one email from that vendor, further searches will only be conducted for later 
emails. 
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7.4.1.1 Subscription with mailing lists 
The svstern administrator can subscribe to an advisory mailing in the usual manner (e. g. 
sending a 'subscribe' message to the list, or providing contact details via a subscription 
,, veb page). Alternatively, the subscription process for common mailing lists can be handled 
within the system, as illustrated in Figure 7.4a, while Figure 7.4b illustrated redhat- 
announce-list subscription webpage. 
To send a en-n, t, , -ýi- r,, i, 
TogotothEwebsile clicktherelv8ni 
ve nd -), no rri e 
FF-T 
CE RT Acl. ý, 
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Microsoft 
Microsor 
Microsoft Eullttin 
Red Hat 
Redhat bugzillrý 
redhat-announce-iist-admin 
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Add websde Cwcel 
. ... ....... 
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SubsaibiM to redhat-annmm-fist 
, ýqcnbe to redhat - announce- list by Ing cLt týe ýo low ng fcr- You w 11 be seqý em3 I rEcuesting confirnatiDý 
*. ri-ly subscribing you. This is a nidden list, wn, ch means that the list of members is available only to tne I* 
YoLf wW address: 
Your nme (optional): 
may enter a privacy password belcw. This prow ýdes on Iy mild security, but should prevent others 
ým messing wr& your subscription Do not use a valuable password as t will occasionally be emailed 
ý-k to you in deartext. 
ou choose not to enter a password, one will be automatically generated for you, and it will be 
to you once you've confirmed your subscription You can always request a mail-back of Your 
t-sword when you edit your personal opt-ons. once 3 mortn, your password will be emailed to 
)iý, a errinder 
P ck a password: 
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Mv, h laril do you prefer to &play your El (USA) 
messages? 
Would VoL like to weive hct mail batJed in a dailV 
d gEst? !. No 
C Yes 
Subscribe 
(b) Redhat-announce-list subscription page 
Figure 7.4: Subscription window 
The systern administrator can subscribe to various published advisories. The owners of 
these advisories are added to the Vendors table in the database it' they are not already 
registered as vendors. The software that the vendor supports will also be added to the 
Software table, if not already existing. Further, the email address that is on the advisory is 
added as a valid email for that vendor. This improves security by only allowing emails 
from recognised senders to be added to the database. 
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7.4.1.2 The vendor's rules 
Once a subscription has been activated the emails will come to the Outlook mailbox ofthe 
designated user. The first email (or couple of emails) needs to be manually scanned to 
determine ho-, N, best the email can be decoded to retrieve the criteria of interest to this 
system. Then the rules for that vendor can be updated. However, in order to ensure some 
level of compatibility with existing advisories, the prototype system allows mappings to be 
defined between the generic format and the current fon-nat of' vendor-specific advisories. 
Such a mapping is illustrated in Figure 7.5, illustrating the mapping applied to the generic 
forniat and the current Microsoft vulnerability bulletin forniat. As shown, the vendor 
formats will not always provide all of the information under distinct fields - it is often 
buried within free-text description, or not provided at all. As a result, some ofthe fields in 
the generic format will remain blank. 
Vendus III ýave Qlose 
S. No.. LWk In Rule Text 
I SoNare Softwarel 
2 Sewo Max Resk. 
3 ExplooSite 
4 ExplogRatrQs R6 Ratrq. 
5 vuhwabilty 
6 TargetType 
7 lrrlW Irr; W: 
8 AmmAd 
9 ExperbSe 
10 PaLlh Patch Avallabilky: 
11 Start5can Patch Avakt! N4: 
12 ErdScan AdTowledgment: 
0 Tftle T gle 
Figure 7.5: Mapping vulnerabiliq, 
These rules relate to the important criteria of patches. For the location of the patch there 
are two values: startscan and endscan. These values deten-nine where in the email there 
possibly links to the patches are being advised on. Specifying these rules are advantageous, 
as it makes scanning the email for relevant information easier and speedier. For instance, 
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consider the difference in specifying startscan and endscan values. If these values are not 
specified, the email decoder needs to scan the whole email for values that indicate a patch. 
If the email is examined and it is determined that there are standard headers, footer, and 
vulnerability information that does not include URLs, it is better to specify startscan and 
endscan values. This allows the decoder to ignore these portions of the email. For each 
email, this allows a small optimization in the time taken to decode each email, but this time 
quickly adds up when emails are processed each day for many clients. 
Startscan =0 or rule. startscan. placefound 
Endscan = email length or rule. endscan. placefound 
While between startscan and endscan values 
find next http, ftp, or https urls 
format patch ficld for cach url found, dclimitcd by "i" 
The Rules section allows the specification of where the relevant criteria can be found in the 
vendor's emails. The email manager will search for that location and put the sentence 
following the specification in that field on the Email table. It is best to specify all the rules, 
where possible, as this decreases the amount of processing time spent searching the email 
for matching criteria. However, some advisories that are subscribed to, such as SANS and 
Linux, may be general in nature, and thus have no specific information encoded within 
their advisories. 
The Email manager retrieves the new emails from each Vendor. Prior to retrieving the 
email the signature is checked. In retrieving the emails, they will be coded onto the email 
file, according to the rules captured. Section 7.4.1.5 shows further details for digital 
signature. 
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The users are able to filter or sort the emails by various criteria. The sort option orders the 
display by any of the criteria, or by software, or the sender name. The sender name is the 
default sort order. 
7.4.1.3 Classification& Setfilter 
The Classification and Set Filters allow the filtering of emails displayed, and the system 
administrator can build his own local searchable database. The Classitication facility is 
more flexible in that it allows the individual filters to be ANDed or ORed together but only 
allo,, vs the selection of one value for each criteria. The classification window is illustrated 
in Figure 7.6, shoxving all searchable fields. 
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General Filters: 
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Severity/Riský 
Exploitation Sideý 
Exploitation Rating: 
Vulnerability type ý 
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Reference. F,, 
ý 
ClearAll Cancel 
JD operator 
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Figure 7.6: Classification window 
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Set Filters only allows the ANDing of the criteria selected, but multiple values for each 
criterion can be selected and these are ORred, (for instance vendors Microsoft and SANS 
can be selected. and emails for either vendor will be retrieved). These facilities are of use 
to deteri-nine which vulnerability needs to be addressed first. The set filter window is 
illustrated in Figure 7.7 showing all filter fields. 
YL. 11-ji tlltef--ý here 
Vendor Name Affected 
Software 
Target Type Severity/ Risk 
Exploitation 
C 1 
71 Exploitation 
Rating 
Vulnerability 
- 
11 
1 Impact /i 
Consequence 
Reference 
AdvancedFilter Cancel 
.................................................. ............ 
Figure 7.7: Set filter window 
7.4.1.3.1 Configuring the selfiltersparametersfor operation 
Almost all the parameters for the structure of the prototype work in the same , vay. It is 
necessary to add most of the parameters through the set filters option. 
7.4.1.3.2 Configuring the vendorsfor operation 
The next step is to configure the vendors for the prototype. For example, when clicking on 
the Vendor name button in the Set filter window, the system will display the Vendor name 
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,. vindow, as shown in Figure 7.8. The system administrator can tick the displayed vendor 
name. then click OK to select vendor name. Click Add to add a new vendor to the 
prototype, add the relevant details (i. e. vendor name, vendor email, and vendor website), 
and then click Update. To see all the data click Refresh to include the new data. 
Alternatively, continue by clicking on Add Email, click Add to add a new email address 
for the vendor, add the relevant details, and then click Submit Add. Figure 7.9 illustrates 
Add Vendor name window. 
Vendor Name 
BugTraq Add Vendot 
CERT 
CERTAdvisory OK ............ 
CV, E 
Linux Cancel 
Microsoft 
Red Hat 
Figure 7.8: Vendor name window 
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VenName: lRed Hat 
WebSite: lhttps: /Ilistman. tedhat. com/mailman/listinto/ie( 
iubscription Email: liedhat-announce-list-fequesý@redhat com 
Add Email After you add a record, you have 
Add Software to click "Update" button 
6 
118 
122 
I& 
I Add I Update I 2elete I Refresh I Close II 
Figure 7.9: Vendor name configuration window 
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7.4.1.3.3 Finalise the vendor's details 
An email record needs to be set up for each vendor that sends advisories that will be 
processed by this application. The email address is the address that the email is sent to, 
while the Email name is the outlook name the email is sent from. A vendor, such as 
Redhat, may have advisories coming from multiple addresses. As such Redhat needs a 
record of each email address mail is received from. 
A record is also required in the PGP database in order for the email verification procedure 
to work correctly. Clicking on the PGP button will launch the PGP keys application. A 
search of one of three public PGP key databases can be done. There is no way to tell which 
of the three databases the key holder has published their key to. This will return 
information about who holds the key, the type of key hold, and for how long it is valid for. 
Once the matching key is located it needs to be imported to the local key-ring and updated 
in the vendoes details. This will make it available to the email verification process, when 
new emails are received from that vendor. 
7.4.1.3.4 Configure Affected Software 
A software record is required for each software that the vendor supports. As software may 
not always be referred to by its full name, it may require multiple records (an alternative 
would be to define an alias that points to an existing record). These records are also used 
for creating the client's software profile and for checking which software patches are for. 
Figures 7.10 and 7.11 illustrate Affected software, and Add software respectively. 
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-Close im--m 
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___L_ 
Figure 7.11: Add software window 
The parameters that need to be set up through the Set Filters to operate the prototypc are: 
a) Target type; 
b) Severity / Risk-, 
c) Exploitation side; 
d) Exploitation rating; 
e) Vulnerability type; 
t) Impact / Consequence; 
Reference. 
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The delete function is a two step operation. To delete an email from the inbox, or its 
subfolders, the email is first moved to the deleted folder. If emails are then deleted from 
there they are removed from the database and from the Outlook folder. Figure 7.12 
illustrates the personal folders where the system administrator can create sub folders under 
Inbox and he can move any message to designated folder, also the deleted items are shown. 
Personal Folders! 
inbox 
1.0racle 
ý' j 2. Redhat Announce 
3 Microsoft 
ýý'; 'j 4 Microsoft 
Deleted Items 
1. asdasdf 
Figure 7.12: Personal folders 
7.4.1.4 Main Interface 
The advantage of the AVMS interface is that advisories from multiple sources (and 
originating in different formats), can be managed through a single interface. Figure 7.13 
presents the main interface of the notification system, which is similar to a standard email 
client, displaying sender name, subject, received time and the like. In addition, other fields 
such as the severity of the vulnerability are extracted from the original source message, and 
can be used to sort and filter the messages received. This information enables the 
administrator to judge the importance of the message and can be used to draw his attention 
to it. If an associated patch is not available, the advisory source may provide workarounds 
to avoid any exploitation of the vulnerability. 
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[suse-security-annource) SuSE Security Arorourrement: 1210812003 18: 04: 3 
(suse-security-anrource] SuSE Security Anriciuricement: 26M/2w3 18: 19: 1 
[Suse-security-arroDurice] SLgSE Security Announcement: 03jC9/2003 17: 04: 5 
[su9, --Securrty-aiinoLjnce1 SuSE Security Amiciurxement: 11/09/2003 09: 01: 5 
(suse-smurity-arvwxxicel SuSE Security Announci 16/09/2003 21: 5 
[susc-security-amounce) SuSE Security Armunceriont. 16, Ug/2003 19 33: 4 
[ suse- security-anrmxnx eI SuSE Securit V Annuum 20/ 09/ 2003 17: 2 
[suse-security-amouncel SuSE Security Annoum 01/10/2003 10: 5 
[suse-searay-m-inot-rce) SLEE SeCur Ity AnnourTemF? nt 01/10/2OG3 13-00! 5 
[Suse-securrty-anroxice] SuSE Security Amouncement: 01/10/2003 18.31: 3 
To: suse-secunty-announce@suse. com Patch: 
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size Tt 
35 KB 
37 K8 
31 KB 
6 KB 
45 KB 
33 KB 
34 KB 
45 KB 
46 KB 
51 KB 
50 KB 
39 KB 
47 KB 
60 KB I 
Announcerntnt-ID SuSE-SA2003038 zi 
Date Tuesday, Sep 16 2003 22 15 h= -i 
Affiected products 7 2.7 3,8 0,8 1.8 2 
SuSF linux Database Server, 
SuSE eM" Server 111,3 1 
SuSE 1-4nux Enterprise Server 7,8 
'uSE lAnux FirewaH on CD/Admin host 
SuSE Laiux Connectvity Server 
SuSE I-4nux Office Server 
SuSE 1-4nux Standard Server 8 
Vulnerabidy Type potentW remote pnvdege escalation 
Seventy (I -10) 8 
SuSE defauk package yes 
Cross Reftrences http /Iwww openssh comiftn(buffer adv 
, '7PT VTT*3' 3628 
'VF 'AN-2003-0693 
41 Start 10 & 
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Figure 7.13: Filtered list of advisories 
7.4.1.5 Retrieving the Email messages 
The Get-Mails button is the heart of the Notification management system. The Notification 
system uses the folder designated as the default on the machine it is running on to open the 
Outlook mailbox using the Outlook server on the installation machine. A filter is then 
applied to retrieve only the emails of concern. That is a search is conducted ofthe Outlook 
emails for all later time stamped emails by each address for each Vendor. Figure 7.14 
illustrates what user sees as the task of getting email progresses. The amount ot'detail that 
is extracted from each email depends on the rules specified for that vendor. Once all 
addresses are checked the default inbox is displayed in sender name order. 
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Fulnerability Management System 
There are 1130 emails. 
Please Wait Processing 
Retrieving.. newsietter-bounce@linuxsecurity. com 
Figure 7.14: Getting emails progress windomv 
Prior to accepting the email into the system, the signature of the emails is checked. For 
each email, the PGP server is invoked, sending it is the key ID of the vendor and the email 
text. including the signatures. The server then verifies that the email text has not been 
tampered with. Emails that are invalid are highlighted, as are ones where the key no longer 
exists (i. e. may have been revoked), or the email message did not code to the signature (i. e. 
it has been tampered with). 
In order to deten-nine the high priority emails, the Set Filter was used for any email with a 
severity ranking. A shortened list of emails is displayed. Clicking on any message will 
show the email in the browser window. In the email listing the left six columns are the 
criteria rankings used through the prototype to assist administrators determine which 
vulnerability patches need to be deployed first. The email may be perused from here. If 
there is only one patch in the URL, it may be retrieved directly from here, by clicking on 
the patch URL as indicated in the email heading. 
The Download (and Resume Download) and Distribute functions provide an entry into the 
next discussed sections. 
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73.2 Automated Rectification System 
7.4. Zl Downloader 
This module is invoked by the user by clicking on download or resume download on the 
main interface. It will check the selected email or all the emails currently displaying in the 
Inbox. Figure 7.15 represents the downloader flowchart. This is a two-phase process. 
The first phase is the navigation of URLs until all URLs from the selected email(s) 
referring directly to the patch are retrieved. The second phase is to retrieve all patches. If 
the email(s) being checked contains only patch URLs the first phase is very short. If the 
email is only an advisory, (i. e. contains no patches), the first phase will retrieve URLs to 
determine if there is a patch to download, but the second phase will not execute because 
these emails normally do not contain patches as they have not been published by software 
vendors yet. 
If the patches for this email have not already been determined, the browser window will 
locate each URL from the email in turn to search for a valid patch to download. 
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Figure 7.15: Downloader flowchart 
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The URLS navigated to are restricted by the IncludeWords table and by their depth, i. e. no 
URLS are collected from home pages; URLS are only collected if the words within URLS 
refer to security or patches or other words included in the IncludeWord table i. e. 
http: //www. microsoft. com/athome/security/online/default. mspx. For instance, if the email 
mentions microsoft. com, within two depths there are more than a thousand URLS collected 
to be navigated to. In an attempt to curb the number of URLS that are navigated, these 
URLS are not collected. 
Storing of collcctcd URLs was considered, as this would save time in the number of pages 
needing to be visited each time. However, Microsoft and other vendors regularly change 
the URLs from which download are available from. Thus, a saved URL may no longer be 
available for the required patch, thus an error is returned, rather than locating the patch. 
Further the user has the option to specify how many depths to go from allowed URLs. If 
the page contains URLs of actual patches, then the patch table is checked to determine that 
this has not been downloaded previously. If not existing, a record is added to the patch 
table. 
The second phase downloads all patches located on the patch file that have not yet been 
downloaded. If an error is received in attempting to retrieve the patch it is recorded on the 
patch file as an error download. There is no attempt to download it again. If the patch is 
retrieved it is put into the server downloads area to be forwarded to clients. The record is 
updated as completed. 
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7.4.2.2 Retrieving the patches 
Figure 7.16 illustrates the downloader interface. It shows the downloader working in its 
first phase where it is navigating the URLs from a selected Microsoft email. Each time the 
do-wriloader is invoked, the system default depth level is indicated. This may be altered if 
looking for specific patches. The administrator may also interact on seeing the link, decide 
that no useful intlon-nation would come from that page, and click on 'Skip link'. If the 
administrator vvishes they may also stop the email check to proceed to the second phase of 
the downloading. The bottom left hand comer indicates ho\v many links have been 
traversed, and how many more to go at each level allowed by the depth parameter. 
Download qtatjs 
Remote server 
File name: 
Total progress 
Depth Level Stop Emal Skip unk 
Check 
hltP /I. - , p.? F&, OD-43201 BOB 298D4COCA26FAAEDF1&EB7i-, iýý. -; Lý- 
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Figure 7.16: Downloader interface 
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The first phase is the navigation of URLs until all URLs from the selected email(s) 
mentioned are retrieved. Each URL is examined to determine whether it refers to a 
downloadable link or is a link to a further page. If it is a downloadable link it is saved to 
the Patch table, if it is determined that this patch has not been downloaded previously. All 
other links are navigated to by using the Internet Explorer. While Internet Explorer is 
retrieving the page, the program allows other machine activities to continue. When reached 
this link is marked as navigated. All links on the page are stored on the email links table as 
not yet been seen if they match the navigation depth level, web-site depth level and include 
words constraints. The page is checked using IEs links collection. Mail, script and 
bookmark links are also ignored. To store the correct linked software on the patch software 
file, IEs innerHTML collection is used. 
The depth restricts the number of pages URLs are collected from. The default value is 3 
levels. This means up to three levels of pages will be collected for examination. Thus the 
referred URL page URLs are collected by default the user has the option to change this 
level up or down in order to restrict or enlarge the number of pages examined. Each 
qualifying URL is saved to a temporary link table. This means they can specify to only 
visit the actual URL (a depth of 0) or to only visit each of the URLs on its page (a depth of 
1). 
The next phase processes each download in turn. It may be terminated at any time. That 
patch is not marked as downloaded, and the download will recommence from the 
beginning the next time. 
This module has three exposed events to handle errors, completion, and progress reports. 
The start download and cancel download methods are called as required. However, it can 
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only handle http and ftp communications. This it navigates to a URL and will retrieve a 
specified file name from there. It does not handle retrieval of files that are not on Internet 
servers. 
The administrator may select to distribute the patches from here or from the main screen. 
7.4.2.3 Distributor 
The distributor is invoked from either the main screen or the download manager, and 
illustrated in Figure 7.17. This distributor module displays all patches waiting in 
server/downloads that have not yet been sent to the target client(s). It retrieves all clients 
from the database. The user first selects the client which they wish to deal with. All the 
patches that match the client's criteria that have not yet been delivered to them 
Ab du L2 
plh 0 7866 Fal.. 
eithef a client and click Duwnluad. ur select a client and then a patch. 
Cliený SofWare lPaktchUFkL 3 
11 Me Windows NT 40......... 
- 
ftpý//ttp suse com/pub/suse/066/update. ftip //ftp suse. com/pub/su, - 
- 
Me Windows NT 40 htip //download microsoft corn/downlond http //www rnicrosoft com/ 
- 
Me Windows NT 40 ttp //ftp suse com/pub/suse/086/update ttp //ffp suse com/pub/su 
- 
Me Windows NT 40... 
..... .... 
ftp //ftp suse com/pub/suse/1386/updote ftp //hp suse com/pub/su 
_ 
Me Windows NT 40 ftp //tip suse com/pub/suse/0136/update tip //ftp suse corn/pub/su 
- 
Me Windows NT 40 ftp 1/tIp Suse com/pub/suse/ppic/upid ate, ftp //ftp suse comffiub/ýu- 
- 
Me Windows NT 40............ ftp //ttp suse com/pub/suseli366/update tip /Ittp suse com/pub/su 
a Windows NT 40 ftp //ftP suse corn/pub/suse/sparc/updmlttp //ttp suse com/pub/su, 
Me Windows NT 40 ftp //hp suse com/pub/susa/686/updatH flp //ttp susa com/Pub/su: 
Me Windows INT 40 ftp //ftp suse com/pub/suse/0815/upilinfe tip //ftp suse com/pub/su 
12ownload I Maintain Client I 
-- ---- _. __j -History 
. 
Qose 
Figure 7.17: Distribution window 
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are then displayed. The user may select to send all the patches at once or to individually 
send patches to the client. The reliability of the client's connection needs to be taken into 
account when detennining which to select. 
The client management section is where the IP address and port is recorded for the client, 
as well as a memo field that can be used to record the clients location. The IP address and 
port give the details to make a connection with the client in order to send and install the 
patches. There is also a subsection to record the software that the client wishes to receive 
patches for. New software may be added for each client from the list of software that 
emails are checked for. In this way a complete portfolio of the client's software profile can 
be maintained. There is a display of the history of patches sent by client. 
The distributor will then initiate a connection with the client. If the client is waiting for a 
connection, the two will handshake and then progress to sending the download. The 
communication is managed by the Winsock protocol. 
The History button shows a history of all patches sent to the client. This shows the date the 
patch was sent, where the patch is located on the server, the result of the transmission, and 
the error message if the transmission was not successful. The Maintain Client option 
allows for the maintenance of client history and their software profiles. The maintain client 
section is where the IP address and port is recorded for the client, as well as a memo field 
that can be used to record the client's location. The IP address and port give the details to 
make a connection with the client in order to send and install the patches. 
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7.5 Client side modules 
7.3.1 Client Receiver 
This module is installed on the client machine. When executing, it resides in the system 
tray. The user can set options as to whether he wants to be alerted when a download or an 
installation occurs, or if these may proceed silently. The user can set this module to one of 
the following options: 
* Accept download available patch and install it automatically. 
* Ask for pennission before download the patch. 
9 Automatically download the patch and then alert the user to accept installation. 
* Automatic download and install the available patch at a scheduled time. 
In all scenarios the client will not be connected to the vendor's web site to download the 
patch. These scenarios are designed similarly to Microsoft Automatic Updating Software 
(Microsoft, 2003c), but the developed framework differs from the Windows Update 
Scrvice in that it allows administrators to catcr for non-Windows platforms in addition to 
Windows platfonns. Thus RedHat and SuSE advisories can be added to the database, not 
only Windows vendors. Their patches will be downloaded and implemented with the same 
ease, which is help system administrator and end users to deploy the available patch in 
time manner and avoid any interruption of the service for the active user. 
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These options are saved into the registry, and so do not have to be reset for each session. 
Figure 7.18 illustrates the client receiver window. 
ýN rr Automated Vulnerability Resolver downloads r'j j the patches and delivers them to your system 
.............................................................................................................. Keep the system updated by downloading and'; 
Installing patchs available. 
........................................................................... ...................... 
S ettings 
Ask me before downloading any patch 
available. 
Automatically download the patches available 
and ask me when they are ready to install. 
Automatically download and install patches 
available at the specified scheduled. 
I Everyday at 
16 PM ", I 
OK I Cancel I 8pply 
Figure 7.18: Client's receiver window 
When a connection request is received, the Winsock protocol will handshake and connect 
with the server. It will then receive the patches, and store the patch file in the download 
profile, and then initiate the installer. 
7.3.2 Installer 
This module is invoked once a download is completed. When the patch is downloaded It is 
saved into a sub-directory called 'download'. Each new download is then run to install on 
the client machine. Once the installation is completed the patch file is moved to a sub 
directory called 'done'. It will report back to the user whether the patch is installed or not. 
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Figure 7.19 illustrates the patch implementation message. If the installation is unsuccessful 
the file is not moved to the 'done' directory. 
Figure 7.19: Client installer 
7.6 Conclusions 
This chapter described the Automated Vulnerability Management System prototype. 
demonstrating two main features of the proposed architecture; the ability to provide a 
custormsable notification system, and the ability to act upon the relevant advisories. It 
implements the many steps in vulnerability management and its correction that can be 
automated and left to run without intervention, with the necessary security being applied at 
all stages, starting with verifying the digital signature ofincoming vulnerability advisories 
messages and ending by communications to clients, so as to prevent the rectification agent 
being misused by hackers as a means of getting the target system to accept malicious code. 
The framework enables messages from multiple vendors to be processed and priontised 
within a single administrative interface. 
The prototype system has succeeded in providing a harmonised front-end for 
administrators who would otherwise have to manually inspect, filter advisories from 
multiple sources, and then manually retrieve any associated patches. 
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The development of the prototype has also served to inform the AVMS architecture, 
especially in areas relating to how the generic format can be designed and mapped. The 
prototype has served to prove the viability of the AVMS architecture, and doing so, it has 
provided a practical validation of the ability to achieve flexible automated and 
comprehensive management system. In that sense, the system in its current form is 
believed to represent advancement on existing vulnerability management approaches. 
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8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the implementation of the Automated Vulnerability 
Management System (AVMS) prototype framework. The purpose of the implementation 
was to build demonstration software that acts as a proof of concept for the theoretical 
research. This chapter evaluates the framework both theoretically and practically, 
providing illustrations of typical system behavior and performance. The chapter concludes 
by discussing the advantages of the AVMS over existing vulnerability resolution 
techniques. 
The validation of AVMS was achieved by two approaches: 
1. The performance of AVMS was evaluated theoretically given predefined 
performance rates of a number of typical vulnerability approaches that could be 
found in IT networks. 
2. The patching vulnerability processes were validated by runing the AVMS 
framework prototype on a reference network. Through patching the machines in 
the reference network, it was possible to validate the security processes within 
AVMS. 
The next two sections will present the findings of these two processes. 
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8.2 Theoretical System Performance 
The AVMS prototype framework was designed to provide a harmonised front-end for 
administrators who would otherwise have to manually filter incoming vulnerability 
advisories and then download and deploy the patches. The prototype framework is 
Windows XP based, but accepts alerts for any operating systems or applications requested. 
Thus if the platform is of interest to the local system administrator, the mailing list 
subscription information is added to the AVMS framework, and all future advisory emails 
received will be processed. This does mean that the AVMS needs to be updated with new 
subscriptions when a new vendor is added to the organization! s system. Each advisory 
message can be viewed in its original format, with all relevant details. This has several 
advantages for the administrator. Firstly, the information is not filtered into the format of 
an alert provider, such as Symantec, thus it can be assessed in the context of the 
organization. Secondly, it is not waiting until the warning is verified by the alert provider, 
thus the administrator receives notification and patch information as soon as it is available. 
The inventories of system software are manually recorded, including the software version 
numbers. Some other systems do automatic recording of this information. An organization 
needs to consider the confidentiality of this information. This information needs to be 
secure from hackers wanting to damage the organization's continuous operation, so that it 
is not made easier to target the organization by deliberately sending honed bugs to them. It 
also needs to be confidential from careless employees, for the same reasons. 
The main console starts with the advisories to be processed. These are displayed in date 
order by default. The advisories are automatically checked for tampering by checking their 
PGP key. This is the major digital signature used by mailing lists sources. 
191 
Chapter 8: Automated Vulnerability Management System Evaluation 
There are several filters that can be used in order to select the alerts to be processed 
according to the local network configuration. These filters include vendor, software, 
severity as well as other criteria. Patches from several or all emails can be retrieved at one 
time. Patches can be retrieved either directly or through the software vendoes website. 
Once a patch is retrieved, its software dependencies are matched to all clients with the 
same requirements. The AVMS prototype has an agent, with a very small footprint, on the 
client's system to deploy patches. The agent can be set to retrieve patches at a particular 
time. The deployment of the patches can be scheduled to avoid any interruption to the 
service in a similar manner to Microsoft's Windows Automatic Update. 
Patch deployment is a semi-manual procedure in that the retrieval is decoupled from 
pushing it out to clients, so that the verification and testing of the patch can occur before it 
is sent out. The client needs to be ready to receive the patches. Depending on the 
scheduling set by the user at the client, the installation of the patches may be delayed until 
a scheduled period. There are two options controlled by the client i. e. silent or active 
downloading and installation modes. 
There is no reporting or bandwidth throttling in the AVMS prototype, because the client 
sets the schedule as to when to receive the patches, it is assumed they would like the 
process to be completed at that stage, and not drawn out by only consuming a certain 
percentage of resources up to that stage. 
In order to make a fair comparison between the AVMS framework prototype, and selected 
available vulnerability products, this section focuses upon selected vulnerability products 
that show a good cross-section of the issues that current solutions are trying to address. 
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This was achieved by examining the publicly available literature about the products, as 
well as by evaluating them in practice where a suitable version was available. The 
commercial products evaluated against a range of criteria which represents a common 
features for these products as follows: 
o Operating System 
Denotes that the Operating System which vulnerability product can operate under. 
9 Notification 
This concerns the ability of the product to provide IT networks with new 
vulnerabilities and of the availability of patches or workarounds for those 
vulnerabilities that are relevant to their networks. 
o Scanner 
Does the product incorporate network scanner that will identify known 
vulnerabilities in operating system and software applications? 
o Agent 
Small software installed in client machines to enable the system administrator or 
server to deploy the patches. 
o Scheduling 
This feature enables system administrator/client to deploy and install the patch in a 
programmed time. 
9 Download management 
Is it possible to configure the manner in which patches are retrieved from vendors? 
For instance, some products offer the ability to prioritize which patches to 
download first. 
e Reporting 
Report the received advisories and the patch installation in the target machine. 
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* Rollback 
This feature enables the system administrator to rollback to the setting that existed 
before a patch was applied, which is useful if a new patch causes any problem to 
the machine. 
e Audit trial 
A record to showing who has accessed a computer system. This feature enables 
system administrators to monitor use of computer system. Also, to show what the 
product has done automatically. 
e Policies 
The ability to allow the configuration of different functions such as who is allowed 
to authorize testing of a patch is complete, who activates deployment to critical 
clients, etc. 
* Resource grouping 
A way to categorize the networks and clients to prioritize the deployment of the 
patches. 
8.2.1 Alert systems 
There are several vulnerability alert systems available in the market, which aim to provide 
the system administrators with early warning alerts for new vulnerabilities. 
8. ZI. I Symantec Deepsight Alert Services 
DeepSight Alert Services offers personalized vulnerability and malicious code alerts. 
These alerts are derived from tracking 18,000 product versions from 2,200 vendors. 
Information is sourced from 150 authoritative sources (SecurityProNews, 2005), and 
integrates Bugtraq as a database of vulnerabilities. 
194 
Chapter 8. - Automated Vulnerability Management System Evalualion 
.1 
?, via "aý -5.3.4 
-dow'46220- 
7 ý1- r 
14-0 '111L . -1 4 
: rrc. 
It I 
r,. j .2 I.,. .I 
ILI3 
ý. ý, "41 ,Uý, ý .ýý. 
W Al 41 
i- -.. ý., a, '. "4, -, - '-, 
ý .. 1.1 .-ý. 
symantec - 
Figure 8.1: DeepSight Alert System web based console 
This database was initially produced by SecurityFocus (Dyer, 2003). The alerts can be 
delivered via email, fax, SMS, and voice alerts (Security P roN ews, 2005, Andress, 2005). 
The alerts can also be routed to different users depending on their rating or the systems 
affected (Symantec, 2004). DeepSight Alert Services uses a web based administration 
console, as shown in Figure 8.1. 
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DeepSight Alert Services Version 6 also allows for XML delivery of vulnerability reports, 
allowing integration with existing helpdesk solutions, such as Remedy Help Desk 
(Symantec, 2004). 
Symantec DeepSight alert services are only a notification system with a web-based 
interface. It relies on a system administrator to download and deploy the patch. 
In comparison to the AVMS framework prototype, both are subject to the availability of 
vulnerability notifications. The notification configuration possibilities, such as SMS and 
alert level notification, are impressive. However, if this is an enterprise class tool, there 
will be dedicated administrators 'on duty', negating the necessity of having to contact 
personnel by any method other than interface alerts. 
Secondly, Symantec is relying mainly on its own resources. While those are considerable, 
they rely on their own experts' evaluation and interpretation of other resources. In 
comparison, the AVMS prototype relies on the resources that apply to the organisation. 
There is no delay between a team of experts finding the data and publication after filtering 
the incoming advisories according to the local configuration by the organisation. With the 
time window from an exploitation release to network compromise decreasing, the time 
taken to identify a real problem is an important consideration. 
Thirdly the setup of matching vulnerabilities to technologies is less well-defined in 
Symantec's product. With the AVMS prototype, the affected software of the vulnerability 
is recorded, and for each client their software profile is recorded. When a check of which 
patches need to be deployed is done, all new vulnerabilities that match any client profile 
will be presented to the administrator. In the case of DeepSight, there is no automatic link 
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between the vulnerability lists and the necessary deployment lists and a vulnerability list 
will need to be set up for either each client configuration or each software version the 
enterprise supports. 
In terms of defending the novelty of this research it is worth noting that DeepSight alert 
services were released in 2002, while the notification part of the AVMS was designed and 
implemented before this point. Further, DeepSight alerts could be a source of information 
for the AVMS. 
8. ZI. 2 SintelliAlert 
Sintelli Alert is a service that aims to deliver information on the latest vulnerability 
advisories to IT organisations. It is a web based application, and therefore no software 
needs to be installed. Each alert issued identifies: 
o The affected system 
* The potential impact 
e The risk to the system 
Sintelli alert provides detailed advice based on the local configuration. The alert provides 
guidance which helps system administrators to prioritise the addressing of vulnerability 
problems (Sintelli, 2005b). 
The Sintelli alerts are derived from tracking 4000 products and 13000 versions. Sintelli has 
used CERT's comprehensive database since 1988, and it is searchable by Name, Bugtraq 
ID and CVE ID. Sintelli alert analyses and then prioritises vulnerabilities according to their 
severity. By contrast, AVMS has a local searchable database. 
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AVMS allows an organisation to decide on the urgency of a particular alert from the 
moment it is received from the releasing alert notifier. The visual criteria of vulnerability, 
as shown in AVMS, explained in Chapter 7, allows the administrator to determine that 
organization's vulnerability with ease. With Sintelli, alerts are delayed by their 
intennediate processing. These alerts are then categorised according to their general risk 
rather than the clients' particular risk pattern. Further, Sintelli relies upon CERT's database 
only, while AVMS uses multiple sources of information. 
Furthermore, the level of information sent to a client varies according to their subscriPtion 
level. For instance, Sintelli has SME and full service products. The alerts sent to SME 
customers are delayed, so that full-service clients have some advantage from that service 
(Sintellli, 2005b). This will hamper the protection that smaller clients receive. By contrast 
AVMS does not make the distinction. 
8.2.2 Automatic updating systems 
Some software vendors have an automatic updating system to support some operating 
systems and applications, which enables home users and system administrators to update 
their systems. The following subsections will discuss Microsoft Update Services. 
8. ZZI Microsoft's Update Services 
Software Update Services have been discussed in chapter 3 as many software vendors use 
this service. Windows Server Update Services, the successor to Software Update Services, 
is also covered. 
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8.2.2.2 Software Update Services 
Software Update Services (SUS) is an agent based system supporting Windows 2000, XP 
and 2003. Data is collected by inspecting configuration files, versions and locations. It 
notifies of potential impact, and patch criticality, and links to Microsoft knowledge base 
publications (NetworkWorld, 2005a). The links to Microsoft's knowledge base gives in- 
depth details on what makes the program vulnerable, how to apply the patch, tile cross- 
checking inforniation as well as the current status of the update. Figure 8.2 illustrates the 
Microsoft Software Update Services window. 
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Figure 8.2: Microsoft Software Update Semices window 
It is more of a patch repository requiring clients to go to the repository to obtain the 
patches they required. It also has no reporting procedures, although these SUS 
shortcomings have now been addressed in the latest versions. Each patch also provides 
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metadata that allows automatic routing to the correct machine (NetworkWorld, 2005a, 
Garcia, 2005a). 
A client needs to run MBSA (Microsoft Baseline Security Analyser) in order to determine 
which patches have been applied (Garcia, 2005a). 
There is no need for an administrator to learn another package as these details are available 
within the AVMS. Similar to the AVMS they both provide security. SUS offers security 
built into the installation package so that if the package is corrupted the package cannot be 
installed, whereas AVMS has the additional measure of checking that the advisory is 
secure by verifying the alert with the PGP key to ensure the authenticity of the sender and 
the integrity of the message. 
8. ZZ3 Windows Server Update Services 
Microsoft has released the first candidate for their new Windows Server Updates Services 
(WSUS). WSUS requires BITS (Background Intelligent Transfer Service) 2.0 to be 
installed separately to utilize the bandwidth throttling options, IIS 5.0 to interface with the 
Automatic Update mechanism and Net Framework 1.1 if WSUS is to be customised for 
the organization to be installed (Aguiluz, 2005). It also needs to run from Windows Server 
2000 SP4 or Windows Server 2003. It provides services for all supported Windows 
operating systems, i. e. from Windows 2000 SP3, and major Microsoft applications such as 
Office, Exchange Server and SQL Server. Many Microsoft applications are still 
unsupported, such as the developer tools and business solutions (Garcia, 2005a, Microsoft, 
2005c). 
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NNISUS now has a configurable bandwidth allocator. This allocater configures the arnount 
of bandwidth that will be used by the service in order to deploy patches. This allows the 
systern to continue to be usable while the transfer is taking place. It uses BITS to 
intelligently determine how far previous downloads had reached and where the transfer is 
to recommence from (Garcia, 2005a). 
Servers are configured in a parent-child relationship to detennIne where the patches are 
inherited from (Garcia, 2005a). This allows children with a configured WSUS parent 
server to inherit updates from that server rather than downloading the patch from Microsoft 
again. Figure 83 illustrates the WSUS window. 
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Figure 8.3: Windows Server Update Services 
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WSUS uses the group policy administrator to determine rights. This may require 
administrators to have greater rights than is now normally the case in order to deploy 
patches. This can make it difficult to deploy patches quickly (Garcia, 2005a). This is 
problematic from either viewpoint. The first is to have the administrators rights escalated 
when they are deploying patches; this adds another procedure to be undertaken when 
patches are being deployed. The alternative is to generally grant access rights in excess of 
what is actually required, giving leeway for errors, intentioned or not, to cause greater 
damage (Garcia, 2005a). 
In comparison to these servers (which are only available for MS windows), AVMS gives 
coverage to a much wider range of operating systems. Also, it actively retrieves packages 
from the vendor and sends the patches to clients that need them, rather than waiting for 
them to decide when to update their machine. This is an important consideration in view of 
the short vulnerability exploitation times that have been seen. 
However, WSUS does not address some of the issues that were apparent in SUS. In 
particular this is the concern with the range of operating systems and applications that 
patches can be deployed for, making it necessary for the organisation to have multiple 
systems to cover all platforms they need to support. 
In comparison to AVMS, WSUS has incorporated some advantages over it, in particular, 
the bandwidth allocator function, and the interrupted patch downloading recommencement. 
However, there would be no research-related challenge in adding such functionality to 
AVMS. 
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As mentioned in chapter 3, the automatic update risks have not been completely addressed 
either. There is an optional component to specify the update server to be used with user 
credentials. However, it is up to the administrator to still check that the source of the 
updates is a valid source. It is possible for the user to select basic authentication, allowing 
their password to be sent in clear text as shown in Figure 8.3, which defeats the security of 
the system. 
8.23 Patch management systems 
Patch management systems attempt to address the issue of having vulnerable systems 
affected by previously addressed vulnerabilities. Ideally, these systems give the 
organization an early warning of which patches have been issued, which of their systems 
are at risk, and where the patch has been deployed to. 
8. Z3.1 Computer Associates eTrust 
e-Trust Vulnerability Manager r8 (VM) is an appliance based vulnerability management 
solution. The appliance is a scanner based on proprietary technology to verify the network 
assets attached to the organizations networks. The management solution advises on 
vulnerabilities and current system settings. Figure 8.4 illustrates eTrust vulnerability 
manager console (Read-Miller, 2004; CA, 2004; NetworkWorld, 2005b). 
203 
Chapter 8. - Aulomated Vulnerability ManagementSystem Evaluation 
Shooting Reskial: I to IS of Is 
1 A t 4 D U*k A1 .r . 
TT 
P. V"d. j 
Ope'l 16 Vandar MW, tgo 2,4142,27499 ""t 27962 1 
rq, ý; "J-4 Provided 
sor, icas 
%rd fdm,, n 
.4 C-p- 
f ope. I V4.40, ý4,1, Isew Tr 
Provided ý*". Ceq 
0004 L5 . 4-111,27322 IT 
atta)l 
Pro, idild sw, ic*4 
.. 'altoll ope. I1 11,71" 
pri., ided 
Open L Volmdor 00410,4140.315W IT 
1 pre'aded Tonteal 
ft go, tow to I L opeft 12 11ý-.. 1, , VerdD, 23238 1 
)1 
E: ODOM ZZ083 IT 
C: oDel 11. ??, M 
Provided ýOnwcl 
wo 1*6344 ils, C Ap*, V0,4t., "-A-- IT 
Provided S, 8ý1*00 
LAW em"; C APON 13 Vonds, kuj. - 24012 1 tr IA41 stalks* Jk- rmijod Stir 
Figure 8.4: eTrust vulnerability manager (CA. 2004) 
The appliance scans the network to make an inventory of all machines and operating 
systems. It identifies what software is running on the target systems, the patches issued and 
an), vulnerability discovered. These assets can then be grouped based on their risk profile 
and appropriate privileges assigned. VM correlates the inventory with the vulnerability 
database to identify vulnerabilities to be addressed. VM allows the marking of 
vulnerabilities according to the status of the affected systems within the organization. that 
is an urgent vulnerability for a system that is only used at month end would have its 
urgency reduced within that organization. The marking is recorded allowing an audit trail 
of patch status. Execution and access can be restricted by time scheduling. There is a 
download management feature as well as a common console allowing the deployment ot 
all patches from within a group, for example a test group prior to final deployment (Read- 
Miller, 2004; CA, 2004-, NetworkWorld, 2005b). 
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Clients can specify whether they want to receive vulnerability notifications by the hour or 
day. The notifications are produced by CA's Security Advisory Team, a global 240 
research team (CA, 2004). 
VM works for Windows XP and 2003, HP-Ux, AIX, and Solaris. Data is collected by 
scanning configuration settings and binary file checksums (Read-Miller, 2004; 
NetworkWorld, 2005b). 
Audit trails of what has been done can be annotated by the system users with 
administration notes possibly improving the patch management process. There is full 
reporting capabilities with ad-hoc queries supported when additional information is 
required. 
An issue with this application is that VM does not come with preset policies. They need to 
be handcrafted, increasing the learning curve for the application and the amount of time it 
will take on administration. Another issue is that processes are treated as users, increasing 
the number of objects needing administration under the policies (DeMaria, 2004). 
By comparison, AVMS does not do scans of which machines are on the network(s), or 
which software is running on the networks. However, AVMS does not restrict the 
operating systems for which it will notify on. Further, AVMS does not require complicated 
authorisation processes in order to functions. 
AVMS similarly provides mechanisms for scheduled deployment of updates. AVMS 
provides straightforward audit trails, as does VM. However AVMS does not provide 
mechanisms to annotate these reports. 
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8.2.3.2 Shavlik Technologies LLC HFNetChkPro 5 
lJl`NetChkPro, prior to version 5 had versions for different company size. From version 5, 
there is a standard package \, vith a pricing model of $25 per seat for oranizations' buying 
up to 100 seats. The Shavlik engine is used by many other patch management vendors 
such as Microsoft and Symantec. The HFNetChkPro illustrated in Figure 8.5 
(N et-work World, 2004b, Garcia, 2005b). 
There are no agents on the clients. It supports Linux, Windows NT4, XP, and 2003. 
Sliax7lik are extending support to HP-UX, Solaris, RedHat and AIX (NetworkWorld, 
'1004b. Garcia. 2005b. Datamonitor, 2005). 
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Figure 8.5: Shavlik HFNetChkPro5 console 
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Scans can be grouped by Active Directory Organizational (windows only) Unit or IP 
address range. Data is collected from configuration settings, binary file checksums, 
fingerprints and file versions. It checks the running software, disabled software, patches 
issued, vulnerabilities discovered and remediation steps the administrator should undertake 
(NetworkWorld, 2004b; Garcia, 2005b). 
The console shows which patches are required, available, or not installable. It alerts on the 
potential impact, criticality of the patch, and all files in the patch. There is bandwidth 
throttling. The scans and patch distribution can be scheduled. Distribution servers are 
controlled from a centralized console, via replication. Firewalls, such as XP SP2, may 
however block HFNetChk probes (NetworkWorld, 2005a; Garcia, 2005b). 
Twenty-one report types, giving a large spectrum of information, are available including 
machine inventory, patches by machine and deployment status. The reports can be web- 
accessible to allow up to date information to be disseminated. Authentication, however, is 
not built in to have the reports grouped by departments reducing their usefulness as far as 
individual departments are concerned (Garcia, 2005b). 
As previously mentioned, AVMS does not do checksums to determine the current patched 
state of software. It does have mechanisms to show which patches are critical and which 
have been deployed. It does not have extensive reporting facilities, as this was considered a 
less important aspect to focus upon from a research perspective. 
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8.2.4 Comparison results 
Table 8.1 illustrates the theoretical comparison between vulnerability products and the 
AVMS prototype system. AVMS has been developed to attempt to address some of the 
realities of organizations in todays world. Organizations. as detailed in Chapter 7, wish to 
diminish the amount of time devoted to patch management. In this respect. knowing that a 
vulnerability exists, that a patch is available, that the patch is available locally. and where a 
patch needs to be deployed are important criteria. 
Productý \ 
Sintelli Symantec DeepSight Computer Microsoft 
I 
Microsoft Sha%lik AVMS 
Alerts Associates NN SUS SUS Alert 
C Criteria riteria 
Windows Windows Linux, 
Windows, 2000 SP3, 2000, Windows, 
Operating N/A Window's 
HP-Ux, Office, 2003 and HP-UX, Windows 
SN'stems AIX, Exchange, XP Solaris, 
Solaris SQL Redl lat 
Server AIX. 
Notification Yes Yes No No No No Yes 
Scanner No No Yes No No No No 
Agents No No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Scheduling No No No Yes Yes Yes Some 
Download 
No No No Yes Partial No Yes 
managemen 
Reporting No No Yes Some No Yes No 
Rollback No No No No No No No 
Audit trail No No Yes No No No Internal 
Policies No No Yes Yes 0 No No 
Resource 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
grouping 
Table 8.1: Theoretical comparison result 
To the first point knowing that a vulnerability exists and the second point that a patch is 
available, AVMS accepts the addition of all vulnerability publications an organization 
wishes to subscribe to. Thus it does not limit the operating systems that can be tracked 
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through it. This is an important consideration in terms of the number of operating systems 
and packages a typical organization has. Secondly, the organization can be assured that 
they arc notiricd as soon as the information is published and mailed. Thirdly, the patch is 
downloaded and available at the organization as soon as the subscription email is 
processed in AVMS. While some may %%ish to wait until a third party such as Symantec or 
Computer Associates has tested a patch, those groups do not test every combination of 
products and platforms and deployment options before releasing the patch as acceptable. It 
remains the organization's responsibility to do their own testing with their local 
configurations. Thus this point of AVMS is not adding any vulnerability to the 
organization. 
AVIAS is designed to be modified by the system administmtor in a flexible way i. e. to 
modify vulnerability source or to change the depth of the downloader in navigating to 
search for patches. While the available vulnerability solutions, rely on the vendor to update 
databases and modification. 
8.3 Practical validation of Prototype 
Having considered validation from the theoretical perspective, it is relevant to now 
consider the performance validation. 
Ten different advisory mailing lists were subscribed to and 316 emails were received from 
28 different email addresses, of which 268 were accepted as shown in Table 8.2. The major 
reason for emails not to be accepted, as is the case for CVE, is that within AVMS 
legitimate alert addresses need to be registered. Thus if an alert is received from a different 
address (US-CERT Community), "MS will not recognise that this is a subscribed alert 
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when the registered address was cert-advisory@cert. org. This protects AVMS from sparn 
and spoofcd e-mail. If an email is received from a craficd source, either the PGP signature 
%%ill not be valid, and that email will be highlighted in the email window, or the email will 
not 'code' to the processing rules captured for that source of cmails, and its data will not be 
proccsscd. 
In the final test, 268 cmails were loaded into the database in 5 minutes. Various filters were 
applied to test the correct emails were displayed. Fifty software items were entered into the 
systcm, split across four vcndors. 
Vendor Email 
addresses 
PGP Key Emails rec'd 
Emails 
accepted 
Red Hat 6 Yes 197 181 
Microsoft 2 Yes 18 18 
SuSE 11 Yes 24 5 
CERT 2 Yes 21 21 
SANS I No 20 16 
Linux 4 Yes 26 26 
CVE 2 No 4 
Table 8.2: AVAIS test result 
Eleven emails were tested through the downloader system, which resulted in 40 patch 
download records being created. The downloaded patches matched to different vendor 
soft-A-are descriptions. 
Two clients were set up with varying software profiles. They were set up with 2 
respectively - Windows NT 4.0 and Windows XP for the first and Windows XP and 
Internet Explorer 6.0. Six patches were successfully delivered in single and bulk patches to 
a client, and were installed. 'Ibis tested the client and deployment engines work, as 
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described in Chapter 7. Ibis demonstrates the abilities of AVMS to correctly deploy only 
the required patches to clients. 
8.3.1 Defccts 
In analyzing the results obtained from the operations of the prototype, some deficiencies 
were noted. While these did not compromise the aims of the prototype, their resolution 
uill makc a morc complac and flexiblc application. 
&3.1.1 41fulti-ralued dependency evaluation 
In the original specifications; of this prototype system, particularly during the data design 
phase, AVNIS was designed according to the available advisories format. With dynamic 
changes in advisory format by vendors it was necessary to modify AVMS to be compatible 
, %%ith any future changes in advisory format. For instance in AVMS"s context, alert 
providers cover soft,, A-are from many vendors, which in turn relates to many client software 
configurations. In the case of getting multiple advisories (from different sources) relating 
to the same issue, the AVMS is programmatically resolving the issue. For instance, if more 
than one advisory links to the same patch, including name, the patch will only be retrieved 
once. However, if the patch is located at a different URL, that they arc duplicates will not 
be recognized, and both will be retrieved and flagged for forwarding to clients with 
matching soffivare processes. 
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that these work&rounds do not remove the vulnerability from the 
system, and they will limit funýtjonality. Please consult the 
'Norkarounds for JPEG Vulnerability - CAN-2004-0200* section of 
Microsoft Security bulletin K504-026. 
Appendix A. References 
Microsoft Security bulletin M504-0.28 - 
<http: //nicrosoft. con/technet/security/bulletin/MS04-028. a3 > 
Microsoft End User Security Bulletin for MS04-028 - 
'http 'i aicro3oft. couj'3ecurltyiýbuiletins/200409 3peg. mspx> 
US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU0297462 - 
ýhttp / www. tb. cort. org/vuls/id/297462> 
Microsoft KB Article 973374 - 
<http. iisujpp4ýrt. micresoft. ccei7id-873374> 
CVZ CAM-2004-0200 - 
<bttp-/, 'cve. sitre. org/cgi-bin/cverume. cgi? naae-CAN-2004-0200> 
AW*n4ix S. Affectod Hiccosoft Pcoducts 
The following Microsoft Products are affected: 
Microsoft Office XP S*rvic* Pack 3 
Microsoft office XP service Pack 2 
Microsoft office XP software; 
" Outlook 2002 
" Ibord 2002 
" Excel 2002 
" PowerPoint 2002 
" FrontPage 2002 
" Publisher 2002 
Mi,: t-Asoft Office 2003 
Microsoft office 2003 Software: 
" outlook 2003 
" Nord 2003 
" Excel 2003 
" PowerPoint 2003 
" frontPag* 2003 
" Publisher 2003 
" IntoPath 2001 
" onemote 2003 
. 11-1--f, D. -I lanl 4-- D. -k, 1 1.11 -. -. 1 
Figure 8.6: Affected products in CERT advisory 
I-Lirther. more intelligent decoding ot'which soft,, vare relates to , Nhich patch is required. At 
tile moment. if the page the patch is on reters to more than one patch and those patches 
hme different software profiles, there is no intelligence as to which software relates to 
%%hich patch. As can be seen from the CERT Advisory in Figure 8.6. five patches are 
mentioned. and man), affected products but there is no intrinsic tie between the two. Such 
issues , %ould be resolved over time if the generic reporting format was adopted as a 
standardised approach. 
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8.3.1.2 URL navigation controllerfacility required 
This depth navigation is different from the depth navigation in the download subsystem. 
Ile depth level mentioned there relates to the number of pages down from the relevant 
URL that link-suill be colicctcd from. 
For instance, in the Nlicrosoft Security Bulletin summary for December 2004 (12/2/04) 
there arc many links provided. Links 5 through to II do not actually relate to the security 
bulletin. Link 3 requires manual selection to go to a specific country page. Only the first 
two links have alcrt related information. In this case the first one can be retrieved by the 
start scan and end scan mechanism, as shown in the following list: 
1. http: //go. micror. oft. com/f%viinld? l, inkld=38912 
2. ii-ttp: /Igo. microsoft. com/fivlink/? I, inkld=38912 
3. iFttp: Hsupport. microsoft. com/common/international. aspx 
4. Tit-tp: /A"%--tv. microsoft. com/technet/securitN, /-.; ecnews/default. mspx 
5. ii-ttp: /A%-w-. v. microsoft. com 
6. -*%-ivw. microsoft. com/technet/securitvilow/hulletin/summaiT. mspx 
7. iv, %viv. microsoft. com/technet/securit-*, /builetin/summaiN. mspx 
8. http: /A, *,, %%-%v. microsoft. com/securi4, /Protect/ 
9. http: //i%-i,. -iv. microsoft. com/technet/securitv/topics/policv/s, %vdist. mspx 
10. http: /A%-i%-iv. microsoft. com/misc/tinsubscribe. htm 
11. littp: /Aiiviv. microsoft. com/info/let! alinfo/default. mspx 
Without any mechanism to control how far into a site to navigate, a link such as link 5 
could lead to an attempt to traverse the whole of Microsoft to find a patch. So in this case 
because this is a top level link- it urill not even be stored on the patch file. The word 
security is on the allowable words list though, and this link would be stored on the file to 
be traversed by the downloader to look for a valid patch. 
So to control which links to navigate, AVMS has two mechanisms. The first is to limit the 
types of URLs navigated by their depth, i. e. the number of back slashes they contain. No 
top level URLs, such as "www. microsoft. com", will be traversed, but 
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"http: //www. microsoft. com/technet/Security/default. mspx" will be. The second is to limit 
the kind of URLs navigated. Allowable words are used, such as technet and security, to 
detennine the likely applicability of the URL. Thus 
"http: //www. microsoft. com/technet/Security/default. mspx" would be deemed applicable 
while link II from the previous list would not. 
However, at present there is no user interface to manipulate the words that control whether 
a URL will be collected in the search for patches. Adding too many words, to this list can 
potentially exponentially increase the number of URLs navigated to in the endeavor to find 
a patch. 
Further there should possibly be a facility to control which level to navigate from. Thus if 
the URL in the email, or from a previous collection, is at the top or the next level of a site 
it will not be navigated to. It should also be considered whether this should be a vendor 
level parameter. 
8.4 The recent vulnerability solutions 
This section discusses the recent vulnerability solutions from the marketplace that AVMS 
is in competition with, and as such may need to have functionality added to the prototype. 
8.4.1 Vulnerability solution marketplace 
In chapters 3 and the previous sections in this chapter, there has been some discussion of 
how the vulnerability management solutions marketplace has changed since this project 
was initially designed. The scope of each solution marketed is increasing, and more and 
more facilities are being added to either the package or complementary packages 
developed. 
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8.4.1.1 Alert system marketplace 
The alert service has grown in recent years; there are several alert systems available in the 
market and most of them provide personalized configuration. Alert systems are important 
in addressing awareness problem. The details of how these systems work at present have 
been discussed in chapter 3 and some commercial alert products have been discussed in 
chapter 8. 
8.4.1.2 Automatic updating ch anges 
There have been advances in automatic updating. A large part of this is linked to providing 
the ability to group resources. Thus all Windows systems where SQL was a prime required 
resource could be put into one group, and any SQL patches could be sent to all those 
systems just by sending it to the group and thus automatically dispatched to all the 
concemed systems. 
In tenns of ever shorter windows of opportunity taking preventative actions, and ever 
larger groups of servers occurring in organizations, it was necessary to be able to push 
verified patches to as many resources as possible in as short a time as possible. New 
facilities in packages such as Microsoft WSUS allow intennediate WSUS servers to be 
used, so that once the patch is approved from the central server, the sub servers can begin 
to push the patch to those resources allocated to them. This allows better use of the 
bandwidth from each server rather than trying to update whole farms from a single server. 
This is an improvement of services to the vendors' clients by recognising what the 
organizations' needs are. In the future the push may be that support for a wider range of 
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operating systems occurs because of the diverse operating systems existing within 
companies. 
8.4.1.3 Vithierability reportingfacilities 
Over the last two years most vendors of vulnerability applications have addressed the 
completeness of their reports. The increased availability of reports shows more detail to the 
auditing of vulnerability management. It is now easier to determine what the status of 
network resource groups is regarding the patches that have been applied to them and the 
current vulnerabilities in that system. 
These reporting updates include having the reports available from an intranet site which 
can be filtered by the group accessing the report. This allows concentration on issues that 
directly concem that group. 
8.4.1.4 Merging of alert awareness andpatch management 
Recently some security software developers have merged alert systems and patch 
management systems. For instance, Symantec's DeepSight Alert services now have 
companion products ON Watch and Threat Management. The Alert services primarily push 
vulnerability advisories to the customer. The ON Watch service allows tracking of patches 
received and updated. The Threat Management service allow the customer to see which 
threats are active. 
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8.5 Conclusions 
The notification system of AVMS was the first to be implemented. The personalized 
vulnerability alerts were not available at that time; Symantec released DeepSight alert 
services in 2002. 
The results from the theoretical validation have illustrated that the available vulnerability 
resolution systems in the market solve the problem partially. None of the products 
evaluated provide a comprehensive solution (i. e. addressing both notification and 
rectification via a single environment). 
There is more focus by organizations in checking the status of their systems as a part of 
their total risk management. It can be seen from the commercial products that there is a 
much wider and deeper range of report options now available including audit trails. AVMS 
already records which patches are retrieved and when they are sent to clients in order to 
make producing reports a natural progression. 
The AVMS prototype has successfully achieved the objectives of providing a 
comprehensive solution to tackle vulnerabilities, including notification and rectification by 
automating the process. 
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9.1 Achievements of the research programme 
The research programme has met all of the objectives originally specified in chapter 1, 
with new conceptual and practical work being undertaken. The specific achievements 
were: 
1. The vulnerability taxonomy has been formulated (chapter 2), which identifies the 
vulnerability types and maps them to classifications used in the generic 
vulnerability format. Chapter 2 continued by describing the vulnerability life cycle, 
and vulnerability exploitation. 
2. 'Me limitations of existing vulnerability approaches were established, i. e. the 
limitations of vulnerability assessment tools, alerting systems, automatic updating 
systems and patch management systems (chapters 3 and 8). 
3. The scale of the vulnerability problem was established in chapter 4 with an analysis 
of the vulnerability statistics, and the problem was benchmarked in a reference 
enviromnent. 
4. A high level analysis of different vulnerability advisory formats has been 
undertaken, leading to the establishments of a generic vulnerability advisory 
format, with a full description of the elements (chapter 5). 
S. The Automated Vulnerability Management System (AVMS) framework has been 
designed and developed (chapter 6 and 7). The comprehensive framework is based 
upon the use of the proposed generic vulnerability format. 
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6. A theoretical and practical validation of the prototype has been achieved (chapter 
8). It was demonstrated that AVMS was capable of addressing vulnerability 
management problems in real-world scenarios. 
As a result of these achievements the following contributions to knowledge have been 
made: 
* Enabling understanding of the practical overhead of management 
vulnerability problem contributed by benchmarking study. 
* Proving the feasibility of automating the vulnerability management process. 
Several papers relating to the research programme have been published at refereed 
conferences and in international journals, (copies of which arc provided in Appendix A), 
and have received positive comments from delegates and reviewers. As such, it is believed 
that the research has made a valid and useful contribution to the IT security field, and 
specifically in the context of vulnerability management solutions. 
9.2 Limitations of the research 
Although the objectives of the research programme have been met, it is nevertheless 
possible to identify a number of limitations associated with the work. The main limitations 
of this programme are listed below. 
1. The difference in vulnerability advisory formats. Some advisories provide direct 
download links to the patch such as SuSE, and some other advisories do not 
provide direct links such as Microsoft. In addition some advisories provide multi 
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patch downloads. This limitation would be resolved by the wider adoption and use 
of the generic vulnerability reporting fonnat. 
2. Vulnerability advisories do not provide enough information such as vulnerability 
type, impact of the vulnerability etc., in some advisories it is buried within the text. 
As can be seen in the mailbox views of AVMS, there are many parameters that are 
not populated at all because the information is not provided in a format that the 
rules section can decipher (as described in chapter 5). 
3. The AVMS has been modified to tackle the problem of dynamic changes in 
vulnerability advisory format in future. The system administrator should review 
the rules processing for each vendor regularly to modify it to match the advisory 
format changes. 
4. AVMS was implemented on a Windows platform. It has not been tested on other 
operating systems. 
5. The lack of a practical evaluation of AVMS by security administrators within 
operational networks. This would have enabled a more comprehensive analysis of 
system performance in real time, along with qualitative feedback from security 
administrators. 
Despite these limitations, the research programme has provided sufficient proof of concept 
for the ideas proposed. 
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9.3 Suggestions and scope for future work 
It is possible to identify a number of areas in which future work could be conducted to 
build upon what was undertaken in this project. A number of ideas have already been 
covered in the previous chapters. These areas, together with new ones are surnmarised 
below. 
1. As explained previously (chapter 8), key words are used to determine whether a 
link within an advisory will be used to search for patches available to address the 
advised problem. There should be a user interface, possibly within the AVMS 
options, to add or remove the words that indicate where patches are likely to be 
located. The accuracy of this word list will affect the number of URLs navigated to 
search for patches. 
2. In building the prototype, it became evident that some areas had not been covered 
in sufficient depth. It also demonstrated the degree to which human intervention is 
still required until a more sophisticated text interpretation model is built to manage 
the diversity of terms used in advisories and the manner in which different vendors 
handle patches. It is possible that this difficulty will be resolved as more vendors 
adopt a standard fonnat, such as the generic vulnerability fonnat which was 
proposed in this research (chapter 5) or the syntax advocated by CVE, to pass on 
infonnation about the vulnerability and its corrective actions. A part of this is 
mentioned in the previous area of further rules development. If an email is 
decoded, and there is no relevant data found for a particular area there is no 
feedback to the operator that this vendor's emails should be re-examined to 
determine a more accurate set of rules for decoding the email. If the email display 
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is examined it can be seen that there are many emails that do not have criteria 
entries. 
3. The framework must ensure the validity of the patches and workarounds that it tries 
to apply, so as to prevent the rectification agent being misused by hackers as a 
means of getting the target system to accept malicious code. For instance AVMS 
should check the MD5 check sum supplied with Linux downloads. (MD5 is a 
method for creating a 128 bit long message digest). It is forwarded with the link for 
the patch and can be used to verify that the package downloaded is the one advised. 
Microsoft patches have inbuilt checks, as described in Chapter 7, that use 
checksums to ensure the patch package downloaded is the package originally 
created. 
4. In the current situation the network inventory is collected and updated manually. 
This process would be unsustainable in large networks. Adding an inventory 
system to the AVMS will automate this process. This would explore the software 
and hardware added to the network and compare it to prior network traversals. 
Inconsistencies should be reported. Where new machines are discovered, they need 
to be confirmed as valid machines for the network, by integrating inventory system 
data to the AVMS database. After that their software profile needs to be added to 
AVMS to deploy future patches to them. 
5. Adding a formal method for accessing the logs created in error reporting. At 
present AVMS logs errors into files organised in folders by month and then logs by 
day. However, there is no method within AVMS for reviewing these logs. This 
should be incorporated into AVMS and is particularly important for patches that 
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have not been successfully sent to clients or not retrieved from the links sent in 
advisories. 
6. The AVMS can be evaluated by MSc projects, with future students conducting 
appropriate work in that area. 
9.4 The future of vulnerability management 
The explosive growth of IT networks has increased beyond any expectation. The number 
of discovered vulnerabilities is increasing. The fact that network administrators are unable 
to tackle the vulnerability problem in a secure manner demonstrates that comprehensive 
vulnerability management system is required. 
17his research has emphasised the existence and increasing scale of the vulnerability 
problem in IT systems, and has focused upon addressing the need for a comprehensive 
vulnerability management system. The existing approaches (such as assessment tools, 
alerting systems, automatic updating systems and patch management systems) are 
insufficient to tackle the vulnerability problem. Instead a comprehensive vulnerability 
management system is required to notify the system administrator with the relevant 
advisories and prioritise them according to the local network configuration. Such a system 
would have to adopt a generic vulnerability format, and mediate the differences between 
vendor vulnerability formats. In addition to notification, the system would also have to 
rectify vulnerabilities in a trusted and timely manner. 
In conclusion, the research presented in this thesis has addressed a number of vulnerability 
issues. A framework has been developed to read the incoming advisories and then filter 
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and prioritise them. An automated agent acts upon these messages by downloading the 
patches from the vendor websites and then the system administrator can test the patches 
before deploying them to networked machines. The research has made a tangible 
contribution in this area. 
Vulnerability resolution will remain a crucial factor in protecting IT systems. A 
comprehensive vulnerability management system will help in addressing this important 
issue in IT security and minimise the exploitation of IT systems in the future. 
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